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editorial
Dear Readers,
Since 2010, there has been a significant shift toward creating
foundations that have a defined endpoint. According to one estimate,1 about 19 percent of family foundations established between
2010 and 2014 plan to spend out their endowments, compared
to only 3 percent of those created before 1970. The U.S.’s biggest
foundation is a limited-life foundation — the Gates Foundation is
set to close 20 years after the death of the donors.
Limited-life (also known as sun-setting, or spend-down) foundations have some things in common with perpetual foundations
that are exiting a line of work. Beginning in the late 1990’s
with the rise of strategic philanthropy, many perpetual foundations began funding time-limited strategic initiatives. The
Skillman Foundation in Detroit, for example, funded the “Good
Neighborhoods” initiative for more than ten years, ending in 2016.

Teri Behrens

Both of these situations — ending the foundation or ending a line of work — create a specific set of
challenges. What is the best way to exit and leave in place strong organizations, networks, and fields
that can continue to achieve positive results for their communities? How do you preserve the knowledge and intellectual assets of the foundation? How do you manage foundation staff in the context of a
spend-down or ending support for the line of work they are passionate about? How does the foundation
ensure that the organizations in which they have invested will continue to honor the intent of the funding? How do you create partnerships with other funders, including government?
As new foundations are choosing to limit their lifespans and perpetual foundations continue to fund
work in targeted, limited-time initiatives, their effectiveness at addressing these and other questions
has a significant impact on the nonprofit landscape. It requires that, more than ever, nonprofits think of
philanthropy as seed capital rather than on-going support. It requires that exiting foundations are extra
diligent about mission alignment. It requires greater collaboration among funders. It requires creative
approaches to human resources.

"Trends in Family Philanthropy." National Center for Family Philanthropy 11/02/2015.

1
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Fred Smith (2016) shared a compelling metaphor for what ideally happens when a foundation ends its
grantmaking:
If I knew I was setting an end date, I would call it dissolution — but not in the way that term is normally
used… When salt dissolves, it is absorbed and assimilated into the body… It becomes an integral
part of the body, and long after we consume it, the effects remain…
That is how I see the most important work of a foundation. If we do our work right, we will do more
than invest in a community or make financial gifts that evaporate when we are no longer there.
Rather, we dissolve and the things that are truly lasting — our values, our way of seeing opportunities, our relationships, our non-financial contributions — become a lasting part of the community in
which we live (para. 4–6).

The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation
have co-sponsored this special issue of The Foundation Review on Exit Strategies to expand what we
know about how to achieve that lasting impact.
Gienapp, Reisman, Shorr, and Arbreton describe the findings from a time-bound initiative of the
Hewlett Foundation on nuclear security and how learning from that initiative has influenced how they
think about exiting other fields of work.
Foundations have often proposed that their role is to pilot interventions, with government funding then
taking over support for successful approaches. Knox and Quirk share the experience of exiting work in
Northern Ireland and partnering with government as the exit strategy.
While many foundations now appreciate the importance of bringing evaluation in at the beginning of
an initiative, thinking about how to conduct evaluations at the end of an initiative poses its own challenges. Beadnell, Djang, Vanslyke, Masters, and Anderson conducted a “sunset evaluation” and share
some of their methodologies.
Kibbe draws on interviews of grantmakers and grantees to identify areas in which foundations can
improve their exit practices, offering a summary of advice from both perspectives.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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editorial

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

As part of exiting out of the Building Health Communities initiative, the California Endowment
commissioned a research project to identify effective exit practices. Yu, Jhawar, and Berman report
on the results of this national scan.
Halverstadt and Kerman share the emerging hypotheses of two foundations, The Atlantic
Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation — each four years from sunset — about the
opportunities and challenges for evaluation in the limited-life context.
The issue includes an interview with Marie Columbo, director for strategic evaluation and learning
at the Skillman Foundation, about the unique challenges of exiting place-based work.
We conclude with personal reflections from Debra Joy Perez about the role of relationships in exiting.
We hope these articles inspire our readers to plan their exits to be both graceful and impactful.

Teresa R. Behrens, Ph.D.
Editor in Chief, The Foundation Review
Director, Institute for Foundation and Donor Learning,
Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy at Grand Valley State University
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Anne Gienapp, M.P.A., and Jane Reisman, Ph.D., ORS Impact; and David Shorr, M.P.A.,
and Amy Arbreton, Ph.D., William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Keywords: Summative evaluation, advocacy evaluation, time-bound investment, philanthropic exit, nuclear security

Introduction
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s
Nuclear Security Initiative (NSI) began as an
exploratory grant in 2007, and was extended into
a seven-year, $24.7 million initiative when the
foundation’s leadership saw a window of opportunity and the potential to make a significant
impact within a relatively short time. The initiative was sunset in 2015.
The Hewlett Foundation currently organizes
its grantmaking within five core program areas
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, n.d.).
Like many foundations, Hewlett pursues opportunities for impact beyond its primary program
areas, reserving funds each year to support
what it calls “special projects.” These projects
— including one-time grants or multiyear initiatives — are not required to align neatly with
existing program goals, but must adhere to
the framework (now called Outcome-Focused
Philanthropy) that guides all of Hewlett’s strategic work.
Once funded, special projects are often renewed
or extended over several years, so it can be easy
to lose sight of an impending end point. Such
was the case with the NSI: partnerships had
developed, momentum built, and expectations
arose as the initiative was extended over seven
years. Uncertainty among Hewlett staff, grantees, and co-funders about when the initiative
would end led to disappointment within and outside the foundation when the NSI exit strategy
began to take shape.

Key Points
•• As its seven-year Nuclear Security Initiative
wound down in late 2014, the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation engaged ORS
Impact to conduct a summative evaluation.
That evaluation yielded insights pertinent to
future work on nuclear security and other
fields where policy-related investments,
strategies, and goals are prioritized, as well
as insights regarding Hewlett’s approach to
the initiative exit.
•• During the life of the initiative, significant
changes in the geopolitical landscape
influenced both the relevance and the
expected pace of advancement of its
established goals and targets. Rather than
focusing on whether identified targets had
been achieved in a narrow “success/failure”
framework, the evaluation explored where
and how Hewlett’s investments and actions
made a difference and where meaningful
progress occurred over the seven years of
investment. Evaluation findings highlighted
contributions and areas of progress that had
not been explicitly anticipated or specifically
identified in the initiative’s theory of change.
•• This article describes the initiative and
its theory of change, evaluation methods
and approaches, findings, and how these
informed the foundation’s planning for
initiative exits and approach to measurement of time-bound investments. Although
time-bound philanthropic initiatives are a
well-established practice, the approach
merits closer examination in order to discern
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and
wind down these types of investments.
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The initial Nuclear Security
Initiative investments
occurred at a time when
many philanthropies were
shifting from more traditional
grantmaking to bolder
approaches — sometimes
called “big bets” — that were
often designed to address
complex, systemic issues
and achieve meaningful
social or environmental
change. A common belief
in the philanthropic sector
was that with a high degree
of accountability to impact,
foundations could surgically
and successfully realize
ambitious goals within a
reasonable time period.
As the NSI drew to a close in late 2014, Hewlett
engaged ORS Impact to conduct a summative
evaluation. Although the NSI included specific
goals and targets, the foundation team and evaluators determined that summative evaluation
would not focus narrowly on assessing whether
or not these had been achieved. Instead, evaluation sought to document how and where
Hewlett’s investments made a substantive difference during the seven-year NSI, where meaningful progress occurred, and how Hewlett’s exit
was perceived by the field. The timing of ORS
Impact’s evaluation offered a rich opportunity for
the foundation’s leadership and program staff to
8 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

deepen understanding about both philanthropic
approaches and monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) in the context of a time-bound initiative.
Although time-bound philanthropic initiatives
are a well-established practice, the approach
merits closer examination in order to discern
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and
wind down these types of investments. This
article describes the NSI evaluation along with
how findings informed Hewlett’s philanthropic
approach, and provides a case example of a philanthropic-initiative exit. Key considerations for
M&E practices that are particular to the context
of philanthropic investments where an exit is
planned are also presented.

Overview of the Nuclear
Security Initiative
Security issues are not a central element in the
Hewlett Foundation’s main programs, though
it has a history of funding special projects in the
peace and security space in response to perceived
opportunities. At the time the NSI was launched
in early 2008, the foundation assessed that nearterm gains on pressing policy issues were possible, presenting a ripe opportunity for impact.
The initial NSI investments occurred at a
time when many philanthropies were shifting
from more traditional grantmaking to bolder
approaches — sometimes called “big bets” —
that were often designed to address complex,
systemic issues and achieve meaningful social or
environmental change. A common belief in the
philanthropic sector was that with a high degree
of accountability to impact, foundations could
surgically and successfully realize ambitious
goals within a reasonable time period (Brest,
2011). At the NSI’s inception, Hewlett’s philosophy of grantmaking was guided by this point of
view, an approach known as “strategic philanthropy” (Brest & Harvey, 2008).
The NSI had a bold, aspirational goal to reduce
the risk of a nuclear disaster by a discernable
margin. The initiative encompassed three main
strategy areas, each one large and complex in its

The Legacy of a Philanthropic Exit

FIGURE 1 Overview of NSI Strategy Areas

Results

own right and each with numerous ambitious
policy targets.1 (See Figure 1.)

that a time-bound investment could be successfully and precisely calibrated.

During seven years of investment the NSI set
over 100 specific targets that spanned numerous
issues, including strategic developments within
NATO, multinational as well as nation-specific
actions, and the fair consideration and adoption
of treaties and agreements.2 The number and the
array of targets reflected the foundation’s view

The NSI grants were made to a range of organizations, including university-based research
institutes and think tanks, as well as nonprofits
engaged in advocacy and communications activities. Grants included both restricted support for
specific programs and general operating support. Significant investments were made in five

1
A target is a type of outcome that describes a specific change or specific amount of change (e.g., 90 percent of all thirdgrade students are reading at grade level). Targets communicate expectations about impact and are often used in strategic
philanthropy or venture philanthropy. In the context of the NSI, targets reflected expectations about change and could be
assessed as having been “achieved” or “not achieved.”

Although some of the NSI’s targets may reflect the passage of legislation (based on inputs from grantees and experts in the
field), the Hewlett Foundation does not lobby or earmark its funds for prohibited lobbying activities, as defined in the federal
tax laws. Its funding for policy work is limited to permissible forms of support only, such as general operating support grants
that grantees can allocate at their discretion and project support grants for nonlobbying activities (e.g., public education and
nonpartisan research).

2
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[T]he evaluation was a broad
and inclusive inquiry that
aimed to systematically assess
and determine how and where
the NSI had made a substantive
difference — where meaningful
progress had occurred, and
perceptions within the field
about the foundation, the
initiative, and the exit process.
“anchor” grantees — organizations that the foundation viewed as key partners in the pursuit of
initiative goals.
Beyond these financial investments, Hewlett
invested human resources to boost the efforts of
grantees and enhance impact. The NSI program
officers took steps to convene grantees and support coordinated strategy, and were also careful
to situate the initiative’s efforts with the ongoing work in the field, coordinating closely with
their counterparts in the Peace and Security
Funders Group. As time went on, program officers gained a sense of the nuclear security field’s
strengths and weaknesses and shared insights
with both peer funders and grantees in order to
inform strategy.
A combination of shifts in the foundation’s strategic priorities and an assessment of diminished
opportunity in the nuclear policy arena led the
foundation to wind down the NSI in 2013. An
important aspect of the wind-down strategy
was intentional efforts to strengthen capabilities within the nuclear field via joint efforts with
other funders and a number of organizational
capacity-building grants.

NSI Evaluation Approach and Methods
The field of nuclear security is beset by a host
of wicked problems. Thousands of destructive
weapons — in the hands of regimes that are
stable and in those that are less so — inevitably
shape power relationships within a complex,
global political system. Nuclear materials are
transported and stored without proper protections and there is the risk that weapons or
nuclear materials can wind up in the hands of
nefarious actors. For these sorts of problems,
the pathway to desired goals cannot always be
plotted in advance. Despite established goals and
targets, the actual results for any initiative tackling such a web of wicked problems are unlikely
to conform to plan. To maintain relevance, targets — and sometimes goals — must evolve in
response to an interplay of global factors. It is
against this complex backdrop that the NSI summative evaluation took place.
Evaluation can be conducted for a number of
purposes. The NSI evaluation did not focus on
accountability; nor did it aim to assess the merit
and worth of the NSI’s impact by examining its
100-plus targets within a narrow “success/failure” framework or by asking whether the initiative had advanced its bold goal to reduce the
risk of a nuclear disaster. Instead, ORS Impact’s
evaluation was intended to support the foundation’s learning and ongoing strategy decisions.3
As such, the evaluation was a broad and inclusive
inquiry that aimed to systematically assess and
determine how and where the NSI had made
a substantive difference — where meaningful
progress had occurred, and perceptions within
the field about the foundation, the initiative, and
the exit process.
To support learning and decision-making, evaluation inquiry broadened the notion of what could
be considered “success” in a global-scale policy-change effort and assessed where progress had
occurred in forms other than achieving specific
policy targets — certainly the most visible but
also the most ambitious sorts of change.

3
The NSI evaluation’s purpose and methods are consistent with strategic learning. For further description of this evaluative
approach, see Patton, 2011; Coffman & Beer, 2011; and Lynn, 2012.
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FIGURE 2 Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change. Adapted from Schlangen and Coe, 2014.

MORE
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The NSI summative evaluation relied on four
sources of data:
1. in-depth interviews with a broad cross
section of actors in the field, including
Hewlett staff, grantees, funders, policymakers, and experts inside and outside of
government (n = 35);
2. analysis of 720 grantee and program officer
reports;
3. review of selected news articles, op-eds,
websites, and grantee and funder publications; and
4. a focus group with four evaluation experts,
including those with experience in philanthropy, where the intent was to discuss
monitoring and evaluation approaches relevant to initiatives such as the NSI.

Using purposive sampling, key informants were
carefully selected with the help of an advisor
who consulted with the evaluation team. The
evaluation advisor, Joy Drucker, brought deep
expertise in peace and security issues and was
able to identify and help broker connections to
those who could provide rich perspectives on the
questions of interest, including those inside and
outside of government.
Key informant interviews and reporting documents underwent thorough content analysis.
Interviews and reports were coded to surface
particular patterns and themes where data
offered a weight of evidence. To provide perspective on how and where meaningful differences
had been realized over the life of the initiative,
the evaluation drew on the metaphor of an iceberg. (See Figure 2.) The evaluation sought to
describe the wide base of the iceberg “below the
waterline” — the array of less visible changes
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 11

Results

Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change

Gienapp, Reisman, Shorr, and Arbreton

Results

that constitute modest but important incremental progress or establish the enabling conditions
for more visible policy changes, such as more
effective dialogue, stronger alliances among key
actors, and improved capacity for effective communications. In the case of the NSI, the “below
the waterline” outcomes were highly relevant to
the initiative’s strategies — including both grants
and nongrantmaking approaches (Schlangen &
Coe, 2014).
The methods employed in this evaluation were
intended to generate useful findings that could
inform action. Findings are not intended to be
generalizable, though they may be reasonably
applied to other, similar settings — e.g., policy-change initiatives implemented in an environment of complexity that are also time bound.4

Evaluation Findings: Notable
Accomplishments
The weight of evaluation evidence pointed to
key accomplishments that were attributable to
Hewlett’s grantmaking and its role as a philanthropic partner. As a partner, the foundation
spurred interchange and collaboration within
the field by convening key players, identified and
addressed the field’s biggest capacity gaps, contributed to significant policy agreements, and
facilitated tighter alignment among grantees
and funders.
The ‘Three-Legged Stool”

• Regularly reassess the ongoing relevance
of desired impacts and/or targets given
changes within foundations or the surrounding environment.

The NSI addressed shortcomings and enhanced
capacity within the nuclear security field by
emphasizing that the field’s diverse organizations
— including technical, research-focused organizations and politically savvy advocates — are
necessary complements for one another. The NSI
program officers recognized the need for grantees to adopt a sustained campaign mentality to
marshal their strongest arguments and allies
against the wicked problems inherent in the field.
The NSI helped grantees and funders see that the
field must function as a “three-legged stool” in
order to be most successful. The concept refers to
intentional integration of elements that together
provide a solid base for advancing policy change:
the “legs” being strong, relevant research and
analysis; effective advocacy and communications; and seamless coordination among multiple actors, some of whom might specialize in
either research or advocacy. The NSI supported
an expansive group of grantees, including those
that were described as “new voices, new players.”
Noting that grant support in the field had previously been tilted towards research, interviewees
credited Hewlett with proactively and intentionally leading the effort to build advocacy capacity within the field. The cohesive “three-legged
stool” framework reflected a new way of operating for the field.

• Apply broad measurement frames that
allow a full, rich picture of progress to
emerge — beyond quantifiable targets.

While emergence of a strong campaign mentality was not one of the targets specifically articulated within the NSI, evidence indicates that

The foundation understood that insights from
the summative evaluation would not be applied
directly to its efforts within the NSI; rather, the
desire was for an inclusive, comprehensive set of
lessons that could be applied to other foundation
initiatives. The foundation was also interested in
delivering insights to those that would remain in
the nuclear security field — including its grantees and the Peace and Security Funders Group
(PSFG).
Insights relevant to the foundation and the field
that are described in this article include the
following:
• Be thoughtful about the desired impacts of
a time-limited initiative based on the context, the scale of investment, and the range
of strategies.

4

For more discussion of the generalizability of qualitative evaluation data, see Patton, 1980.
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Improved Nuclear Governance

One of the NSI’s strategy areas was to create or
strengthen international rules and governance
structures to address weapons proliferation,
prudent development of nuclear power, and safe
handling of nuclear materials. Consistent with
Hewlett’s approach, there were numerous policy targets associated with this strategy area,
and the evaluation found evidence of progress
on a number of them. Grantees also succeeded
in highlighting urgent nuclear security issues
confronting NATO. And, the NSI was credited
with boosting the capacity of nongovernmental nuclear policy specialists in key countries to
engage more effectively in the arena.
A notable international policy success arose via
one of Hewlett’s anchor grantees — namely,
the creation and adoption of the nuclear vendors’ code of conduct, which enlisted commercial vendors of nuclear energy technology in a
new nuclear security regime and thus achieved
an important paradigm shift. One NSI grantee
observed that vendors had previously viewed
those in favor of nonproliferation as radical: “You couldn’t be pro-nuclear energy and
pro-nonproliferation. [With the code], that has
now evolved.” Although the complexity of the
policy-change process can make it difficult to
confirm a clear causal relationship between philanthropic investment and policy outcomes, this
was a rare instance where it was possible. As one
expert put it, “This was the Hewlett Foundation
punching above their weight.”

Although the complexity of
the policy-change process can
make it difficult to confirm
a clear causal relationship
between philanthropic
investment and policy
outcomes, this was a rare
instance where it was possible.
As one expert put it, “This
was the Hewlett Foundation
punching above their weight.”
Adoption of the code of conduct was one of the
initiative’s targets, and highlights the notion of
quality over quantity. There were numerous
policy targets associated with this NSI strategy,
and some may ask whether achievement of a
single target qualifies as a notable accomplishment. However, it is important to recognize the
code of conduct was a significant, multinational,
cross-sector agreement that resulted from strenuous negotiations.
Perception of Hewlett as Leader

The Hewlett Foundation’s re-entry into the
nuclear security space was seen as bringing
“excitement, energy, and innovation”; many key
informants perceived the Hewlett brand as synonymous with innovation. Throughout the NSI,
the foundation showed a willingness to embrace
new, potentially high-value investment areas that
had not received significant attention from other
funders in the nuclear security space. An example was investments the NSI made in Turkey and
Brazil, which were emerging both technologically and politically and thus bound to influence
the trajectory of nuclear security. Hewlett was
credited with being a leader and the main funder
for this work, and those knowledgeable about the
effort described the impacts as “huge.”
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 13
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grantee efforts bore impressive fruit by helping
create an enabling environment for adoption of
the New START strategic arms reduction treaty
in 2010. As one interviewee noted, “[to advance
policy solutions], you want to have a set of grants
that goes at the drivers of [nuclear security] policy.” In the case of the New START, well-coordinated actors with a greater range of expertise
were well positioned for success. There is also
evidence that the NSI’s ongoing, balanced investment in research and analysis, advocacy, and field
building helped ensure that actors were prepared
for future efforts.
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Hewlett’s investments in
building the capacity of both
government and civil-society
actors to develop localized
solutions to nuclear challenges,
enhance oversight, and shape
the debate at the domestic
and international levels were
viewed as critical to improving
nuclear security globally.
Early in the NSI, there was concern that certain
states entering the global nuclear security debate
lacked a cadre of thought leaders with sufficient
expertise, relationships, and funding to wield
meaningful influence. Hewlett’s investments in
building the capacity of both government and
civil-society actors to develop localized solutions
to nuclear challenges, enhance oversight, and
shape the debate at the domestic and international levels were viewed as critical to improving
nuclear security globally. Those familiar with the
NSI’s work in Turkey and Brazil saw significant
gains in both states in terms of knowledge, transparency, and relationships between governmental and civil-society actors.
Hewlett also made a concerted effort to encourage innovation in the field. During the final years
of the NSI, the foundation forged a partnership
with four other nuclear security funders — the
Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
the Ploughshares Fund, and the Skoll Global
Threats Fund — to form the Nuclear Innovation
Collaborative. A charge of this group is to bring
“positive disruption” to the arena of nuclear
security in order to identify new ideas and
approaches. The ultimate aim is to update the
archaic Cold War framework within which
nuclear security is often discussed and address
the waning prominence of nuclear weapons
14 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

issues in recent political debate (Ploughshares
Fund, 2014). Although the collaborative is still
young, one of its major areas of focus will be
bringing together innovators from different
backgrounds to pursue high-impact collaborations and draw more active and effective people
into the field.
Like the campaign mentality that emerged,
broadened innovation in the field was not articulated as an NSI target — although evidence indicates that the foundation’s work in this area led
to impressive results.

Insights Regarding Strategy,
Evaluation, and Exit Planning
Contemporary approaches to grantmaking
employ a wide variety of philanthropic tools for
addressing a problem or opportunity of interest to
a foundation. Traditionally, grantmaking focused
on establishing core programs and continuing to
support them over a long time frame. The desire
for high-impact approaches grew with the trends
of venture philanthropy, strategic philanthropy,
and grantmaking effectiveness. The concept of a
targeted, time-bound initiative is an outgrowth of
these newer philosophies; emphasis is on investment in specific strategies aimed at achieving
clear goals in a limited time period. Given that
the success of policy-focused efforts can be contingent on mercurial realities, it can be self-defeating to tie an initiative’s success to overly specific
or ambitious goals. This raises the questions of
how a time-bound initiative can be both targeted
and responsive, and which approaches are best
to gauge progress. Discussion below illuminates
insights from the NSI evaluation.
Shifting Strategy Amid Changing
Opportunities

During its lifespan, NSI strategy shifted in
response to changing opportunities in the global
landscape while retaining many of its original
targets. The foundation re-examined the NSI’s
strategies and goals after an initial three-year
investment and, after some tweaks, extended
the initiative for another three years. A midcourse evaluation of the initiative carried out
by a respected expert in the field suggested that
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philanthropy approach that emphasized setting
clear goals and measureable targets. The targets
were useful in so far as they helped establish
what the initiative set out to achieve. However,
many of the NSI’s fixed targets became quickly
outdated as global circumstances shifted and
thus were less useful as longer-term benchmarks.
Setting targets in the dynamic context of policy
change work is challenging because impact is
affected by a multitude of factors, including the
evolving complexities of the decision-making
environment as well as the types, scale, or combination of funded strategies (Guthrie, Louie,
David, & Foster, 2005; Reisman, Gienapp, &
Stachowiak, 2007; Morariu & Brennan, 2009).
The potential pitfall of relying on highly specified targets as the measure of success is that they
may skew toward a best-case scenario — what
could happen given unfettered strategy. Targets
may not accurately reflect what is achievable
given fundamental capacity in the field and
inherent obstacles in the landscape, or the less
dramatic but often very important incremental
steps necessary to advance goals.

As the second phase of the NSI moved forward,
strategies shifted to reflect a “perceived niche”
for the foundation (Redstone Strategy Group,
2012). Goals continued to be ambitious, emphasizing alignment and agreements among global
actors. The new program officer focused her
efforts on building a stronger, campaign-style
infrastructure across the field so that everyone
— including a range of grantees and members
of the Peace and Security Funders Group —
would be more effective both individually and
collectively.

While the NSI realized progress on many fronts
— including the enhanced capacity of certain
actors, stronger dialogue and debate, and adoption of the New START and the code of conduct
— it was probably overly optimistic to expect the
initiative to advance so many ambitious targets
without more sustained and targeted investment
(Harvey, 2016). In addition, important successes
of the initiative were not reflected within the
100-plus targets — e.g., greater alignment and
cohesiveness among grantees and funders in
the field and increased momentum due to new
energy and innovation in the field.

A Mismatched Focus on Policy Targets

Continued focus on ambitious policy targets was
a mismatch with both the time frame of the NSI
and the mix of funded strategies. The NSI’s multiple policy targets suggest that perhaps there
were outsized expectations about what could be
accomplished within given grant cycles and via
the funded strategies.
As noted, Hewlett’s philosophy of grantmaking
at the outset of the NSI was guided by a strategic

As noted above, policy work is somewhat like
an iceberg: it is not always easy to see in its
entirety. Major policy advances are typically
visible — like the tip of the iceberg — but reflect
only one component of a much greater set of
achievements, i.e., the deep, wide base of related
results that are less visible. The base of the policy-change iceberg is comprised of elements that
signal the right conditions for big policy “wins”
as well as less newsworthy budgetary or technocratic steps that can still be quite valuable, so
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 15
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the NSI’s strategies had been largely successful
to date — namely due to the code of conduct
and the grantee’s work on adoption of the New
START — and that continuation of the NSI
would likely achieve more of the initiative’s targets. Hewlett’s board agreed to extend the NSI,
but as the second phase of the initiative began,
a number of shifts occurred around the globe.
Tensions between the U.S. and Russia intensified as Russia effectively annexed the Crimean
Peninsula. At the same time, relations between
the U.S. and China had begun to cool and the
2011 earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in
a critical incident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear
plant, dampened the potential for expansion of
nuclear energy. These factors, along with increasing gridlock in Congress, meant that earlier
hopes for rapid advances in nuclear security policies were starkly diminished. Internally, a new
program officer assumed management of the
NSI. With a strong background in policy work
via years of experience working on Capitol Hill,
this officer recognized that advancing policyrelated targets would be challenging.
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Because the NSI’s measurement
tended to focus on achievement
of targets and did not
intentionally assess progress
on interim outcomes,
measurement efforts were not
as comprehensive or valuable
as they could have been. As
is common with a strategic
philanthropic approach,
measurable goals and targets
were viewed as the markers
of progress for the initiative.
Many of the targets were built
on linearly predictive “x will
lead to y” assumptions.

Because the NSI’s measurement tended to focus
on achievement of targets and did not intentionally assess progress on interim outcomes,
measurement efforts were not as comprehensive
or valuable as they could have been. As is common with a strategic philanthropic approach,
measurable goals and targets were viewed as
the markers of progress for the initiative. Many
of the targets were built on linearly predictive
“x will lead to y” assumptions. As policy targets
appeared to be less obtainable later in the initiative’s life cycle, the NSI program officer focused
on advancing “below the waterline” outcomes.
However, grantee reporting and the foundation’s
measurement remained narrowly focused on targets. Grantee reporting focused on performance,
such as the number of conferences organized,
the satisfaction of conference participants, the
production of conference proceedings, and number of white papers developed. The vast majority of grantee reports stated that performance
targets had been “met” or “exceeded.” However,
there was no formal or intentional measurement
of how grant-funded work was advancing policy
targets or broader strategy outcomes.

it is important to bring them to light (Reisman,
et al., 2007). As noted, there is evidence that the
NSI influenced change “below the waterline”
— e.g., greater capacity to build bridges, stronger relationships with decision-makers, and
enhanced coordination among a range of actors
in the field. Although these outcomes were not
identified as expected targets at the outset of the
initiative, these types of changes were nonetheless a logical fit given the mix of NSI strategies.
During the NSI’s second phase, as the landscape
shifted, a greater focus on advancing the necessary preconditions for policy change rather than
precise policy targets would have been more
reasonable and “right sized” given the initiative’s breadth and time frame.

The increased infrastructure and development
of champions realized by investing in a few
“anchor” grantees, for example, was not identified as a key expectation or measure of the NSI’s
progress. In reality, infrastructure development
is largely accepted in the field of advocacy and
policy-change evaluation as a key progress indicator for advocacy investment.5 Similarly, the
convening role that the foundation played led
to stronger alliances among the PSFG. While
increased capacity, the championing of development, and alliance building are not adequately
captured by quantitative targets, these changes
can in fact be directly measured through many
innovative techniques that are becoming common practice in the advocacy-evaluation field.
Intentional measurement in these areas can
help foundations to better estimate progress

Challenges to Measurement

5
A few existing frameworks describe outcome areas related to advocacy and policy-oriented work, and describe the areas of
infrastructure and other interim outcomes that reflect enabling conditions or otherwise signal progress for long-term policy
change or social change. See Reisman, et al., 2007; Coffman, 2007; Reisman, Gienapp, & Kelly, 2015; Alliance for Justice, 2013;
and Klugman, 2010.
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Approaches to Gauging Success

The NSI evaluation acknowledged the weaknesses inherent in a too-narrow assessment
of policy work, and applied a broader frame
to describe the initiative’s successes. Gauging
success by documenting the percent of targets
achieved over the course of the initiative would
have provided a more quantified but a much
more limited picture of the results of the initiative. While some targets were achieved, the
changing global landscape meant that many
targets were off the mark and out of reach. The
assumptions upon which targets were built
became overtaken by events — assuming, that is,
that the original optimistic views of the opportunity were solid in the first place.
By probing deeply in the areas “below the waterline,” the NSI summative evaluation was able
to provide rich data about the varied types of
success that were actually realized and pointed
toward areas of opportunity to continue the
work. Significantly, the evaluation was also able
to lift up important messages about the exit
strategy and the effects of the initiative sunset
on partners who were continuing to forge ahead
to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
bad actors. While the foundation’s intent was to
make a gracious and conscientious exit and leave
the field in a strong place, there were unique
aspects to Hewlett’s role and the expectations
applied to its presence and actions in the field
that left questions about how key efforts would
be sustained following the NSI’s sunset.

Impact of Evaluation Findings on
Hewlett’s Thinking
Many of the NSI evaluation findings illuminate
how careful thought about goals, outcomes,
and strategy — at the heart of the foundation’s
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy (OFP) approach
— reflects both strengths and potential pitfalls
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2016).
While the foundation’s approach to OFP has
evolved, its commitment to reflect on both

successes and failures has been consistent
(Hartnell, 2003). When Hewlett staff commissioned the NSI evaluation, a hope was to use the
results for learning. Aside from documenting
achievements of the NSI, the evaluation surfaced provocative issues and recommendations
relevant to complex, policy-oriented, and timebound initiatives — features that characterize
the foundation’s existing work. The NSI evaluation findings brought timely value to Hewlett
staff in a number of areas.
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy

The evaluation affirmed a reorientation of outcome-focused grantmaking already in progress at
the foundation. Outcomes-Focused Philanthropy
retains a focus on outcomes already in place at
Hewlett, but more explicitly recognizes the need
at times to flex and adapt outcomes throughout
a philanthropic strategy’s life cycle. As described
earlier, there was a too-strict management to
the NSI’s highly aspirational goals and myriad
specific targets and not enough attention to how
developments in the field suggested the needs for
course adjustments, such as closing opportunity
windows. While management to goals continues, OFP places greater emphasis on the utility of
interim outcomes, scanning for developments in
the field and at the foundation, and learning and
adaptation through every stage of a strategy’s life
cycle — origination, implementation, refresh,
and, in the case of some strategies and all timebound initiatives, exit.
A subsequent evaluation of another Hewlett
Foundation policy-oriented strategy provides
an example of how the foundation flexed and
adapted outcomes. Program officers intentionally shifted monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
questions to better recognize the initiative’s
early stage. Given the context, foundation staff
recognized that the greatest value of M&E
would be to guide decision-making and future
implementation of the strategy. The initial M&E
questions focused heavily on the extent of progress toward policy goals. Upon reflection, those
questions were recognized as too far-reaching
and too summative, given the strategy’s stage of
development. Foundation staff instead adopted
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 17

Results

and inform decisions about strategies or funding approaches.
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For initiatives such as the NSI
that are implemented within a
highly complex environment,
continuing to hammer away
at specific targets even when
opportunities have changed
suggests the need to establish
better triggers during strategy
origination that can spur
reflection about whether or
when it is necessary to change
course. For example, staff
may need to periodically ask
and answer questions such
as: What facilitates or creates
barriers to progress? How will
we assess whether to keep
going or change directions?
It is important to ask these
questions early enough to make
a difference, and to be open
and transparent with grantees,
engaging them with regard to
these questions as appropriate.
questions that explored grantees’ access to policymakers, grantee alignment with the established policy goals, and the degree to which
grantees might form an effective coalition.
These questions were a better fit with the strategy context and M&E purpose, and ultimately
more useful as findings informed the strategy’s
adaptation and ongoing implementation.
18 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Balancing Expectations

The evaluation underscored the need to balance
expectations about the timeline for progress
with an understanding of what information is
needed to make good decisions at key strategic
moments. As the NSI case illustrates, attacking complex, wicked problems — which are
the focus of many of the Hewlett Foundation’s
programs and initiatives — is tricky, and progress is almost always nonlinear. It is also true
that advancing ambitious goals often requires
a long time horizon. To guide learning and
decision-making in both long-term efforts and
those known to be time bound, the foundation’s
evaluation guidance — including its Evaluation
Principles and Practices (William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation, 2012) — encourages staff to
establish comprehensive evaluation questions in
a project’s origination phase, then prioritize and
sequence, and apply evaluation findings to learning and adaptation throughout the life cycle.
Evaluation questions may address the overall
effectiveness of the work, value for money, or
continued “fit” of the strategy and approach,
particularly given any changes in the external
environment.
The NSI evaluation also confirmed the importance of assessing field capacity thoroughly
before launching an ambitious initiative, as well
as the need to align a strategy’s scope and goals
with the capacity of the field to accomplish those
goals. In the NSI example, the need for significant capacity building was identified only after
the foundation was deep into the work. Taking
that to heart, Hewlett has included questions
about capacity and needs in the OFP framework;
these are to be addressed throughout the strategy life cycle.
Finally, the NSI findings illustrate the need for
caution about targets. Targets can be useful to
help gauge progress, particularly when initiatives
are mature, when strategies are stable, when a
robust evidence base has been established upon
which to base expectations about future outcomes, or when there is a clear and logical time
frame for achievement. For initiatives such as
the NSI that are implemented within a highly
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Methods Aligning With Principles

The NSI evaluation illustrated methods that
aligned well with the Hewlett Foundation’s evaluation principles. The foundation’s first principle
of evaluation is “lead with purpose.” The NSI
evaluation offered a clear model of how to do
so when engaged in complex work, be it policy
change or other long-term endeavors. Given that
the policy arena can be unpredictable, it is a mistake to focus only — or too much — on whether
a particular policy change has happened.
“Progress” — frequently the basis for decisions
about whether to continue an investment —
should encompass key intermediate steps that
make ultimate change more likely, such as
improvements in the capacities of advocates
or the addition of new allies. The foundation
increasingly recognizes the value of including
such interim achievements as relevant markers
of headway in policy-focused strategies. There
is more emphasis on how Hewlett’s investments
can help create conditions for positive change:
“below the waterline” outcomes versus emphasis

on specific tactics and whether they generate
high-profile targets. And there continues to be
recognition of evaluation data’s value for learning and enhancing the efforts of the foundation
and its partners. This approach has been applied
recently in two foundation initiatives.7
Exit Planning

The NSI evaluation helped refine thinking about
exit planning. The Hewlett Foundation is now
even more cognizant about the need to be as
crisp and clear as possible regarding the definition of an initiative and the expectation of exit.
It is important to point out how initiatives fit
into the foundation’s ecosystem. In most areas,
Hewlett invests for the long haul (e.g., performing arts, Western conservation, reproductive
health). Initiatives are launched when the foundation sees the potential to have an impact in a
specific area, and can learn and test whether and
how its philanthropic dollars can be leveraged to
make a difference. However, the default expectation is that an initiative is time bound.
Two issues arose regarding the decision to end
the NSI and exit the field of nuclear security.
First, although the NSI was intended as a timebound effort, the work gained momentum, opening up the hope that the foundation’s investment
might continue. There was ambiguity among
Hewlett staff, grantees, and partner funders
about when, exactly, the NSI would end. Once
the decision was made to exit, it caught the field
by surprise — there was no sense of a planned or
intended end.
The NSI’s finite time horizon was not communicated clearly at the outset, either internally or

For further discussion of sense-making in complex systems, see Snowden, 2010. The framework sorts issues facing leaders
into five contexts defined by the nature of the relationship between cause and effect. Four of these — simple, complicated,
complex, and chaotic — require leaders to diagnose situations and to act in contextually appropriate ways. The fifth —
disorder — applies when it is unclear which of the other four contexts is predominant.

6

7
The Cyber Initiative commissioned its first evaluation in 2016, focusing on progress in building a network of experts. While
it was one of five initiative outcomes, staff believed it should be evaluated first because findings provide an opportunity
for learning. To that end, they have identified a number of questions to investigate: Have cyber experts in industry,
government, academia, and other relevant sectors begun working together? If not, why not? If so, what are the key enablers?
Are there particular forces that can promote or inhibit the emergence of a network? The Madison Initiative commissioned
an external evaluation group to work closely with the staff team throughout the initial three-year grantmaking period. The
evaluators played the role of “critical friend” and helped the team take a developmental approach by asking tough questions,
uncovering assumptions, and collecting and interpreting data to aid the initiative’s development with ongoing feedback
offered in real time.
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complex environment,6 continuing to hammer
away at specific targets even when opportunities have changed suggests the need to establish
better triggers during strategy origination that
can spur reflection about whether or when it is
necessary to change course. For example, staff
may need to periodically ask and answer questions such as: What facilitates or creates barriers to progress? How will we assess whether to
keep going or change directions? It is important
to ask these questions early enough to make a
difference, and to be open and transparent with
grantees, engaging them with regard to these
questions as appropriate.
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The NSI’s finite time horizon
was not communicated
clearly at the outset, either
internally or externally.
Although justification for
the decision to exit was laid
out for stakeholders in 2013,
the hope that had mounted
for the NSI’s extension led to
disappointment both inside
and outside the foundation.
External stakeholders perceived
the decision as abrupt and
opaque, and contrary to the
openness, frankness, and spirit
of collaboration that program
officers brought to the PSFG.
externally. Although justification for the decision
to exit was laid out for stakeholders in 2013, the
hope that had mounted for the NSI’s extension
led to disappointment both inside and outside the
foundation. External stakeholders perceived the
decision as abrupt and opaque, and contrary to
the openness, frankness, and spirit of collaboration that program officers brought to the PSFG.
As one funder said, “we had spent so much time
collaborating and being as open as possible that
it would have been useful for us to have been
involved earlier on before the foundation’s decision to completely pull out was made.”
For grantees, Hewlett’s decision to exit resulted
in significant uncertainty, and organizations had
to make hard choices about where to focus their
energy. Organizations’ need to increase their
fund-development efforts necessarily resulted in
20 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

diminished program resources — and this at a
time when there were significant demands and
activity in the field during the lead-up to the U.S.Iran nuclear framework. In retrospect, it seems
clear that the foundation could have done a better job signaling its intentions and communicating the decision to exit.
Once the decision was made, the foundation
sought to exit the NSI as conscientiously as possible, augmenting staff and taking other steps
to leave the field and grantees in a strong position. Grantees were informed of the decision a
full year prior to the NSI’s final grants. Many of
these grants, supported in part by the foundation’s Organizational Effectiveness grantmaking
program, enabled grantees to hire consultants
and address particular areas of organizational
weakness. One such grant, for instance, went
toward a communications consultant to work
with a leading center of scholarship on nuclear
security. Two grants supported organizations
facing transitions of longtime leadership, and
another supported an international network of
next-generation security professionals to develop
a case statement to bolster deeper engagement
of their constituents. In addition to these targeted capacity-building grants, some anchor
grantees received general support at larger than
normal levels so they would have running room
to adapt. The foundation commissioned the
ORS Impact evaluation in part to harvest lessons
for the NSI grantees and other funders — conducting the evaluation in an open manner and
providing grantees and grantmakers with opportunity to provide input on evaluation questions
and preview findings, digest, and comment.
The Hewlett Foundation also took steps to preserve funding for nuclear security efforts by both
encouraging peer funders to stay in the field and
supporting the recruitment of new funders to the
field. The foundation was particularly concerned
about continuation of support for its field-building efforts in Brazil, Turkey, and Israel, and the
foundation’s staff stressed the value of this work
to peer donors.
Drawing from these and other lessons, the foundation has heightened intentionality regarding
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Foundation has applied lessons and insights
from the NSI summative evaluation in order
to enhance and strengthen efforts regarding
implementation and measurement of complex
work, including exit planning for time-limited
initiatives. While not broadly generalizable, we
believe that the NSI evaluation findings nevertheless offer lessons that are widely applicable
in the field as investment in time-bound special
initiatives has become a more common philanthropic approach.

• To what extent did the strategy achieve its
goals, outcomes, and key implementation
markers?
• What were major accomplishments?
• What were significant factors enabling or
inhibiting success?
• What lessons were learned?
• What would you have done differently?
• What are recommendations for colleagues,
other foundations, and the field?

Conclusion
The NSI leaves behind a proud legacy: a
strengthened professional community, significant policy accomplishments, noted progress in
priority strategy areas such as nuclear energy
and emerging powers, and the infusion of new
energy and innovation into the nuclear policy
field. These outcomes were beneficial to the
field, though they weren’t initially identified as
the focus of the initiative.
Evaluation highlighted the importance and
value of thoughtfully identifying outcomes
for a time-limited investment — particularly
an investment that aims for ambitious policy
results. In addition, the evaluation points to the
utility of regularly reassessing the relevance of
established outcomes (or targets) given likely
shifts in the operating environment, and application of broader measurement frames that generate learning and inform action. The Hewlett
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good exit planning. Hewlett is specifically
mindful of the need to begin planning for exit as
early as possible, communicate early and frequently with grantees and other stakeholders,
and work collaboratively to ensure a smooth
transition for all. There is also greater intentionality with regard to drawing actionable
lessons from a planned exit. The foundation’s
OFP materials also encourage program staff to
consider a range of questions as they gear up for
and carry out an exit:
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Introduction
Atlantic Philanthropies is a limited-life foundation that has been making grants since 1982
in eight countries. In 2002 the foundation
announced its intention to distribute all of its
assets and close down by 2020; by that point
it will have granted an estimated $7.7 billion
worldwide, the largest exercise in limited-life
philanthropy to date. Atlantic Philanthropies
has described its philosophy in the following
way: “Our goal, simply put, is to do as much
good as possible, for as many disadvantaged and
vulnerable people as possible, as soon as possible” (2005, p. 3). Underpinning this general goal
is a particular focus on tackling global inequalities and injustice. The founder of Atlantic
Philanthropies, Chuck Feeney, imbued the foundation with his personal philosophy of “giving
while living” to achieve profound social change
during his lifetime.
This article will examine Atlantic’s work in
Northern Ireland, where since 1991 it has supported three thematic intervention areas: aging;
children and young people; and reconciliation
and human rights. Across these program areas
some basic working principles applied: tackle
the root causes, rather than the symptoms, of
disadvantage; lever new or match funding for
interventions; and mainstream successful policy and practice across Northern Ireland and
beyond. Atlantic’s funding approach involved
supporting key nongovernmental organizations
to drive and advocate for change. As part of its
exit strategy, Atlantic Philanthropies has moved
to partnering with the power-sharing Northern

Key Points
•• This article is a case study of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in Northern Ireland, where
it supported three thematic intervention
areas: aging; children and young people; and
reconciliation and human rights. Atlantic, a
limited-life foundation that has been making
grants since 1982 in eight countries, will
close down by 2020 and is engaged in an
exit strategy.
•• Atlantic’s original funding approach involved
supporting key nongovernmental organizations to drive and advocate for change;
its work helped to support and consolidate
the peace process in that country. Its exit
strategy has involved a formal partnership
arrangement with the Northern Ireland
Assembly to take external interventions to
scale and mainstream services previously
funded through NGOs.
•• This article draws on qualitative data
gathered through interviews with key
stakeholders — the funder, government
officials, and NGOs — and considers
the consequences of this approach for
sustaining and mainstreaming policies
and practices. It also offers both specific
and general lessons on partnering with
government as an exit strategy.

Ireland Assembly, a radical shift in both strategic
and operational terms.
Based on reflective practice, this article will
examine Atlantic Philanthropies’ move from a
bottom-up external funder that worked through
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NGOs to a top-down, insider, partnership role
with the government of Northern Ireland. It
will also draw on qualitative data gathered
through interviews with key stakeholders — the
funder, government officials, and NGOs — and
consider the consequences of this approach
for sustaining and mainstreaming policies and
practices. The article concludes with an examination of the lessons learned from partnering
with government as an exit strategy: Atlantic’s
role changed from funding NGOs to advocate
for policy change outside government to one
in which Atlantic is actively collaborating with
government. The aim is to capture the learning
from actors directly involved in the partnership
process. What is offered is a formative overview
of issues considered important by the stakeholders based on early reflections on their experience
with Atlantic’s exit strategy. Interviewees remain
anonymous and no reference is made to their
host departments for reasons of confidentiality; within Northern Ireland’s small policy
community, members could otherwise identify
respondents who gave freely of their time and
opinions in good faith.

The Northern Ireland Context
The context of Atlantic’s work in Northern
Ireland is important in understanding the role
it has played. The island of Ireland was partitioned in 1921, with the southern 26 counties
gaining independence from Britain and the
remaining six counties in the northeast remaining part of the United Kingdom. The new state
of Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority
(roughly 65 percent at the time of partition) and
acquired its own parliament and considerable
autonomy within the U.K. A chronically insecure Protestant majority, an alienated Catholic
minority, electoral malpractice, ethnic bias in
the distribution of housing and welfare services,
and a declining economy meant that the state
could never command full political legitimacy.
During the 1960s a civil rights movement began
to campaign for more equitable access to political
power, social provision, and cultural recognition. It met with resistance and divisions within
unionism — those with allegiance to the U.K.
24 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Politics spilled onto the streets. In 1969 the
London government deployed the British army
in an attempt to restore order. By the mid-1990s,
more than 3,500 people had been killed. Between
1974 and the cease-fires of 1994 there were seven
attempts to reach a political and constitutional
settlement. All of the initiatives were Londonled and included an element of power-sharing
between Catholics and Protestants; all foundered
in the face of local opposition. The first moves
toward peace progressed along two parallel
routes: Route one sought to maintain momentum between the constitutional parties; route
two saw the first tentative moves to involve
republicans (supporters of a united Ireland) in
talks. On Aug. 31, 1994, the Irish Republican
Army declared “a complete cessation of military
operations” and the main loyalist paramilitary
organizations followed its example in October,
paving the way to the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement of April 1998 (Darby, 2003).
The Ulster Unionist Party agreed to share power
with Sinn Fein (the republican political party)
on the condition that it decommission its weapons; Sinn Fein didn’t do so, and the Assembly
(established under the 1998 agreement) was
suspended in February 2002. This fitful process
was to continue, and devolution was suspended
indefinitely for the fourth time by Northern
Ireland’s secretary of state in October 2002 due
to a “lack of trust and loss of confidence on both
sides of the community” (Reid 2002). A political breakthrough came in the form of the St
Andrews Agreement in October 2006. Northern
Ireland has enjoyed a period of political stability
since 2007 and a significant decline in political
violence, although legacy issues around flags,
parading, and otherwise dealing with the past
continue to dog political progress. While regularly described as a post-conflict society, peace
remains fragile not least because of such issues
as the highly segregated nature of Northern
Ireland on ethno-national grounds and the lack
of political consensus on how to deal with the
past. There also remains an insidious undercurrent of dissident loyalist (Protestant) and
republican (Catholic) activities aimed at vulnerable communities, where those factions exercise
greatest influence.

Partnership With Government

TABLE 1 Timeline of Atlantic’s Work in Northern Ireland

1993–95

No political
settlement

Atlantic makes its first grant in Northern Ireland (from Dublin
office), for low-risk, cross-community peace-building work.

Downing Street
Declaration

Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on
funding a Washington office to promote a political alternative
to violence.

IRA cease-fire
1998
2001–02

2003–14

Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.

Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement

A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in
policing, justice, and dealing with the legacy of the past.

Northern Ireland
Assembly suspended

Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher
education.

2007: Power-sharing
Assembly restored
2014: Stormont
House Agreement

Atlantic’s role is in cementing peace through interventions
in aging; children and youth; and reconciliation and human
rights.
Atlantic partners with the Northern Ireland government.

2014–present

Fresh Start political
agreement on power
sharing

Atlantic’s Belfast office closes (2016).
A strategic decision by its board will end all Atlantic grantmaking by 2016 and close it by 2020.

Virtually all of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in
Northern Ireland can be traced back to Chuck
Feeney’s overarching desire to help build a lasting, sustainable peace and to reconcile deeply
divided communities. Feeney’s distress over
the violence in Northern Ireland became particularly acute on Nov. 8, 1987, when an IRA
bomb placed at a British war memorial killed 11
people attending a remembrance service in the
town of Enniskillen, close to his ancestral home.
Feeney saw the gruesome aftermath on television while in London and said that he wanted
to see peace, in his lifetime, in Northern Ireland
(O’Clery, 2007). Starting in 1990, Atlantic began
making grants in Northern Ireland, for the first
five years from its Dublin office. At a time of
intense and continuing political violence, funding
opportunities were limited. Atlantic supported
noncontroversial cross-community and crossborder contact and dialogue aimed at broadening political debate (Atlantic Philanthropies,
2015). Throughout more than 2 1/2 decades

of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, Atlantic
Philanthropies sought to address the legacy of
violent conflict that prevented movement toward
reconciliation, stability, and the protection of
human rights. (See Table 1.)

Atlantic Philanthropies
in Northern Ireland
The role of Atlantic Philanthropies in Northern
Ireland has received almost no attention in the
literature. Jung, Harrow, and Phillips examined community foundations across the U.K.,
which they define “as independent philanthropic
organisations working in a specific geographic
area which build up a permanent collection of
endowed funds contributed by many donors”
(2013, p. 411; see also, Daly, 2008). The only
foundation referenced in Northern Ireland,
Community Foundation of Northern Ireland
(CFNI), makes grants to meet a wide variety
of needs in its service area. While recognizing
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 25
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FIGURE 1 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Grants in Northern Ireland: 1991–2015
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the absence of high-net-worth donors in
Northern Ireland, Jung, et al. noted that the
position of CFNI was “greatly enhanced by
major funding from Atlantic Philanthropies”
(2013, p. 420) and the European Union’s Peace
and Reconciliation Fund. Beyond that, there
has been no in-depth academic examination of the significant role played by Atlantic
Philanthropies in Northern Ireland.
During the period 1991–2015, Atlantic
Philanthropies awarded 618 grants totaling about $603 million in Northern Ireland;
the average grant was around $976,000. (See
Figure 1.) To put the total grants provided
by Atlantic into perspective in the context of
public-sector spending, the Northern Ireland
public expenditure budget is around $12 billion
per year. Hence, over the lifetime of Atlantic
Philanthropies’ involvement in Northern Ireland
it has provided grants equal to approximately 3.6
percent of one year’s public expenditure budget.
26 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

In the areas of peace, reconciliation, and human
rights specifically, it spent almost $156 million,
or 26 percent of its total funding for Northern
Ireland. This was the largest percentage of its
spending, followed by grants to higher education, at 22.5 percent; children and young people,
at 16.8 percent; and aging, at 13.5 percent. The
remainder of the funding was spent on a variety of areas, including community development
and civic engagement, youth development, early
childhood development, and strategic learning
and evaluation.
Spending patterns in Northern Ireland reflected
the wider move by Atlantic Philanthropies from
2007-09 to support a social-justice framework
broadly characterized as focusing on the root
causes of inequality, which perpetuate disparities
in power and access and which can be addressed
only through systemic and institutional change
(LaMarche, 2009; Proscio, 2010, 2012). This
approach captured the mood of political change

Partnership With Government

Atlantic’s role in supporting a social-justice
model appeared at odds with the pattern of
spending in the field of American philanthropy (National Committee for Responsive
Philanthropy, 2003, 2005; Jagpal & Laskowski,
2011). Suárez’s research, for example, indicated
that larger private foundations were much less
likely to discuss social justice than public foundations for fear of “drawing attention to their
work by using potentially contentious language
like social justice and social change in their programming” (2012, p. 272). Conversely, those
foundations that mentioned “social justice or
social change in their programming reject the
legal and normative restrictions on social action,
sending signals to activist grant seekers that their
ideas and tactics are welcome”; as a consequence,
foundations become “institutional entrepreneurs, pushing the broader philanthropic
community to reconsider funding strategies and
acceptable priorities” (p. 273).
Although broadly informed by a social-justice
framework, it is perhaps a more accurate assessment that Atlantic Philanthropies adopted a
generic theory of change in Northern Ireland
that had unwritten principles: judiciously select
well-respected NGOs, set broad parameters
for the social changes sought, provide them
with resources to effect change, build their
capacity to advocate though the use of robust
evidence funded by Atlantic, and take their
pilot projects to scale. In that sense, the wider
theory-of-change agenda was to build from
the bottom up, and Atlantic’s role was, as one
Atlantic interviewee said, one of “leading from

behind” and “oiling the wheels of high-level
advocacy” where its positional and financial clout
added value to the work of NGO groups. There is
no consensus within Atlantic on whether such an
approach demonstrated clear intentionality or if
those loose parameters simply offered the space
for flexibility in the highly volatile political environment that is Northern Ireland. What became
clearer as Atlantic’s funding in Northern Ireland
shifted to reflect the wider concerns of building
peace is that it sought to “normalize” society
through tackling social and religious inequalities that had fueled the violence and left those
impacted by the conflict most vulnerable (Beirne
& Knox, 2014; Borooah & Knox, 2014). Atlantic
points to a range of successes across the thematic
areas it supported. (See Table 2.)
While these achievements cover a number of
issues, a set of core themes and approaches emerge
from the work of Atlantic Philanthropies. Atlantic
has always sought to build and consolidate peace
in Northern Ireland — from early support for
organizations involved in dialogue (former combatants) through challenging work with those
on the margins and on to large-scale partnership
investments in shared education. It sought ways
to use Atlantic’s unique position and perspective
to encourage moves toward a more peaceful and
stable society. As Atlantic staff envisioned how to
make lasting impact with its work, the final phase
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, from 2014
onward, focused on working with government to
enshrine the most successful models the foundation’s grantees had helped develop. We examine
this exit strategy in some detail.

The Exit Strategy: Partnering
With Government
The interface between government and philanthropy has received limited attention in the
European literature. Smyllie, Scaife, and
McDonald (2011), for example, argue that for
some philanthropic organizations, the willingness of government to subsidize or fund projects
initiated by philanthropy is a measure of success. Whether this happens can depend on the
nature and form of the particular welfare state.
European foundations see value in partnering
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in Northern Ireland. The political settlement
synonymous with the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement in 1998 resulted in a power-sharing devolved government, but there remained
many of the underlying issues that gave rise to
the conflict. As noted by Gara LaMarche, then
chief executive of Atlantic Philanthropies, how
the social framework applies in Northern Ireland
“might lead us to see all of our work through
the lens of whether it serves to perpetuate peace
through supporting emerging political and social
structures that encourage the integration of a
deeply divided society” (2009, p. 3).
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TABLE 2 Atlantic Philanthropies: Key Successes in Northern Ireland

Results

)		 Programs

of shared services were developed at hostile “interface” communities,
improving delivery on issues such as early years and parenting, cyber-bullying,
and youth engagement for many individuals and families.

)		 The

number of integrated schools and preschools (where Catholics and
Protestants are taught together) nearly doubled, from 49 to 90, and the number
of students being educated in integrated schools nearly tripled, from 7,000
to 21,000.

Reconciliation

)		 In

2016, some 325 schools (one-third of all schools) were actively involved in
shared education, engaging 17,000 pupils.

)		 The

shared-education model was replicated in the deeply divided societies
of Macedonia and Israel-Palestine, disseminating lessons learned from
Northern Ireland.

)		 Downing
)		

Human Rights

IRA cease-fire

)		 Chuck

Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on funding a
Washington office to promote a political alternative to violence.

)		 Atlantic
)		 Good

Aging

Children and
Young People

Street Declaration

establishes in office in Belfast.

Friday/Belfast Agreement

)		 A

shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in policing, justice, and
dealing with the legacy of the past.

)		 Northern
)		 Atlantic

Ireland Assembly suspended

supports building research capacity in higher education.

Source: Knox & Quirk, 2016

with the state; U.S. and U.K. foundations are
less inclined, although this is changing (Anheier
& Daly, 2006). Smyllie, et al. pose the question
of whether “this activity [partnership between
government and philanthropy] results in public policy development,” an area they argue is
currently unexamined (2011, p. 1141). Thümler’s
study of the role played by philanthropic foundations that co-operated with public actors in
school-improvement partnerships in Germany
and the U.S. highlighted “essentially symbolic
types of action that satisfy the social appetite
for reform while they spare their audiences
the impositions of ‘real’ change — instances of
‘successful failure’” (2011, p. 1112). Anheier and
Daly (2006, citing Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann,
& Toepler, 2006) argue that while redistribution is linked to notions of charity, social and
28 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

public-policy change is associated with philanthropy — an area that is being given greater
attention in research. Overall, in a European
context, research on philanthropic/government
partnership working, from the paucity of published work, is therefore underdeveloped.
Atlantic Philanthropies took the strategic decision, as part of its legacy, that it would partner
with government to sustain and embed key
strands of the work it had supported in Northern
Ireland. However successful external interventions are, philanthropic funding cannot and
should not be a substitute for publicly funded
services for which the state often has a legal or
societal responsibility, whether as a safety net
provider for the most vulnerable or as a public
good. Atlantic’s programmatic strategies had
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FIGURE 2 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Signature Programs
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been about creating knowledge and evidence;
designing, implementing, and testing models;
and advocating for policy change rather than
funding large-scale service delivery. As Atlantic
moved to end its grantmaking by 2016, it wished
to see how the learning and practices it had supported could change or influence mainstream
state-run services.

Social Change (DSC), which offered an overarching policy mechanism to work across
government. The specific focus of Atlantic’s work
involved three signature programs launched by
the first minister and deputy first minister in
September 2014: early intervention, dementia,
and shared education, each of which had formed
part of Atlantic’s previous grantmaking portfolio.

Atlantic partnered with government via a
wider policy framework, entitled Delivering
Social Change (Northern Ireland Office of the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2013),
which was established by the Northern Ireland
Executive branch to tackle poverty and social
exclusion through the combined efforts of several government departments. Atlantic’s plan
to partner with government therefore coincided with a period when the Northern Ireland
Executive feared it was proving difficult to
deliver cross-cutting outcomes that straddled
the individual portfolios of several departments.
In that sense, the evolution of the partnership
between Atlantic and the devolved government
in Northern Ireland was opportunistic rather
than strategic. Indeed, project leaders within
Atlantic had been negotiating with individual
departments before the emergence of Delivering

The total investment in these programs
amounted to $75.5 million; Atlantic
Philanthropies contributed about $28 million
of that investment and the remainder came
from the Office of the Minister and Deputy
First Minister and from government departments with a direct interest in their functions
(e.g., Education, Health, and Justice). The Early
Intervention Transformation Program tries
to transform mainstream public services by
enabling a shift to early intervention and prevention. The Dementia Together Program
contributes to the government’s regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland. The Shared Education Signature
Program aims to scale up the number of schools
involved in sharing classes on a cross-community basis and in sharing resources and teachers
as a way of breaking down sectoral boundaries
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 29
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TABLE 3 Atlantic Philanthropies’ Partnership Programs With the Northern Ireland Government

Results

Partnering
With
Government
Funding

Aims

Early Intervention
Transformation Program
$36.7 million total
partnership funds

$7.73 million total
partnership funds

To transform mainstream
services by enabling a
shift to early intervention
and prevention through a
greater use of evidence
and focus on outcomes.

To develop the extent, frequency,
and continuity of meaningful
shared contact between peer
groups within cross-community
school partnerships. Aim is
to support sustained crosscommunity learning through
shared classes, but at the same
time for schools to retain their
own community identity.

To make a significant
contribution to the
regional dementia
strategy, which
promotes a holistic
model involving the
community, family,
caregivers and services
in support of people
with dementia.

Three work streams:

Funds high-quality programs
that provide opportunities for
shared-learning experiences
that directly support the delivery
of the curriculum. The program
also supports the professional
development of teachers and
school leadership to improve
the quality of sharing and
collaboration among schools.

Three work streams:

• Support families when
problems arise, before
need for statutory
involvement.

• A significant
improvement in
quality and quantity of
prevention and early
intervention services.
• Improved staff
development through
integrated teams.
• Mainstream resources
redirected to make
initiative sustainable.

• Develop human
capital, including skills
training for dementia
workforce.
• Provide respite, short
breaks, and support to
caregivers.
• Raise awareness and
provide information
and support about
dementia.

• Address the impact of
adversity on children.

Expected
Outcomes

Dementia Together
Program

$30 million total partnership funds

• Equip all parents with
the skills needed to give
their child the best start
in life.
Details

Shared Education Signature
Program

• Improved educational outcomes
and enhanced access to the
curriculum for all pupils involved
in shared education.
• Normalized peer-to-peer
cross-community relationships
built through regular contact
within mainstream education.
• Shared education as a
component of regular
inspection processes in schools
and strategic plans.
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• The onset and
progression of
dementia in the
Northern Ireland
population is delayed.
• People with dementia
have the health and
social-care services
they need.
• People with dementia
live well in Northern
Ireland.
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Stakeholder Views
Conception, Design, and Content

Having three signature programs operating
under the same Delivering Social Change policy
framework conceals some significant similarities
and differences. The Shared Education Signature
Program, for example, was largely seen as scaling up Atlantic’s antecedent Shared Education
Program. The Dementia Together Program
was unambiguously about working alongside
government to implement the regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland (Northern Ireland Department of Health,
Social Services, and Public Safety, 2011). In so
doing, it carved out areas of work that would
add value to the implementation of the strategy: human capital development, respite care,
awareness raising, and delirium. The Early
Intervention Transformation Program (EITP),
on the other hand, could be considered a successor program to the work Atlantic had been doing
for the previous 10 years — improving outcomes
for children through early intervention. Much of
its work to date had been about testing, through
children’s NGOs, various preventive measures
early in the lives of children and whether they
produced better outcomes.
As one Atlantic respondent noted:
When we decided to work directly with government, each of the three strands had been doing
their own thing, negotiating directly with potential
government partners in terms of what we might
do. Delivering Social Change then came along and
that seemed to us to be a wrapper which could usefully provide a rubric for our work.

The design and content of the signature programs, however, attracted criticism from
external stakeholders. Those grantees previously
working on shared education detected a loss in
passion and commitment to its essence as the

Those grantees previously
working on shared education
detected a loss in passion and
commitment to its essence as
the effort became absorbed into
the public-sector bureaucracy.
effort became absorbed into the public-sector
bureaucracy. In the Shared Education Program’s
original conception, creativity and risk-taking
were encouraged and, in the spirit of learning
from errors and rethinking practice, schools
were not criticized for making mistakes. While
probity of spending was important, accountability tended to focus on outcomes — what
had been achieved in the schools. Inevitably
those working outside the system on shared
education felt a sense of loss when it became
mainstreamed. Beyond the specifics of this program, moving from pilots to scale can result in
a perceived or real diminution of core content
(Ross, 2014).
The design of the dementia program was criticized for failing to take sufficient account of
existing provisions and, in some cases, duplicating what was already there. The slow pace
of the program was linked to what one NGO
interviewee described as “the clunkiness of the
system, particularly around commissioning, procurement, and recruitment processes, which [is]
exacerbated when a number of public bodies are
involved.” However, most criticism by former
grantees was leveled at the early-intervention
program, for a “lack of coherence.” Complaints
took a number of forms: interventions in which
Atlantic had invested significantly not appearing to any extent in the signature program; the
number of pilots in a program whose purpose
was perceived by former grantees as taking proof
of concepts to scale; the absence of due diligence
applied to partnering with government compared with what had been required of NGOs
who worked with Atlantic; and the seemingly
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 31
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that reflect wider divisions in society. (See Figure
2 and Table 3.) We consider in some detail the
views of stakeholders operating within and outside the philanthropy-government partnership
to deliver these three Atlantic Philanthropies
exit programs.
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An example to illustrate
the problems around
implementation came from
shared education. The Shared
Education Signature Program
faltered at the outset as its
introduction became entangled
with a trade union dispute
over academic assessment.
From this stuttering start the
SESP has begun to gather
momentum, but external
interviewees expressed the
view that its implementation
is being carried out in the most
minimalist way.
lower priority of evidence as a consideration in
program work.
Officials disagreed with these criticisms:
What we are now looking at are projects that draw
from existing practice and, by improving that
practice, become part of a systemic change process
going forward — antenatal and postnatal pathways involving holistic support from midwives and
health visitors respectively in the EITP programme
is a case in point. This is changing the system.

It is also worth pointing out that while the EITP,
with an investment of about $37 million, is the
largest of the three signature programs, Atlantic
Philanthropies makes a contribution of approximately one-third of the overall budget ($12
million). It is not therefore unreasonable for contributing departments to promote ideas that they
deem worthy of support rather than see the EITP
32 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

as simply a vehicle to take Atlantic’s prior interventions to scale. Officials also disliked some of
the branded early-childhood programs supported
by Atlantic that required licensing and the use of
copyrighted training materials. Moreover, DSC
expenditure overall is relatively small. As one
civil servant pointed out:
Year-on-year, going back to 2012, we should not
lose sight of the fact that DSC expenditure is less
than 1 percent of public spending — it’s tiny. Even
if you want the “tail to wag the dog,” you have a
very small tail on a very big dog, so it needs to be
kept in perspective.

Implementation

The key concern raised by external stakeholders
on implementation was that the signature programs were being treated like “an initiative, a
project, or a time-limited intervention.” In other
words, they did not have confidence that the
implementation process to date offered reassurance on mainstreaming. In part, this may have
been a feature of just how slow the process of
implementation had been up to that point, for a
variety of reasons. As one external stakeholder
pointed out,
When we were working on shared education, it
got to the point where every member of our team
would walk through fire to make this work. There
was a solid, unbending belief that this was the right
thing to do, buoyed up by a network of teachers
with the same ambition and commitment. The
energy that you draw from these experiences is
amazing. The reality is that it is never going to be
like that when it is part of the mainstream.

An example to illustrate the problems around
implementation came from shared education.
The Shared Education Signature Program
(SESP) faltered at the outset as its introduction
became entangled with a trade union dispute
over academic assessment. From this stuttering
start the SESP has begun to gather momentum,
but external interviewees expressed the view
that its implementation is being carried out in
the most minimalist way. As one NGO interviewee observed,
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A key aspect of implementing the signature programs is the interagency work associated with
all three areas of work. Interviewees saw considerable merit in this idea and credited DSC as
the vehicle for making cross-departmental work
happen. As one official noted,
Given the unique mandatory political coalition
which we have in Northern Ireland, DSC offers
a vehicle in which a centre left and centre right
administration can approach diverse issues that
straddle their ambitions for growing the economy
while, at the same time, creating a more socially
just or equitable society. … For some DSC can
be an article of faith, others may see it in a more
mechanistic way — for me, it has afforded a real
opportunity to work horizontally.

The fact that departments made a financial commitment to the signature programs “guaranteed
their presence at the partnership table, if only for
accountability purposes,” an NGO interviewee
said. One criticism is that their commitment will
wane after activities have been commissioned,
but still allows them to point to their stake in
the signature programs. More fundamentally,
some interviewees criticized the kind of principal-agent model (Cairney, 2012) that prevailed
across interagency work, citing the relationship between the Department of Education
and Education Authority as one of a number of
examples: the Education Authority may act in
its own interests rather than the expectations of
the Department of Education, causing a principal-agent problem.
Mainstreaming and Sustainability

While a number of interviewees were vocally
critical of Atlantic Philanthropies’ move to
partnering with government (see Table 4), few
offered plausible alternatives. Rather, they provided nuanced comments on the process (more
explicit intentions on Atlantic’s part of what they
wanted from the partnership and greater overall

There was, in general, an
acknowledgment that to
mainstream provision,
services piloted by Atlantic’s
former grantees had to move
from external interventions
into recurrent spending by
government departments. The
issue for NGOs was how this
process happened in practice.
coherence within the three signature programs).
There was, in general, an acknowledgment that
to mainstream provision, services piloted by
Atlantic’s former grantees had to move from
external interventions into recurrent spending
by government departments. The issue for NGOs
was how this process happened in practice.
It is unlikely that the multiple activity streams
associated with the EITP can be fully resourced
into the future. What internal stakeholders argue
is that the working model of the EITP represents
an approach to transforming children’s services
through prevention and early intervention that
can be sustained and embedded in the way services are delivered. This approach attempts to
“change the way we do things” by posing the
following questions: Where is the evidence for
introducing the proposed practice change? What
is the transformation — which piece of the system are you going to change? How will this
change be sustained in the long term?
In shared education, there was an acceptance that
prior work under Atlantic’s Shared Education
Program had been hugely instrumental in securing significant policy and legislative gains that
would help in the process of sustainability. There
were concerns that shared education needed to
be given greater priority within the education
system if it was not to suffer the fate of integrated
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Shared education is about much more that shared
classes. It is about changing the way in which education is delivered by pushing the boundaries to
embrace joint-faith schools, federations, shared campuses, jointly appointed teachers, changes to the
area planning process, and a host of other things.

Knox and Quirk

TABLE 4 Stakeholder Views on Partnership With Government

Results

Delivering Social
Change

Internal (Government) Stakeholders

External (NGO) Stakeholders

Did not attract widespread
governmental support as a framework
for change.

Largely seen as unimportant in the
operation of the 3 signature programs.

Interagency
working

Departments with “skin in the game”
were attentive to where their resources
were going.

Government departments still find it
difficult to work cross-departmentally.
Government officials didn’t always
value third-sector involvement in
partnership arrangements.

“Do no harm” to
grantees

Not seen as particularly relevant — the
relationship between NGOs was with
Atlantic.

Atlantic more concerned with legacy
of partnering with government than
substance/ success of signature
programs.

Challenge role

Signature programs have a “top-down”
orientation owned and managed by
government departments.

Atlantic’s partnership with government
has muted its challenge function.
There is a need for an external voice.

Mainstreaming
and sustainability

There is a legitimate role for
departments to pilot ideas in signature
programs.

Fidelity of Atlantic pilots taken to scale
(Shared Education) in other areas
(Dementia and EITP). Where is the
change in professional practice?

Role of Atlantic
Philanthropies

“Keeping us honest” so that resources
are not absorbed into recurrent
expenditures.

Transformative influence in the way
government does things.

education (i.e., low growth in numbers, plateauing at under 7 percent of all school children).
Shared education is not fully embedded in the
system and political parties see it in very different ways — unionists (loosely Protestants) as
a route to a single, state education system, and
nationalists (loosely Catholics) as consistent
with the principles of parental choice. There is
also a concern, however, that infrastructure and
buildings — shared-education campuses — will
become synonymous with shared education and,
in so doing, its core principles will get lost.

and there is little sign of a follow-up strategy. As
one NGO interviewee put it:

The Dementia Together Program was designed
to complement the rollout of the regional strategy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern
Ireland. The portents for sustainability are not
good as pressure grows on public expenditure

What have been the general lessons learned so
far in partnering with government as an exit
strategy, based on Atlantic Philanthropies’ experience of working outside and more recently
inside the system?
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There is talk that the [dementia strategy implementation group] will be stood down, which is a
worrying development, on the basis that if we don’t
have another strategy, then there is no need for an
implementation group. My concern is that when
Atlantic’s money goes we could lose the significant
gains we have made to date.

Lessons Learned

Partnership With Government

• Bureaucracies. Public bureaucracies are slow,
cumbersome, and must adhere to strict
rules of accountability in spending taxpayers’ money. In partnering with the public
sector, external agencies have to accept that
their funding becomes partly subject to
the same exigencies, although foundations
have the power to set and hold expectations because of the resources they commit
to partnering with government. Hence, it
becomes frustrating when procurement
or staffing processes suck the momentum
out of opportunities when, previously, philanthropic funding could be deft and fleet
of foot. Somewhat perversely, however,
government partners have used Atlantic’s
involvement as a way of bringing pressure
to bear on other parts of the public sector,
either to leverage pre-agreed resources or to
prompt action. Such is the inertia in some
parts of the bureaucracy that an external
agent can, through its resources, be used to
kick-start public agencies.
• The change process. Effecting change in
the public sector is fraught with difficulties for myriad reasons. The particular
experience of Atlantic Philanthropies in
Northern Ireland was at the level of policy
implementation. Early negotiations around
partnership arrangements tended to take

place at the strategic level with parent government departments in a particular area
(e.g., Education, Health, Justice), but the
responsibility for rolling out the programs
lay with government agencies or armslength bodies. Departments often adopted
a principal-agent role and, as a result,
implementation bodies did not wholly own
the signature programs or fully endorse
what Atlantic wanted from them. The significant lesson for external funders is to
recognize the importance of managing
public-policy networks, or what Osborne
(2010) describes as new public governance
that is “both a product of, and a response
to, the increasingly plural and fragmented
nature of policy implementation and service delivery” (p. 9). There should also be
some recognition of the problems associated with systemwide change in the U.K.
public sector, best illustrated by Pettigrew,
Ferlie, and McKee (1992), who highlighted
the factors most likely to create a receptive
context for change.
• Relationships with government. Partnering
with government has the potential to
change relationships. Working as an external funder allowed Atlantic to support
NGOs in developing alternative public-service delivery models with accompanying
evidence of their effectiveness. These
organizations then advocated for policy
change based on proof-of-concept ideas.
In some cases, this pitted NGOs against
the public-sector status quo by challenging existing professional practice. In fact,
Atlantic encouraged and incentivized much
more than this. It supported organizations
in developing advocacy campaigns that
would “take on” public-sector organizations
with the aim of changing public policy and/
or introducing legislation. By association,
Atlantic could have been perceived as a
policy agitator at best, or, at worst, a thorn
in the side of government. Moving to partner with government changed the nature of
that relationship, although not its history.
Atlantic’s capacity to be indirectly critical
of government through NGOs it previously
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• Expectations. External funders may have
high expectations of what can be achieved
with their resources. From 1991 to 2015,
Atlantic awarded grants totaling more
than $600 million in Northern Ireland, or
3.6 percent of one year’s public spending.
This is not to minimize the level of funding
involved: far from it. The key learning point
for external funders is to be very targeted
and selective in areas where interventions
are most likely to influence change. So,
although Atlantic’s overall financial commitment set against the total public-sector
budget appeared small, within the three
targeted areas — shared education, early
intervention, and dementia — the funding
was significant and its track record in modeling professional practice was impressive.
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Philanthropic money allows for
experimentation, creativity,
permission to get it wrong,
and learning from these
experiences. The public sector
does not easily embrace this
approach; the career trajectory
of officials and ambitious
politicians can be tied to the
success of policies.
funded has, of necessity, been muted. Its
new role, however, offered insider status, a
working relationship with senior officials,
and, as a result, influence at the highest
level of decision-making to advocate for
mainstreaming.
• Relationships with NGOs. Not only do relationships with government change, but
those with erstwhile NGO grantees can
alter for the worse. In part this may be
explained by the fact that NGOs have lost a
valuable funding stream and, hence, there
is an element of sour grapes. However, it
is also true that NGOs, whose passion for
their work helped inform the very changes
now being supported in government, get
lost in the routine of what officials might see
as “yet another project.” NGOs have handed
over their “baby,” and look with a very critical eye at the adoptive government parents.
Moreover, NGOs witness what they would
see as Atlantic exercising much less rigor
in selecting government as a partner than
they had experienced at the outset in their
relationship. There will, of course, always
be criticisms from NGOs that government
officials do not exercise the same personal
investment and level of commitment to the
transferred work. When pressed for alternatives, however, NGOs accept — albeit
36 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

reluctantly — that services cannot be sustained outside the remit of the public sector
and their role must be to ensure fidelity to
the good-practice models they helped to
develop. For Atlantic, DSC came along at a
time when it was looking for a way to partner with government, and its standards of
due diligence, given the partner, may well
have been lower than those expected of
NGOs — a double standard, from the perspective of former grantees.
• External voice. This weakening as an
external advocate is borne out in the role
Atlantic plays in the governance of the
signature programs. While Atlantic clearly
deserves a seat at the oversight board by
dint of its significant financial contribution,
civil servants can be resentful of external
“meddling” their work. Even those officials
who accept Atlantic’s presence can reduce
its role to one of “keeping us honest” —
ensuring that philanthropic money isn’t
absorbed into revenue spending in straitened financial times. Hence, having taken
philanthropic money, some officials resist
external funders playing anything more
than a prosaic role. The lesson for Atlantic
here was to make its presence felt not only
by virtue of its financial contribution, but
also in the expertise it brought to the table
in substantive public-policy areas. The
wider lesson for foundations may be that
governments can seek to marginalize their
influence but take their money — not with
malign intent, but simply by absorbing it
into the financial black hole that represents
the public purse.
• Risk aversion. It is not surprising that with
mainstreaming external interventions
comes the prospect of working with public officials and elected politicians who are
risk averse. Philanthropic money allows for
experimentation, creativity, permission to
get it wrong, and learning from these experiences. The public sector does not easily
embrace this approach; the career trajectory
of officials and ambitious politicians can be
tied to the success of policies. Civil servants,
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• The role of evidence. Despite the overt
commitment by the public sector to evidence-informed policymaking, in the cut
and thrust of everyday life and the fluid
political environment in which they operate, officials and politicians can be quite
short-termist in their need for and use of
evidence. This is different from the external
interventions funded by Atlantic that placed
an emphasis on producing a strong evidence
base to substantiate the effectiveness of
the work, including funding randomized
controlled trials over several years. This
could well be seen as a luxury that the public sector can ill-afford in terms of time and
resources. External funders, therefore, offer
a robust evidence base that can be persuasive in making the case for policy change,
and find political advocates who can promote common interests.
• Sustainability. Clearly an important element for philanthropic organizations in
partnering with government is to sustain the interventions, principles, and
approaches they have funded. It would
be relatively easy for government departments, without intent, to simply absorb

philanthropic funding and continue with
the status quo. The question for external
funders is how best to position themselves
to ensure the optimum opportunity for
long-term sustainability. One way could be
to demonstrate cost savings to hard-pressed
government departments. The experience
from the three signature programs has
varied. In one case, sustainability has been
pursued through successfully advocating
for a legal commitment to shared education
and an education policy that rolls out that
commitment. In the case of early intervention, sustainability has been promoted by
changing professional practice and doing
things differently — and not necessarily
with additional resources — to make public services more effective. With dementia,
the approach has been to assist government
in the implementation of its strategy while
testing models of respite care. The learning
for external funders is that approaches to
sustainability can be multifaceted and context specific, but that how to mainstream
their interventions must always be a key
element in any funding strategy.

Conclusions
None of these limitations should be read as
reasons for philanthropy not to partner with
government. Rather, they are set out as reflective learning and potential issues to be aware of.
Indeed, partnering with government offers real
opportunities to embed models that have been
developed externally and moved to the mainstream. There are senior officials in government
receptive to change, open to the challenge of
doing things differently, and grateful for external funding that affords them the opportunity
for experimentation and innovation. Some are
simply weighed down by the bureaucracy in
which they operate and find it difficult to change
course. Others seize the opportunity, value the
evidence base of external funders, and promote
change internally.
What is the reflective learning for Atlantic
Philanthropies from partnering with government so far? First, the evolution and nature
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of course, must be guardians of public
money and their actions can be restricted in
the knowledge that they may at some point
be called on to publicly account for how and
why they took a particular course of action.
That said, the spirit of “delivering social
change” offered an opportunity for external
funders to promote innovation and support
ways of changing professional practice. In
public-policy theory, these circumstances
might be described as “a policy window of
opportunity in which ‘policy entrepreneurs’
(Atlantic Philanthropies) frame issues and
promote their solutions to policy makers
or ‘solutions chasing problems’” (Kingdon,
1984, p. 174). So, notwithstanding a policy
environment in which risk aversion is the
norm, there are policy windows that allow
external funders to influence change with
policies and programs that are demonstrably effective.
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of the partnership may have been different in
circumstances where Atlantic had not been a
spend-down foundation. A broader time frame
would have been available to forge relationships
with government officials who were conscious
that Atlantic was in spend-down mode. This
could have encouraged officials to be less receptive, adopting an “Atlantic is leaving the stage”
attitude. Where Atlantic encountered dyed-inthe-wool officials, conservative in their opinions
and resistant to the whole idea of external
intervention, it simply circumvented and went
directly to politicians. The risk in such a strategy
is to unintentionally antagonize officials who
ultimately are there to implement government
policy. While this approach is undesirable, it
has sometimes resulted in a complete volte-face
by officials faced with policies that have been
put in place by their political masters; a longer
time frame may have prevented such an outcome. Second, Atlantic underestimated the pace
of change in partnering with government and
overestimated its ability to effect systemwide
change. This was made more problematic in a
political context where power-sharing arrangements accentuated ministerial fiefdoms and
made cross-departmental cooperation problematic. Third, Atlantic had developed a strong
evidence base illustrating the success of its pilot
projects and advocated for direct implementation
through a partnership with government. Here
again, Atlantic underestimated the difficulties
in taking pilots to scale within a complex public-sector system. Finally, the degree of negativity
from NGOs and erstwhile grantees toward the
foundation’s partnership with government came
as a surprise and disappointment to Atlantic. It
had anticipated that, at worst, its actions would
“do no harm” and, at best, that NGOs would
be more understanding of the need for mainstreaming. Atlantic was therefore unprepared for
the feelings of abandonment expressed by some
grantees, who may well have developed a degree
of unintentional dependency simply because of
the funding stream they have enjoyed. But grantees’ passion for their work and a desire to witness
systemic changes were factors far more profound
than the loss of Atlantic as a funding source.
38 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

While it is no road map to effecting social change
in the public sector, this article has highlighted
where the tensions exist and ways in which
Atlantic Philanthropies is attempting to address
them. It is too soon to conclude if the partnership between Atlantic and the government of
Northern Ireland will lead to embedding external interventions into the mainstream of public
services, but there is now good will on both sides
to make this happen.
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Introduction
While the benefits of beginning evaluation
efforts at program inception are well known,
many organizations simply cannot do so. There
are a variety of practical reasons for this: funding concerns, lack of capacity, the need to focus
energies on program development and implementation, and changing program goals and
activities. As a result, many such efforts begin
closer to a program’s conclusion — they are
often termed “sunset evaluations.”
The “sunset” descriptor has been used since
the 1970s in such phrases as “sunset review”
and “sunset evaluation” — public-policy terms
referring to an almost always mandated periodic review of a statute, agency, or program to
determine whether it should be terminated, continued, or modified. Here, we reframe the phrase
“sunset evaluation” to describe a rigorous and
useful evaluation that is conducted at or nearing a program’s conclusion. Characteristics of
these sunset evaluations are that they are voluntary and are intended to provide a road map for
other foundations by describing program effects,
accomplishments, and lessons learned.
We previously reported findings from an evaluation conducted at the end of a communitywide
effort to improve school food sponsored by the
Orfalea Foundation. This sunset evaluation of
the foundation’s School Food Initiative (SFI)
showed positive outcomes from the initiative’s
activities and provided recommendations for
organizations interested in engaging in similar
efforts (Carmichael Djang, Masters, Vanslyke,
& Beadnell, 2016). Because the evaluation was
begun as the foundation was spending down
and exiting initiatives, it required creative
40 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Key Points
•• While the benefits of beginning evaluation
efforts at a program’s inception are well
known, for a variety of reasons many
organizations are unable to do so and
instead begin these efforts closer to a
program’s conclusion.
•• Previously reported findings from a sunset
evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s
School Food Initiative showed positive
outcomes of the initiative’s activities
and provided recommendations for
organizations interested in engaging in
similar efforts. Because the evaluation was
begun as the foundation’s activities were
winding down, it required creative design
approaches.
•• This article uses the evaluation of the
Orfalea Foundation’s initiative to provide a
case example of a rigorous and useful sunset evaluation, and discusses other possible
extensions of these kinds of methods.

design approaches. This article’s goal is to use
the foundation’s SFI evaluation as a case example showing methods for engaging in this kind
of sunset evaluation. This example illustrates
approaches we implemented as well as other
extensions of the methods used.

Case Example:
A Foundation’s Perspective
Philanthropists are increasingly choosing to
donate all of their wealth within their lifetime,
instead of holding it in perpetuity. As a result,
foundations are building timelines for spending
down and exiting support for programs. This

Evaluation at Sunset

was the situation with the Orfalea Foundation,
which had invested in the SFI over a long-term
period and when the Obama administration
elevated school-food reform to a national priority. Foundation leaders wanted to share initiative
best practices and lessons learned with other
donors and foundations upon their exit.

However, there was minimal capacity to
integrate or analyze this data and to prepare
comprehensive evaluation reports. Thus, the
foundation used these data primarily to make
real-time adjustments with a given grant recipient or to provide updates when reporting to the
board. For many small to medium-size foundations, using data in this limited way is common.
While desirable and beneficial, it is far less common for foundations to integrate evaluation
findings across grant recipients in order to draw
evaluative conclusions about a complex, multiyear program. There are a variety of reasons for
this: foundations may prioritize directing funds
to programming rather than to evaluation, or
their personnel may have limited evaluation
expertise or face competing leadership and
organizational priorities. Sunset evaluations,
fortunately, can provide organizations that have
engaged in limited data-collection and evaluation
efforts the opportunity to salvage the data they
have collected and better understand and evaluate their overall efforts.

Evaluator Approach in
Sunset Evaluation
Before presenting the methods we used in our
case example, it is useful to point out two “soft

Collaborative Spirit

Intensive collaboration between organization
staff and the evaluators was the most essential of
the soft skills woven through the SFI evaluation.
First, we worked to develop effective relationships with foundation staff to foster successful
brainstorming sessions. These sessions were
particularly important in efforts to identify previously collected data that could be mined. Second,
it allowed the identification and engagement of
key individuals (such as front-line staff and community stakeholders) who had knowledge about
the context and effects of the initiative. This collaborative process also fostered the buy-in needed
to understand the SFI’s evolution and identify the
effects that had occurred over the previous several years.
Researchers have identified two factors that
strengthen the collaborative work of foundation
staff and evaluators (Mattessich, Murray-Close,
& Monsey, 2001): open and frequent communication, and mutual respect and understanding.
Building a collaborative relationship can be as
simple as a timely and friendly email response or
as complex as tuning into the nonverbal or emotional nuances of communication (Mintzberg,
Dougherty, Jorgensen, & Westley, 1996). We
used these and other approaches to communication to ensure successful collaboration. One
way we demonstrated mutual respect was to
explicitly reiterate the importance of foundation
personnel input and expertise to this work. We
also worked hard to foster a willingness on the
part of all parties to step out of their positions
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 41
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The SFI is a case in which conducting a sunset
evaluation was a useful, even necessary, solution.
Over an eight-year period, Orfalea had invested
$14.3 million in operating its own educational
programs as well as providing grants to schools,
school districts, and other nonprofit partners.
The goal of these efforts was to improve the
quality of food served in schools in Santa Barbara
County, California. During this period, the foundation prepared for evaluation by developing a
logic model and by having both foundation personnel and grant recipients collect field data.

skills” woven through each of the methods. Soft
skills are typically defined as behaviors associated with well-functioning relationships with
other people, such as communication, interpersonal and social skills, management practices,
and leadership. These skills — sometimes understood as emotional intelligence in action — are
frequently undervalued in professional settings,
but their use can often differentiate between
average and outstanding performance (Goleman,
1998; Wilkins, 2014). The two most salient soft
skills we identified when reflecting on this case
example are collaborative spirit and group process facilitation.
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True collaborative spirit
involves open and honest
dialogue. Engaging in this way
in a professional context can
be challenging to evaluators
and organizational staff alike.
Yet this type of emotional
intelligence in action is
particularly important in
sunset evaluations, which
require identifying creative
solutions for compiling
and collecting evaluative
information – often in the
context of staff reductions,
increased demands,
diminishing resources, and
differing expectations.
as experts in order to hear and learn from one
another. Doing so set the norm that all evaluator and staff dialogues were opportunities for
mutual learning.
This type of collaboration, however, is more
than a set of techniques. True collaborative spirit
involves open and honest dialogue. Engaging in
this way in a professional context can be challenging to evaluators and organizational staff
alike. Yet this type of emotional intelligence
in action is particularly important in sunset
evaluations, which require identifying creative
solutions for compiling and collecting evaluative
information — often in the context of staff reductions, increased demands, diminishing resources,
and differing expectations.
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Facilitating Group Processes

Another key soft skill used in this evaluation was
facilitating group activities and discussions to
draw out and harness the accumulated knowledge of multiple players. These players were
not limited to initiative staff, but also included
participants, community members, and other
stakeholders. In addition to surveys and individual interviews, we gathered information from
various constituencies using facilitated group
processes. Group work can help guide participants through a process of assessing their current
situation, envisioning and setting goals, developing strategies, and planning action steps. Skilled
facilitation of group processes can produce powerful results — for example, an evaluation plan
that has been “created, understood, and accepted
by all participants” (Wilkinson, 2012, p. 5).
Skillful facilitation of groups is an especially
important tool in sunset evaluation. It can maximize the quality and validity of the evaluation’s
findings in two ways. One way it does this is by
eliciting important information that informs the
evaluation’s design and interpretation. Another
way is by providing the benefit of bringing
together the inevitable differences in viewpoints
that stakeholders have developed over time. For
example, we encountered differences in opinion among individuals, all of whom had high
investment in the initiative, about the primary
outcomes of interest. Maneuvering these differences can be particularly challenging without
both access to a range of facilitation techniques and the ability to use them competently.
Successful group facilitation by the evaluators or
foundation personnel can bring varying perspectives together and position the group to work
toward a common viewpoint.
The facilitation techniques we applied in this
case were guiding, acting as taskmasters, motivating, and building bridges (Wilkinson, 2012).
To do this, we began with a documented facilitators’ guide describing how we intended to move
the group through this process, though we also
allowed for flexibility. By sharing this facilitation
guide with the group, we made our plans transparent. This transparency served multiple aims.
First, knowing that we had a plan increased
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participant comfort. Second, an explicit agenda
framed the tasks and helped keep the work on
track. Third, seeing progress on these tasks created a great source of energy and momentum,
helping us to motivate those involved.

Methods Useful in Sunset Evaluation
The Orfalea SFI evaluation highlights that while
some methods cannot be used at or near program completion, many others are still available.
Not usable are methods that must be implemented before a program begins, such as wait-list
and randomized-control group trials. However,
many other options remain available and appropriate. (See Table 1.) Because sunset evaluation
occurs at the conclusion of a program, these
options typically involve a process of working
backwards. Here, we present three approaches
that we used to design and conduct the SFI evaluation: mapping program evolution, leveraging
existing data, and collecting retrospective assessments of program effects.
Mapping Program Evolution

Many organizations develop their theories of
change and logic models at the beginning of
program implementation. These theories and
models serve as guides for framing program
evaluations because they explain how resources
will be dedicated and what effects upon targeted populations are expected. However, many
times these frameworks shift during a program’s
life, whether tacitly or intentionally. In sunset

evaluations, it therefore becomes important that
evaluators understand the history of the program, including how guiding theories evolved
over time.
Key elements in the process of mapping program evolution include understanding the initial
theory of program change, factors that led to
adjustments, decisions made accordingly, and the
concluding theory of change. By engaging in this
process the evaluator could learn, for example,
that the program shifted its activities specifically
because program staff found that a given activity was too cumbersome to implement. This
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 43
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Perhaps the most important facilitation technique we used in this case was bridge building.
We encountered many different perspectives on
the initiative’s theory of change and its evolution.
By creating a safe space to discuss them, we were
able to illustrate how differences in perspective
were useful. This enabled us to find and focus on
areas of agreement, and to carefully and respectfully dissect areas of disagreement. We believe
these facilitated processes helped foster commitment to the evaluation among foundation staff
and board members. In turn, this commitment
increased the likelihood that the evaluation
would meet their learning needs as well as their
desire to share valuable lessons with others.

Key elements in the process of
mapping program evolution
include understanding the
initial theory of program
change, factors that led
to adjustments, decisions
made accordingly, and the
concluding theory of change.
By engaging in this process
the evaluator could learn, for
example, that the program
shifted its activities specifically
because program staff found
that a given activity was too
cumbersome to implement.
This information itself is an
important evaluation finding
that can help others avoid going
down problematic paths when
doing similar kinds of work.
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TABLE 1 Approaches to Conducting Sunset Evaluations
Approach

Map Program
Evolution
Understand program evolution:
• Initial theory of program change

Purpose

• How and why adjustments
occurred
• Concluding theory of change

Leverage
Existing Data
• Identify outcomes to
be measured in any
new data collection

Retrospective Assessment
of Program Effects
Answer evaluation questions

• Answer evaluation
questions

Tools

• Difference in stakeholder
perspectives about theory of
change
• Archived documents (e.g.,
theory of change, logic models,
grant applications, internal
communications documents)
• Current and prior website
content
Potential
Data
Sources

• Stakeholder surveys
• Staff, stakeholder interviews
• Facilitated, structured activities
with stakeholders to map
understanding of program
theory of change

• Past interview data
(formal, informal)
• Past survey data
• Program participation
data

• Participant interviews
conducted at end of
program

Secondary data:
• Community surveys
• Government records

• Identification of drivers of
change

• Creation of new
scales and variables
to be included in
additional data
collections

• Creation of agreement about
evaluation questions to pursue

• Participant questionnaires
administered at end of
program

• Participant
demographics

• Facilitated discussions with
organization leaders about
maps

• Identification of barriers to,
facilitators of implementation
Outcomes

Primary data:

Evaluation of program
effectiveness, overall and for
subgroups

• Assessment
of participant
characteristics
• Evaluation of program
effectiveness, overall
and for subgroups

Strength/
Weakness

Strength: Evaluators and
stakeholders are able to
understand program theory of
change and shifts in this theory.
Weakness: Understanding of the
program is circumscribed by who
participates and what archived
data are available.

Strength: Cost- and
time-effective
Weakness: Limited
by availability,
completeness, and
reliability of data
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Strength: Provides findings
on participant response to
program
Weakness:
• Subject to inaccurate recall
• Limited empirical data on
validity for CSEPP approach
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There are a variety of approaches in the evaluation literature that describe processes using
images or maps to represent program theory and
evolution. The two most common are “concept
mapping” (Kane & Trochim, 2007) and “outcome mapping” (Earl, Carden, & Smutylo, 2001).
While each describes a distinct approach, all
share a focus on using participatory methods to
bring out diverse perspectives to create insight,
understanding, and consensus among stakeholders. The goal and challenge for an evaluator in
using these methods, for a sunset or other evaluation, is to facilitate and manage a process that
helps participants develop a shared vision of a
program’s goals, evolution, and outcomes.
In the evaluation of the SFI, we used elements of
these approaches to map the initiative evolution
by reviewing archived documents and facilitating discussions with organizational leadership.
We first reviewed logic models that had been
created in each year of the initiative. Doing so
allowed us to identify changes across years. We
then facilitated structured activities in which
stakeholders independently mapped what they
believed the theory of change was at the beginning, middle, and end of the initiative, and then
compared their thoughts to those of other stakeholders. Following this activity, we facilitated a
discussion about the similarities and differences
in their maps, with brainstorming about the reasons behind the differences as well as the reasons
changes had occurred. In this way, both evaluators and stakeholders were able to understand
how the initiative evolved, the drivers behind
change, and barriers and facilitators to successful
implementation. Additionally, the activity helped

Most programs accumulate
data throughout the course
of implementing their
program, whether or not it is
documented. However, program
staff may not realize the value
of these types of data for use in
program evaluation. While it is
not unusual to harvest program
data for evaluation purposes,
this practice is especially useful
in sunset evaluations, with the
particular advantage of being
cost-effective.
clarify and create agreement about the evaluation questions to be pursued.
While not used in this example, extensions to
these approaches exist. For instance, evaluators
can uncover programmatic shifts from other
types of archived documents, such as mission
statements and internal program documentation. Another potential source of archived data is
previous content from an organization’s website,
since that is a location where programs often
publish their goals and intentions. Reviewing
both current and prior website content can
uncover changes in goals and the theories underlying the change process. Using stakeholder
surveys is another option for gathering input on
past and current program goals as well as shifts
in focus that occurred.
Leveraging Existing Data

Most programs accumulate data throughout the
course of implementing their program, whether
or not it is documented. However, program staff
may not realize the value of these types of data
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 45
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information itself is an important evaluation
finding that can help others avoid going down
problematic paths when doing similar kinds of
work. Similarly, it is important to understand if
stakeholders had differing perspectives and if so,
the degree to which these contributed to refinements in the theory of change. This knowledge
can be particularly illuminating. For example,
it may turn out that leadership had perspectives
on program goals or pathways that differed from
those of program staff, or that external stakeholders were not aware of a specific program activity.
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for use in program evaluation. While it is not
unusual to harvest program data for evaluation
purposes, this practice is especially useful in
sunset evaluations, with the particular advantage of being cost-effective (Bamberger, Rugh,
Church, & Fort, 2004). Such data could be as
simple as the institutional knowledge among
program personnel that evaluators formally collect through interviews. Alternatively, it could
be data that the program team collected for
reasons other than evaluation, such as program
participation rates or attendance. Weitzman and
Silver (2013) argue for the use of existing data in
program-evaluation activities, and point out that
while they may not always have all the information desired, they often have information that is
useful or closely linked.
The case of Orfalea’s SFI evaluation provides an
example of the value, as well as potential pitfalls,
of mining existing data. One evaluation question
was whether schools that more fully participated
in the initiative had greater improvements in the
intended outcomes. To explore this question,
we were able to elicit from the initiative director her existing knowledge about how engaged
each school was in the SFI. Based on this information, we created a scale that measured the
level of engagement of each school. We used this
scale to perform a subgroup analysis in which we
compared less- to more-engaged schools. Indeed,
we found that more-engaged schools perceived
a greater need for the initiative services and had
greater improvements in outcomes. While creating this measure of engagement was valuable,
it points out a potential danger to keep in mind
— specifically, that creating measures from staff
recollections carries the danger that the knowledge of outcomes may, without them being
aware of it, color their assessments. Evaluators
must consider — and take steps to eliminate
— such threats to the validity of measures developed in this way.
Many sources of existing data can support a sunset evaluation, and some can even allow for the
use of a number of traditional evaluation designs
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). For example, data may be available that allow for pre- to
post-program tests of participant improvement.
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Additionally, data may exist on people who have
not received a program (or who have received
different services) who can serve as a comparison
group. An additional, great example of existing data is when a program team has collected
demographic information about participants
during the course of its program purely to help
with recruitment efforts. Evaluators could use
that information to conduct subgroup analyses
to identify whether a program works better for
some people than for others, thereby giving findings more precision, richness, and nuance.
Typically, other sources of data also exist. For
example, it is useful to keep in mind the value
of institutional knowledge as a type of existing data. Evaluators can learn about this using
thoughtful and reflective interviewing techniques, and this information can inform the
evaluation design, process, and interpretation.
Additionally, when evaluating programs that
intend to make community-level changes,
secondary data sources and records (such as
community surveys or government records)
may provide valuable outcome data. Examples
include using arrest data to examine how a
program influences violence, emergency room
data to explore how a program influences access
to health care, or population surveys to track
behavioral changes.
Retrospective Assessments
of Program Effects

In testing whether a program led to the desired
changes, evaluators at program sunset can be
limited in two ways. First, they may not have
baseline data available to calculate whether
change occurred. In such cases, evaluators
sometimes collect participant perspectives
using retrospective questionnaires. Such questionnaires ask participants to rate the direction
and amount of change that occurred as a result
of the program. This approach provides some
information about possible program effects, but
does not solve the second limitation, the lack
of a comparison (also known as counterfactual)
condition. Specifically, evaluators may not have
access to individuals or groups who did not
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receive the program and who could serve as a
comparison group.

In the Orfalea SFI evaluation, we used this
method to collect data from cafeteria staff representing how things actually were after the
evaluation and a counterfactual comparison
— how they would have been without the initiative. The technique provided very useful
information supporting the effectiveness of the
initiative’s efforts. For example, the data showed
improvements attributable to the initiative in
personnel’s professionalism and skills, kitchen
equipment, technical assistance, and quality of
the food served.
Variations on this approach are also available.
While the CSEPP approach emulates a comparison group evaluation design, a slightly different
question wording gathers data more like a traditional pretest-posttest design. This retrospective
approach asks participants to answer based on
how things are at the posttest and also to think
back and describe how things were for them
before the program (Pratt, McGuigan, & Katzev,
2000). Evaluators have used this method over a
much longer period compared to CSEPP, and a
larger amount of research on it exists. Studies
have found retrospectively-collected, compared
to pretest-collected, information to correlate
more strongly with objective measures (Bray,
Maxwell, & Howard, 1984; Howard, et al., 1979).

An example of our use of this traditional
retrospective approach occurred in a different evaluation project. There, we assessed
the effectiveness of training we provided to
human-service agency staff on evaluation
techniques. To do so, our post-training questionnaires asked them to think back and
estimate their skill level before the training.
This approach allowed us to compare actual
post-training knowledge to their estimates of
pre-training knowledge.
These methods can be quite useful in sunset
evaluation, although they have a number of
important caveats. As with any self-report data,
respondents’ answers are subject to potential
sources of error such as presenting oneself in a
positive light, imagining they should illustrate
an intervention was effective, or misunderstanding survey questions. While both the CSEPP
and retrospective approaches are often the only
choice for collecting participant data on initiative effects, continued research is needed to
further identify the conditions that maximize
the accuracy of information collected using
these methods.

Recommendations for Foundations
Contemplating Sunset Evaluation
For a foundation, there is significant value in
investing in a sunset evaluation at the end of
a program or initiative. Doing so can address
common goals of foundation leadership. For
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A recent innovation in retrospective data collection has shown promise in this regard. This
technique is called “counterfactual as self-estimated by program participants” (CSEPP).
With this method, evaluators ask participants
to answer outcome questions in two ways: an
assessment of themselves currently and how they
would be had they not received the program.
Evaluators then compare the two answers. In
effect, participants serve as their own comparison, providing both program and counterfactual
data. Research comparing this method to traditional random-controlled designs indicates that it
is a valid way of assessing changes in intentions
and attitudes, though further research is need
to validate it as a method to assess changes in
behavior (Mueller & Gaus, 2015).

Moore and Tananis (2009) point out one issue the
retrospective method is meant to address, which
is that respondents may not correctly understand
and interpret questions before an intervention.
For example, participants may overestimate
their knowledge on a topic before receiving
information about it in a program. Hence, their
self-assessment of knowledge would be inaccurately high if asked before the program. After
reviewing the literature on retrospective data
collection, these authors concluded that there
is substantial evidence supporting this concern,
with the end result being a less accurate estimation of program effects using pre- and posttesting
compared to retrospective measures.
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Sunset evaluation can also
contribute to grant recipients’
and other partners’ learning.
For example, engaging in the
evaluation process provides
an opportunity for such
stakeholders to reflect on their
contributions and success
(or failure), and this can
help improve organizational
effectiveness and future
partnering with foundations
or donors.
example, sunset evaluation can capture and
describe the impact of a long-term investment,
which helps build a legacy of giving for the
foundation and a culture of philanthropy in the
communities that they serve. More importantly,
providing opportunities for foundations to learn
from one other can help the philanthropic sector
better understand and invest in critical community needs. Sunset evaluation can also help
build a unified vision of multiyear or complex
efforts among foundation leadership. Engaging
various levels of leadership and program staff
in the evaluation process — for example, mapping the evolution of an initiative — can unite
leadership around a common vision of initiative
success. Sunset evaluation can also contribute
to grant recipients’ and other partners’ learning.
For example, engaging in the evaluation process
provides an opportunity for such stakeholders to
reflect on their contributions and success (or failure), and this can help improve organizational
effectiveness and future partnering with foundations or donors.
To increase the likelihood of a sunset evaluation’s success, foundation leadership and board
48 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

members have several important tasks. First,
they should engage in a facilitated conversation
to establish how highly they prioritize evaluation. Once the decision has been made to
dedicate resources to sharing foundation learnings through an evaluation, it is paramount to
ensure the level of investment aligns with the
prioritization and will adequately support the
work. Once this has been achieved, foundation
staff must vet and select an evaluator or evaluation firm to guide the work. Important evaluator
characteristics to take into consideration include
the creative design approaches and soft skills
discussed above that are necessary for a successful sunset evaluation. There are other important
considerations as well. Does the evaluator
align with your organizational values? Do they
understand the level of resources that you have
available and the implications for the scope of
work? Do they communicate with you in a way
that helps you understand expectations and feel
comfortable asking questions? Lastly, depending
on the intended audiences and uses for the evaluation findings, the experience, credentials, and
reputation of the evaluation consultant or firm
may be important to the perceived credibility of
the evaluation.

Conclusions
The evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s SFI
is an example of how rigorous evaluation can
occur late in the life of a program, even in its
final stages. Specialized techniques such as retrospective assessments of program effects play
an important role in these types of sunset evaluations. Soft skills like facilitation are equally key,
and their importance should not be undervalued.
Together these approaches can produce rigorous, useful evaluations while working within the
timing of programs drawing to a close. This is
good news given that evaluation is an important
element in organizations’ missions to address
challenging social problems, and that the reality of many programs does not position them to
begin their evaluation efforts early.
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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
Barbara Kibbe, J.D., S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
Keywords: Foundation exits; funder-grantee relationships; communication; impact of foundation exits; capacitybuilding; final grants

You tell me that you’re leavin’; I can’t believe it’s true. ...
Think of all that we’ve been through. (Sedaka & Greenfield, 1962)
¯ Neil Sedaka
Introduction

Sector

Funding relationships begin, and they end. All
foundations periodically revisit program priorities and strategies. Course corrections can and
often do include exits. Some exits occur at the
planned end of a time-limited initiative. Others
may be occasioned by new insights that come
from research or evaluation. Still others are the
result of new leaders bringing different priorities
to the fore.
Yet little is known about the effects of foundation
exits on the work, the grantees, and the related
fields. Given the frequency and ubiquity of foundation exits, the literature is painfully thin.
Grantcraft’s monograph The Effective Exit:
Managing the End of a Funding Relationship
(Mackinnon & Jaffe, 2007) was published a
decade ago and focuses primarily on the grantor-grantee relationship. It describes funder exits
as normal. The authors admonish foundations to
communicate clearly, build grantee capacity, and
help grantees find replacement funding.
In 2011, Exiting Responsibly, a rigorous, cross-cutting study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, looked at the broad context for
funder exits and discussed the approaches and
implications of ending field-level support. The
authors argued that planning for and carefully
executing the end of a funding relationship
can help maximize the results of past investments and solidify progress even as the funder
50 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Key Points
•• What do funders leave behind when they
exit? What is lost? Are there approaches to
exits that are more effective at preserving
the results of good work? Through
interviews with 19 professionals who
have experienced or are currently working
through a foundation exit, this article draws
on stories of more than a dozen such exits
to fill the gaps in what is known about how
to exit well.
•• This article discusses four areas where
foundation exits present particular
challenges and where there are significant
opportunities to improve practice – deciding
on and planning to exit, funder leadership,
clear communication, and final grants – and
includes summaries of advice from funder
and grantee perspectives.
•• This article aims to offer practical insights
that may help improve what is all too often
an uncomfortable, confusing, and potentially
damaging process, and, it is hoped, will
spur continued research and contribute to a
sustained dialogue about how to preserve,
or even extend, value in the context of a
foundation exit.

exits. “Responsible and respectful field exits
require careful and deliberate procedures,”
they observed; however, they continued: “It is
quite usual for foundations to exit fields, and
disconcertingly common for them to do so with
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little advance notice and unclear rationales”
(Petrovich, 2011, p. 4).
Six years and many foundation exits later, there
is still too little known about how to exit well
or what the results of foundation exits might
be — even while recent research and a number
of recent, high-profile examples of limited-life
foundations are generating increased interest in
foundation exits and spend-downs (see, e.g., Loh
& Buteau, 2017). This article is intended to make
a modest contribution toward filling that gap.

Study Design and Approach
What do funders leave behind when they exit?
What is lost? Are there approaches to exits that
are more (or less) effective at preserving or
extending the results of good work? At ensuring
that grantees and fields thrive? Or even that the
work continues when there is a persistent need?

In addition to a literature review, interviews
were conducted with 19 professionals representing a range of foundations, nonprofit grantees,
intermediaries, and consultants. Each person
interviewed has experienced or is currently working through a foundation exit. Interviews were
conducted using structured protocols. Interview
subjects were asked to explain the initial goals
or theory of change for the program or initiative
that ended or was winding down, the planning
process for the exit, and the structure of the final
grants. They were also asked to reflect on challenges confronted and the ramifications of exiting
on the work and its field. Funders were asked to
offer advice to other funders and to speak to any
evaluation plans. Grantees were asked to offer
advice to other nonprofit organizations that are
facing the withdrawal of a major funder. At the
conclusion of each interview, subjects were asked

All interviewees were promised confidentiality.
As a group, they responded with great candor
and willingness to be self-critical in the interest
of helping others identify pitfalls in the process.
Many characterized the topic as understudied
and underdiscussed. The content covered in this
article ranges from cautionary tales of precipitous changes in direction with clear damage to
grantees and fields to stories of considered and
deliberate exits where great care was taken,
resources committed, and success achieved. In
all cases studied for this report, the exits were, in
a word, complicated.
This article aims to offer practical insights that
may help improve what is all too often an uncomfortable, confusing, and potentially damaging
process. It is also hoped that this article will spur
continued research and contribute to a sustained
dialogue about how to preserve — or even extend
— value in the context of a foundation exit.
Although the interviews were wide-ranging, this
article discusses four areas where foundation exits
present particular challenges and where there are
significant opportunities to improve practice: (1)
deciding and planning to exit, (2) implications of
funder leadership; (3) the confusion of communications; and (4) final grants. Summaries of advice
— from funders to funders and from grantees to
grantees — are also included.

If I go, there will be trouble.
And if I stay it will be double.
(Headon, Jones, Simonon, & Strummer, 1982)

¯ The Clash
Deciding and Planning to Exit:
“Should I Stay or Should I Go?”
The reasons for a funder exit vary. Adjustments
to funding priorities can come from a new
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 51

Sector

These and other questions were explored in
the research to inform this article. In all, the
research draws from stories of more than a
dozen exits, some from multiple perspectives
(e.g., funder and grantee, or funder and intermediary or consultant). This article focuses on the
experience of and with perpetual foundations in
connection with an exit from one or more major
initiatives or lines of work.

for recommendations of others knowledgeable
about foundation exits and, in this way, additional
interview subjects were identified.

Kibbe

strategic direction — often brought about by a
change in foundation executive leadership or the
expressed desires of the founder or board. Exits
can also be the byproduct of a desire to seize a
window of opportunity — for example, when
new data or shifts in context illuminate a promising path. In some cases, midcourse evaluation
findings may suggest a redirection of resources.
In others, a time-limited initiative comes to its
planned conclusion. In short, a foundation that
exits a grantee relationship, initiative, or issue
area may be responding to internal shifts, changing external circumstances, or both.

Sector

In the situations examined for this study, one
interviewee oversaw a patient and careful planning process that led to a responsible exit from
approximately 75 long-standing grantee relationships. Another, very different case, was described
by a funder who was troubled by the fact that
nearly all the grantees in the portfolio had been
created by the foundation and were seriously and
unhealthily dependent on the foundation at the
time of the exit.
Some exits examined were expected from the
outset, as with time-limited initiatives. Funders
and grantees generally found these situations
easier to navigate, although not routine and
far from simple. In other situations, where
the expectation was for long-term or ongoing
support — or where the extent of the funder’s
commitment was not clear — the exit was challenging for all sides.
Not surprisingly, nearly every interviewee
strongly recommended that foundations plan
for exit upon entry into a new relationship, issue
area, or initiative. However, this advice was
offered with the benefit of hindsight, and heeding
it may not always — or even often — be feasible;
virtually none of the funders in this study did so
themselves. Still, some exits were more intentional than others and, in all instances, there is
room for improvement and there are big lessons
to be learned.
In one notable case, a recently appointed foundation CEO was eager to divert funding to a
suite of new initiatives but was persuaded by a
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midcourse evaluation that, although some adjustments could and should be made, an abrupt exit
would undo a great deal of progress:
We had a succession of leadership changes. By
the end of Phase 1 [of the initiative] there was a
new president and senior leaders who wanted to
embrace new opportunities, and there was a desire
to wind down some existing work to make room
for the new. There was a proposal to end the initiative after five years, but an external evaluation
recommended that we stay the course. We went
into Phase 2 and readjusted to include more of a
focus on systemic change. We pared down so that
we could go deeper with what was working and
emphasized building institutional capabilities to
carry on the work.

In this example, although some grantees may
have lost funding, the work was protected
and continued via a thoughtful approach that
included regular dialogue with grantees.
In another situation, which also involved a new
CEO, external consultants led the foundation
through an extensive process to reassess its
grantmaking. This resulted in a fundamentally
new set of decisions about future focus that
necessitated foundation staffing changes as well
as exits from initiatives and whole lines of work.
Grantees and other field leaders were involved in
the planning process. The foundation responded
to grantee feedback with a five-year ramp-down
plan and significant funding to see the grantees and the work through the transition. In the
words of the CEO, “Our attempt to begin making amends was by collectively planning for the
field to step into the leadership role and for the
foundation to move out of the center of things.”
A third example relates to a significant shift
at a large foundation interested in deepening
outcomes. It chose to reduce the number of
grantees in its portfolio, offering larger, longer
support to fewer organizations over time. That
foundation is gradually exiting many long-term
grantee relationships with a commitment to
transition funding:
[We] did set up a transition fund. … Every unit had
to cut back by 25 percent. That 25 percent went
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into a transition fund, and there was a process by
which you could apply internally for either a grant
or a set of grants for organizations that you knew
you would be giving [final grants] to. … That has
budgetary implications for us. … On the other
hand, it is a respectful way to treat grantees.

In all three of these cases, foundation leaders put
significant additional resources on the table to
help them and their grantees navigate the exit.
They operated in a consultative manner, seeking the input of grantees and other field leaders
as they planned their exits. And they supported
grantees to pivot, formulate new strategies, and
build new capabilities.

A combination of a constrained program budget,
staff restructuring, and shifting priorities precipitated the decision to exit. We received the news
that we were going to exit about three weeks
before we saw all of the grantees at a conference.

Although this example is far from isolated,
previous examples demonstrate that there are
funders that do take a proactive stance regarding
future exits. They are aware of the complexities
of exits and realize that funders simply do not
control all the variables. They know that context
matters. According to these funders, there is no
single or reliably right way to conclude a grant
relationship or initiative. But there is a way (and,
arguably, a mandate) to be thoughtful and constructive. One interviewee said:
When a decision has been made to exit, it requires
careful planning and you need to think about how
you structure the end of that grant relationship. It

How you ever gonna know if
you never take a chance?
You know failure isn’t failure if
a lesson from it’s learned.
(Brooks & Blazy, 1997)

¯ Garth Brooks
Implications of Funder Leadership:
“How You Ever Gonna Know?”
In this, the heyday of strategic philanthropy,1 the
time-limited initiative is very popular. Funders
are going beyond (and, at times, far beyond)
responding to worthy requests for support. It is
now generally accepted that foundations can and
should lead efforts at social change — funding
and convening networks, supporting learning
communities, and engaging in proactive advocacy related to the goals and specific timelines
they themselves establish. There is a healthy
debate in the field about the practice and the

Paul Brest and Hal Harvey (2008) defined strategic philanthropy as consisting of “clearly defined goals, commensurate with
resources; strategies for achieving the goals; strategies that are based on sound evidence; and feedback to keep the strategy on
course.” At that time, they wrote, “Strategic philanthropy deploys resources to have maximum impact — to make the biggest
possible difference. This approach is captured by the idea of social return on investment, where ‘return’ refers to improving
the world rather than financial gain” (p. 17). In 2009, the Center for Effective Philanthropy articulated a definition of strategy
for foundations: “a framework for decision-making that is (1) focused on the external context in which the foundation works,
and (2) includes a hypothesized causal connection between use of foundation resources and goal achievement” (Buteau,
Buchanan, & Brock, 2009, p.3).

1

The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 53

Sector

Another case offers a stark contrast; staff had no
advance notice of the board’s decision to exit a
field-building line of work, leaving them in the
unenviable position of needing to notify grantees
immediately of the shift and of the fact that no
additional funding would be forthcoming:

could be a grant, capacity-building grant, a flexible
final grant, or you can set it up so that they [grantees] can leverage support from other funders. This
is all context-specific. There is no formula for this
other than a standard for what seems fair or reasonable. If you funded a two-year project, sometimes
four months into that second year can be enough
of a heads-up for ending support. It is different for a
long-term, highly funded relationship. You need to
think in budget terms, in the context of providing
a fair and reasonable warning. Always, when you
think about this, ask yourself: How will ending
funding to this organization affect the field? How
will it impact the individual organization? Will it
mean layoffs? How will it affect [the foundation’s]
reputation and credibility? That is basically the
framework that we have laid out.

Kibbe

value of strategic philanthropy, with smart,
thoughtful leaders on both sides of the argument
(Buchanan & Patrizi, 2016).
More than half of the cases studied for this article
offered examples of funders taking center stage
in an initiative or issue area. In all of these cases,
funders were engaged in field building: They
were pioneers in bringing focus to an issue, along
with significant resources. They created new
knowledge and new infrastructure. Along the
way, organizations were created or scaled that
were dependent on their foundation partner, its
leadership, and its reputation.

have included more dialogue about distributed
leadership and about how to replace the foundation’s funding. If I had it to do over again, I
would look at a more open leadership model.”
Leaders in philanthropy talk and write about the
role of funders in providing more than money.
In general, the funder is lauded when it invests in
capacity building; funds evaluation, knowledge
building, and infrastructure for fields; and is
unafraid to be visible and vocal in service of a big
goal. But it is precisely when there is more than
money at stake that an imminent exit is most
likely to cripple grantees or stall fields.
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Regardless of the reasons, when a major funder
decides to shift priorities away from field-building work, exiting without harming the field or
the organizations operating in that field is particularly difficult. As one funder noted, “Our
central presence in the field actually made
attracting other funders more difficult because
we were seen as being so involved.” In the words
of the foundation CEO who championed such a
change in direction and approach:

What, then, is the path forward for a funding
initiative that has field building at its core? What
can or should a funder do where there is a compelling need, an alignment of donor intent, and
a will on the part of foundation board and leadership to address that need? If there is no mature
ecosystem of grantees and funders, the work will
be inherently risky.

We did a lot of stuff that was heavy handed from a
funder perspective. ... It was successful, but I don’t
think we would want to do it again. We experienced lots of staff turnover and lots of grantee
frustration.

When interviewed, exiting funders that pursued
a central role were reflective and self-critical.
Most saw significant downsides to their prominent and visible place in the work and the field,
and would take a different approach in the
future. In the words of three different funders:

The lack of collaboration with others in the
field was viewed as a handicap, according to a
grantee formerly funded in connection with this
work. Also, according to grantees interviewed,
the foundation’s central role in the direction of
the field preempted the opportunity for organizations to learn how to work together without
mandated collaboration. In the words of one
grantee, “It remains to be seen whether we are
all able to learn to play together without the
funder forcing that.”
Across the range of cases studied, funders, grantees, and intermediaries discussed the challenges
associated with an exit where the funder was in
the lead. When asked what they would do differently if given the chance, many echoed this
funder’s statement: “Initial conversations should
54 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

The first step is to acknowledge that risk.

I have especially strong feelings about the situation where a funder is the last donor — a situation
where it is clear that there is not a critical mass of
ingredients that will take the grantee anywhere
good, especially where we helped the organization
get started and develop. We have a long, poor track
record of staying in there when we shouldn’t have.
Donors should not try to substitute themselves in
terms of agency and leadership.
What became pretty clear was that the grantees
really relied on [foundation] staff and energy to
come together. ... They were not staffed in a way
that really had anyone to coordinate group convenings. We offered them a consultant to help
organize convenings. After that, they really had
to tear down group expectations of what they
were going to be able to do. In hindsight, it seems
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obvious. Whether it was wishful thinking that this
would be able to continue merrily without us or a
real misassessment of their capacity, in hindsight it
seems so obvious.
I’m much more attuned to how well the initiative
aligns with the core business of the organization
that we are funding. If they’re really taking on
new work because [the funder] is kind of focused
on an area, that requires a lot of careful thought.
Whereas, if it is much more embedded in their core
mission, I am less worried because after five years,
if you need to tie off support, you haven’t affected
the DNA of the organization as much.

I say high, you say low. You
say why, and I say I don’t
know. You say goodbye, and I
say hello. (McCartney & Lennon, 1967)
¯ The Beatles
The Confusion of Communications:
“Hello, Goodbye”
The common wisdom on communicating about
an exit is easy to recite: (1) communicate early
and often, and (2) deliver consistent messages.
The reasons often cited are: (a) the grantee
should have as much time as possible to prepare
for the loss in funding, and (b) any change or

Literally all of the funders, grantees, and intermediaries interviewed for this report would
quickly agree that early, clear, and consistent
communication about an impending foundation
exit is a worthy goal.2 At the same time, interviewees all shared stories about how hard it is to
follow this seemingly straightforward advice.
Over the course of the research, it became more
and more clear that communicating effectively
about a foundation exit requires more than oneway messaging. In case after case, we heard
that without sustained and genuine dialogue,
momentum can be lost, organizations damaged, and fields diminished in their influence.
In one case, there was a serious gap between
foundation board and staff about the time frame
of support for an initiative. Staff believed that
the initiative would span a decade; the board
declined to renew support after five years. This
was a failure of communication within the foundation that had significant ripple effects. The
fundamental disconnect resulted in confusing
and contradictory communications; reasonable
expectations in the field were unmet, leaving
many disappointed:
It was a five-year commitment from the board. I
don’t know how else to describe it, but there was
a 10-year commitment from the staff. I think the
idea was that the board would launch it and then it
would get incorporated into the regular programming. Depending on whom you talked to it was a
five-year or a 10-year initiative. ... If you are inside
a foundation, you understand what it means for a
board to back something for five years and then,
after that, it depends on the program priorities.
From the outside looking in, it looks as though that
program has a 10-year lifespan. The true length of
time was unclear internally. It was also a lack of
clarity in the messaging; the messaging was not
good — internally and with the grantees.

As stated in the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s A Practical Guide to Outcome-Focused Philanthropy, “It is
imperative when the foundation exits a strategy or initiative to do so thoughtfully, openly, and respectfully. This includes
careful planning, beginning as soon as exit is on the table. Still more important, it includes communicating clearly to
grantees, funding partners, internal colleagues, and the larger field why, when, and how we are leaving” (Twersky & Grange,
2016, p. 85).

2
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The most thoughtful funders interviewed confronted their exits with a desire to leave grantees
strong. Some put significant resources into final
grants, capacity-building efforts, and consulting
for themselves and their grantees. Some did an
admirable job of mitigating risk, and others offer
advice born of lessons learned the hard way. What
emerged in the course of the interviews was a
sense that the more central the funder’s role, the
more challenging the exit and — arguably — the
more responsibility the funder should shoulder.

inconsistency in messaging will signal to the
hopeful grantee that there may in fact be an
opening for future funding.

Kibbe

The foundation executive interviewed in connection with this exit reported that out of 10
grantees supported through the initiative, only
two have been able to continue the work as
envisioned.
A second funder described a similar challenge
with internal alignment:
One problem with exits is the foundation’s own
ambivalence, which makes the whole process more
complicated. We were challenged by our own
inability to be clear about the foundation’s objectives on exit. For example, I asked many folks about
our goal in accomplishing the exit — is it to attract
other funding to fill in behind us? Or is our goal
to wrap up our work without encouraging others
to give because we are ready to move beyond the
work of that initiative? Planning the exit was hard
until we settled on our goals.

Sector

Clearly, when a foundation staff, executive leadership, and board are not aligned about the depth
and breadth of a commitment, it is impossible to
communicate clearly about the why and how of a
funder exit and/or to set realistic expectations for
a field. In the words of one foundation staff person who was surprised by the board’s decision to
suddenly defund an initiative:
This was a five-year initiative that provided
operating support and supplemented with capacity-building consulting support. Grants were very
time intensive. The parameters of the support were
not established in advance, and different people
heard different things about the foundation’s commitment. ... I did not have much time [to carefully
research and plan for the exit]. I didn’t have the
luxury of a thought partner or resources to plan for
this exit. Our planning was a bit off-the-cuff, especially in communicating the news to the grantees.

Another funder described a situation where very
little information was shared with grantees until
the final stages of the exit, which left grantees at
a disadvantage in preparing for the shift:
I don’t know how clear we were. ... At the time,
we probably weren’t being very vocal. There was
the possibility that more funding could come in,
too. ... I think there were certain grantees who
knew, possibly.
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An aspect of much-needed and valued dialogue
relates to grantees communicating with each
other across a portfolio in preparation for the
funder’s exit. In more than one case, funders
expressed some surprise “that grantees weren’t
talking to each other, which suggests that there’s
a place for communication among grantees that
a funder can promote, but will ultimately need
to leave to the field after the exit is completed.”
Another highlighted concern about the quality
of ongoing communication among grantees once
the funder was no longer the catalyst:
We were able to foster grantee communication
through affectionately blunt ways. That kind of
thing goes away once you step out. It’s not just the
money. They lose the entity with the 10,000-footlevel view. That kind of loss wasn’t anticipated.

Notably, for their part, grantees would rather be
in the conversation early, even if all the decisions
are not yet clear. One grantee put it this way:
Give grantees a heads-up early on that [the foundation is] going through the process and [isn’t] yet
sure where it’s going to land, or inform them that
[the foundation is] sure it’s going to land in a particular place. The more transparency a funder can
offer its grantees, the greater the potential of success for the grantee going forward.

While many lessons emerged from the pitfalls of
inadequate communication surrounding exits,
there were notable examples where funders
engaged grantees and others in planning and
implementing the exit. The process was still
challenging, but much more satisfying for all.
One grantee put it this way:
First, they were very clear from early on about the
time limitation of the investment. As soon as they
were sure of their exit date, they told us. We had
several years of very clear communication from
the foundation about what was going to happen
and when.

One funder began the exit planning with grantees and developed a plan that took into account
recommendations from the field. This foundation showed itself to be learning, open to
feedback, and flexible in terms of next steps with
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the active intent to protect programmatic gains
and ensure that grantees remained strong:
We started planning to exit the work in earnest in
2012. We had a grantee gathering and committed
to four more years. We started then communicating with grantees to get clarity about the goal line
and what we could accomplish together in the time
remaining. This process was important for all of
us. We started the convening with a panel discussion with our own team facing the grantees and
invited the grantees to ask anything they wanted.
It was very important for grantees to understand
what we were wrestling with. The issues were very
much the same as issues grantees were troubled
with. There was something about the willingness
to engage in this discussion that helped. Even if the
grantees weren’t happy, they could better understand the foundation’s perspective. The convening
was also important because it meant that key players were together to discuss opportunities. We
asked grantees what we should stay with, where
to double down, and where and when to cut loose.
We considered their input in designing the last four
years of grantmaking, and what the foundation

did was pretty consistent with what the grantees
recommended.

A place-based funder reported on a process of
reaching out to colleagues in the funding community to discuss their exit from a neighborhood
initiative. They engaged other funders who had
a stake in that community in formulating their
exit strategy, and they were willing to exit slowly
even though it meant they would expend more
than the 5 percent minimum payout for a number of years.
One foundation CEO noted that frequent personal contact with grantees throughout the exit
can pay significant dividends. His experience
illustrates the merits of empathy in grantmaking,
and the notion that exits can and should be
hands-on rather than passive:
A little bit of my time goes incredibly far — just
showing up and putting a face on the change,
talking to people about it. It seems silly, but it really
does make a difference. At the end of the day, it is
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still hard. But it makes change more humane and
easier — just showing up and relating to them, recognizing their feelings are real.

From the point of view of the grantees, the most
careful, thoughtful, and respectful exits had
empathy and patience at their core, which in
turn led to the open dialogue that can position a
grantee or a whole field for success in the wake of
an exit. In the words of a foundation CEO interviewed for this study:
Exits take a long time to do respectfully and well.
You have to be simultaneously working the internal culture of the foundation and working the
transition externally. Think about the individuals
that are affected. It’s not just strategy. People’s lives
are changed because of your actions. Don’t underinvest in respecting that piece of it.

Sector

Hard-won wisdom leads to the conclusion that it
is not one-way or even two-way communication
that secures results and leads to resilience for
grantees following a funder exit. Rather, it is allway communication anchored in deep listening
on the part of the funder whose exit is imminent.
At its best, communicating during a funder exit
involves ongoing dialogue among foundation
staff and leadership, grantees, and colleagues in
the funding community who may be looked to
for future funding.

It’s the last waltz. The last
waltz with you. But that don’t
mean that the party is over.
(Robertson, 1978)

¯ The Band
Final Grants: “The Last Waltz”
In nearly all the cases studied for this report,
final grants were made after the decision to exit.
The goals for these investments were varied. In
some cases, all the funder hoped to do was offer
the grantee time to find replacement funding. In
other cases, specific goals accompanied the final
grant. In all cases, funders wanted to help their
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former grantees navigate the future. This meant
that other opportunities were set aside or delayed
while resources supported the work of grantees that were no longer in the bull’s-eye of their
funder’s strategy. A final grant was sometimes
accompanied by consulting, facilitation, convening, and/or introductions to potential new
sources of funding.
In those circumstances where both grantees
and funders were most satisfied, the final grants
were generous and flexible. Funders listened
carefully to the grantees about needs and priorities; grantees influenced the funder’s exit
plans and were encouraged and supported in
thinking about their future. One large foundation described a highly contextual and flexible
approach to final grants:
To sum up the different strategies that we used,
we offered flexible final grants, funded grantee
convenings without us in the middle, capacity-building grants, and also a promotional piece.
The promotional piece was not in the vein of‚ `look
what [the foundation] did and learned,’ but more
of something that each group could use for their
own outreach, fundraising, and communications.
Basically, they felt that being able to publicize
their work as part of a larger cohort would be
really advantageous. Instead of doing a foundation
`lessons learned,’ we helped develop some press
releases and things that they wanted, not just as
individual grantees but as a group. It was very
much driven by what they thought would be helpful to them.

Nearly all interviewees referenced the importance of capacity building in navigating an
exit. Funders want to help prepare grantees for
the loss of funding, and they want to secure
the gains made. Grantees want the time and
resources to understand the implications of the
funder’s exit for their organization and its work,
and they want to plan a path forward. But, capacity building as part of a funder exit is no panacea,
especially not if mandated or overly structured
by the funder. Some capacity-building investments discussed by interviewees were highly
successful; others failed and were more of a distraction than a help.
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Funders interviewed that made a big commitment to capacity building during an exit advise
that the locus of responsibility for building
capacity needs to be the grantee, not the funder
— that these investments at the end of a funding
relationship should enhance the grantee’s independence and therefore should not be dictated
in type or process by the funder. In the words of
one funder:

All in all, reports of capacity building linked
to an exit were mixed. Especially problematic
were efforts to support fundraising as part of an
exit. One funder who was charged with exiting
a field-building initiative with very little notice
discussed the fact that the foundation literally created most of the organizations in the cohort and
had disappointing results when supporting these
grantees to build their own fundraising capacity:
Those relationships didn’t really work out very
well. I don’t think any of those organizations had
a successful engagement with their fundraising
consultant. Mostly what I heard from the consultants was that the organizations weren’t really
willing to do what they needed to do to beef up
their fundraising.

Another funder echoed the sentiment:
We tried supporting efforts to build fundraising
capacity, but haven’t figured out how to do it well.
We didn’t get great results. We had more success
when we worked directly to bring new donors to
the work.

In addition to capacity building centered on
individual organizations, one grantee urged
foundations to take the opportunity of the final
grant to consider the broader context. Doing this
well requires listening, which harkens back to
the previous discussion of communicating effectively before and during an exit:
The funder has to think about the network and
the ecosystem of the environment that they are
exiting, the signals that they are sending to the
organizations about what their strategy should be,
and also how it can possibly go south. Once you
are gone, the grantees could start competing and
start spinning off into other territory. You have the
opportunity with the final grants to set the table
for the direction of the ecosystem.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the variety of reasons to exit, as well as
the complexity and interdependence of a funding
relationship, the experiences reviewed for this
article call for funders to balance their goals and
aspirations against the potential harm to grantees and fields as they are planning to take their
leave. Dialogue and empathy are indispensable
attributes of any valued relationship between
funder and grantee and doubly important in the
context of an exit.
From the cases studied for this article, the greatest exit challenges related to the confluence of
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We don’t have one approach to capacity building.
What we try to do from the perspective of our
unit is to put some markers in the ground to help
us think about it. The first is that a funder cannot
build the capacity of an organization. It is only
the organization itself that can do it. The funder
can just create enabling conditions …. We are not
organizational development experts. We are not
the protagonists here. What we say has undue
weight. We need to make sure that the agency is on
the part of the organization. Once the organization
has its own clear sense of what it needs, you can
respond by giving them specific money or increasing the flexibility of the grant you are giving them.

Simply stated, the problem generally predates
the exit decision, and if a funder is complicit in
creating unhealthy dependency prior to the exit,
it should expect trouble that no single capacity-building grant can address. However, both
funders and grantees are articulate about the
benefits of capacity building throughout an initiative or funding relationship — not just upon
exit. In other words, building capacity that will
help grantees withstand and even thrive in the
event of a major funder exit cannot be an afterthought or a “consolation prize.” The best, most
effective capacity-building efforts in the cases
studied began long before exit. These approaches
accompanied the work across the duration of the
grant relationship while also reflecting a specific
focus on preparing for the exit.

Kibbe

Advice from Funder to Funder
Speaking from experience, funders offer
remarkably consistent advice to colleagues
that are contemplating or making an exit.
Overall, they advocate for respect, patience,
flexibility, empathy, generosity, learning, and a
consultative stance. They recommend:
1.		 Stay off center stage, unless playing a
principal role is the only approach likely to
work. Use a steering committee or some
other form of shared leadership to encourage ownership from the field.
2.		 Screen potential grantees based on how
well the foundation’s goals or initiatives
align with the core business of each
organization.
3.		 Be explicit about the need for sustainable,
resilient programs and organizations, and
support capacity building throughout, not
just as part of final grants.
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4.		 Study the broader implications of an exit
before finalizing plans or taking action, and
create an exit plan that is adjustable. It is
inevitable that things will change.
5.		 Communicate as you go. It may not be
possible to have every relevant decision
made in time to communicate early with 100
percent clarity. Share what you are thinking
and what you know as the process unfolds.
6.		 Help grantees avoid fiscal cliffs. Tier
down support through multiyear exit plans
whenever possible. Consider offering
increased funding for field leaders and
infrastructure as part of the ramp-down.
7.		 Broker relationships for grantees with
other funders, and do this early — not as an
afterthought, when funder partnerships are
very hard to forge.
8.		 Allow grantees to set the priorities for
capacity-building grants. Don’t default to a
final-stage grant for fundraising, as it will
almost certainly be too little, too late.
9.		 Take advantage of your role as a convener
to bring grantees together for collective
learning and planning about how to cope
with the exit.
10. Commit to your own learning and improvement through each exit.

60 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Advice from Grantee to Grantee
Having navigated the loss of a major funder,
grantees were asked to offer advice to other
organizations that may face such a situation.
Here is the essence of what they said:
1.		 Accept that even your most staunch
supporter may change its focus/priorities
and withdraw funding at some point.
2.		 Be entrepreneurial and be prepared. Even if
the loss of major funding is unlikely, engage
in contingency planning as a regular habit.
3.		 Hold to your own mission/vision throughout. Don’t lose your focus to chase funding
— ever.
4.		 Avoid dependency on one, or even a few,
funders so that an exit — expected or not —
will not destabilize your organization.
5.		 Expect relationships with other grantee
organizations to shift when a major funder
withdraws. When the funder is no longer
at the center of an initiative and/or they no
longer convene or support collaboration,
colleagues may suddenly become
competitors.
6.		 Consider the fate of deliverables and work
products. Together with the funder, plan
and ask for support for appropriate curation
and dissemination of what the grant(s)
produced.
7.		 Communicate about the work done and the
value created to set the stage for others to
come forward and support the work in the
future.
8.		 Negotiate the final grant for maximum
flexibility.
9.		 Ask for the funder’s help in identifying new
sources of financial support.
10. Work to maintain the funder relationship
post exit. Your key contacts may be able
to help connect you to new partners or
possibilities down the road.
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three factors: (1) the central role the funder had
chosen for itself; (2) the scale of support offered,
especially when it outpaced other support for
the issue or organization; and (3) the difference
between the expected and actual duration of
that support.
Much more needs to be understood about why
and how funders exit as well as about the effects,
but this limited research does suggest some sensible practices that can immediately improve
both relationships and outcomes related to
funder exits:
• Assure strong alignment of mission and
goals at the front end of any funding
relationship and revisit the question of
alignment regularly. In the words of one
grantmaker:

• Commit to dialogue with grantees as
well as colleague funders about impending exits, taking input to help shape
timing and approach to an exit. In interviews, funders and grantees spoke of the
benefits of dialogue in navigating an exit.
Some funders offered powerful examples
of how grantees influenced their thinking
and helped develop reasonable and responsible exit plans that preserved program
gains and kept grantees strong. For their
part, grantees value thought partnership
as much as they value clarity as a funder is
preparing to exit.
• Consider grantee capacity and
dependency throughout all funding relationships, and work to build
grantee resiliency before an exit
becomes necessary. One funder noted
that the problems associated with exits
likely have much earlier origins:

• Once a decision to exit is made, set aside
time and appropriate resources to ease
the transition for grantees and protect
the affected fields. Although the amount
of time and resources needed will vary
according to the context, generally, funders
at the center of the work have a greater
responsibility to grantees and to the broader
ecosystem of actors in the field. Factors to
consider in deciding how and how much
to invest in an exit should include consideration of whether the field is mature and
stable, or nascent and highly dependent on
one or a few funders.
• Contribute to building much needed
knowledge in this arena. There is a need
— perhaps even a great need — for additional research in this area. While this
article shares stories and insights from
about a dozen foundation exits, it is far from
a comprehensive study or a representative
sample. There are many thousands of foundations, each driven by a charitable mission,
that are routinely entering and exiting relationships and fields. Even if such comings
and goings were only modestly disruptive,
the aggregated effects are likely substantial
— albeit — for the most part — out of sight.
The field should commit to learning more,
sharing insights, and generally exercising
care and mitigating the risks when exiting.
In fact, only one case examined for this
study invested in a retrospective evaluation
following an exit. In that case, the report
was not shared externally. With that one
notable exception, the funders studied
did not look back after the close of their
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Funders planning to exit a field should be mindful that the most durable investments will be
those closest to the grantees’ own core purposes.
Grantees that “stretch” to qualify for funding may
not be able or willing to maintain the effort once
the funder exits.

Some of the challenges are pre-exit — for instance,
grantees that have unsustainable revenue models to begin with. A donor is almost tipping them
already, and then that donor leaves. That’s a challenge that you need to be paying attention to well
before the exit, as a part of financial due diligence.
What are you doing early on so that in year three,
five, or 10 — or however long your program spans
— your grantees aren’t overly reliant on your
revenue? The challenge is more about creating a
healthier landscape pre-exit.

Kibbe
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From Responsive Grantmaker to Branded Builder:
The Continuum of Funder Responsibility in Exits
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Foundation relationships with grantees differ widely. Some foundations work in a responsive manner,
defining a community or area of interest; publishing guidelines; then reviewing and funding (or
declining) proposals on a rolling basis. In these cases, the grantee is leading, defining the project or
program, implementing its plans, and reporting to the funder on progress at regular intervals. This
approach is favored by many place- and community-based grantmakers that describe a broad issue
or need and invite interested organizations to propose programs and potential solutions. The funder
supports the most promising proposals, sometimes limiting the number of years an organization can
receive support, and/or may exit relationships with only those grantees that routinely fail to achieve
their stated outcomes.
In this era of strategic philanthropy, funders also use a range of other, more proactive tools and
tactics — from prizes to mission-related investing — in pursuit of their goals. One commonly used
proactive tool is the initiative — a labeled body of work that typically spans multiple years and
engages multiple grantees. Often, research takes place to further understand the need or opportunity
that is core to an initiative. There may be early outreach to capture insights and inputs from grantees
and potential grantees as well as other leaders and experts as the initiative is designed. Proposals
are typically solicited by invitation only. Initiatives are time limited, and, increasingly, funders include
a learning component, convening grantees and commissioning external evaluations that look across
the whole portfolio of investments over time. In short, the grantmaker ultimately defines an initative’s
goals and the time frame as well as the budget and the learning agenda.
Some funders go even further when they perceive a gap in the ecosystem of organizations ready
and able to respond to a priority need or opportunity. These funders may seed the creation of new
organizations, commission and disseminate research, build leadership, and create new infrastructure
in an effort to build a field. These instances — where a funder is chief architect, the work is branded
through the initiative, and identified with the funder — place the greatest responsibility on the funder
that chooses to exit. Funders interviewed stated again and again that, upon exit, they felt a great
weight of responsibility in those cases where they were at or near the center of the work.
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initiative or line of work. This means they
cannot say with any certainty that goals
achieved were durable or that grantees
remained strong and successful.
Next steps should include a fieldwide
longitudinal study of foundation exit practices to illuminate the scope and scale of
the challenge, and the courageous commitment of funders to study the impact
of their exits from a modest distance.
Together, these efforts would go a long way
in encouraging responsible exits and illuminating best practice.
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Introduction
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Exiting from an initiative is an inevitable part
of philanthropy. Yet the process is too often
treated as an afterthought, and funders rarely
devote enough time to planning for and working through the tensions and issues that arise.
Pointing to a lack of consistency around exit
planning, Jaffe and Mackinnon (2007) write,
“Exiting tends to be regarded as something discrete and separate, a phase in the life of a grant
or program that is fundamentally different from
what comes before” (p. 2).
Among the studies on foundation exits, research
tends to focus on how funders can exit from
specific grants or programs (Association of
Charitable Foundations, 2012; Kerhoven &
Herweijer, 2013). A few focus on strategies for
exiting from a field or on spend-down foundations specifically (Fleishman, 2011; Jaffe &
Mackinnon, 2007; Petrovich, 2011; Gardner,
Greenblott, & Joubert, 2005; Markham &
Ditkoff, 2013; Ostrower, 2009, 2011). To date,
however, no studies have examined how funders
have managed to effectively exit from major,
time-limited, place-based initiatives that aimed
to simultaneously change policies and systems at
multiple levels.

Methodology and Underlying Research
We wish to help fill this gap in knowledge by
sharing some of the findings the 2020 Transition
Research Project, which we conducted on behalf
of The California Endowment (Yu, Lewis-Charp,
Berman, Diaz, & Bollella, 2016).
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Key Points
•• This article shares insights and lessons
from a research project commissioned by
The California Endowment in early 2016 to
inform the planning for its transition out of
Building Healthy Communities, a 10-year,
place-based, policy- and systems-change
initiative. The goal of the nationwide study,
which included literature reviews and
interviews with 30 executives and directors
from 17 foundations, was to tap into
philanthropic leaders’ accumulated wisdom
about exiting out of similar initiatives.
•• In generalizing the study’s findings for the
broader philanthropic audience, this article
presents a guiding framework for exit and
sustainability planning in the form of a set
of recommendations that relate to issues
such as managing relationships between
funder and grantee partners during the exit,
using the initiative’s theory of change as a
tool for decision-making, finding a balance
between demonstrable success and equity,
and managing the internal processes of the
funding organization.
•• The research shows that even though an
exit is inherently difficult, it is possible to
carry out in a way that does not undermine
the accomplishments of the initiative
and leaves the foundation and its grantee
partners in strengthened positions.

Exiting From Large-Scale Initiatives: Insights From a National Scan of Philanthropy

As the foundation entered the second half of
its decade-long Building Healthy Communities
(BHC) strategic plan, it wanted to learn from
other funders who had exited from similar
time-limited, place-based initiatives and transitioned to new lines of work. To help inform its
decision-making, the foundation commissioned
Social Policy Research Associates (SPR) to conduct a research study built around the values and
assumptions that steered the BHC initiative. The
foundation not only embraces its role as a highly
engaged partner and change-maker, it also executes a rare combination of strategies that seek to
align local and statewide policy-change efforts,
grassroots community organizing, resident
power, youth leadership, and narrative change
within BHC.

Between November 2015 and January 2016 we
conducted interviews with 30 foundation leaders1 representing 17 place-based, organizing,
policy, and spend-down foundations: the Annie
E. Casey Foundation; Atlantic Philanthropies;
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation; First
5 Los Angeles; the Ford, MacArthur, Marguerite
Casey, Northwest Area, Open Society, Robert
Wood Johnson, S. D. Bechtel, Jr., Skillman,
W.K. Kellogg, C. S. Mott, Edward Hazen,
and Surdna foundations; and The California
Endowment itself. We also interviewed two

Due to the long-term nature of most large-scale
initiatives, only a handful of interviewees had
experienced the complete process of exit from
place-based work and were able to speak about
the full range of the experience; among these
were individuals from the Annie E. Casey,
MacArthur, and Northwest Area foundations.
Further, only one interviewee was associated
with a funder — the Mott Foundation — that
had exited from a community-organizing portfolio. Finally, although several funders engaged
in policy- and systems-change work, no funder
intentionally linked place-based and statewide
policy-change strategies in the same way the
endowment did in its BHC initiative. These limitations suggest that it will take time to generate
knowledge about exiting from these kinds of
grantmaking efforts.
We knew before we began our study that
the research literature on philanthropic exits
acknowledges the disruptive and often painful
nature of the exit process for funders, grantee
partners, and entire fields (Petrovich, 2011;
Fleishman, 2011; Ostrower, 2011). By the time
we completed our work, however, we were convinced that even though an exit is inherently
difficult, it is possible to carry it out in a way
that does not undermine the accomplishments
of the initiative and leaves the foundation and
its grantee partners in strengthened positions.
This outcome — what we refer to as “successful
exit” — becomes more likely when the exit is
guided by respect for the relationships the foundation has forged with grantee partners; a clear
intention to sustain the change-making efforts
at the core of the initiative; inclusive and evidence-based decision-making; thoughtful and
advance consideration of what comes next; and

1
Interviews were conducted with 10 CEOs, presidents, and executive directors; six vice presidents and directors; nine
evaluation directors, managers, and advisors; two program officers; two field CCI experts, and five current and former
employees of The California Endowment. Of the 17 funders represented among the interviewees, 10 were place-based funders
or conducted place-based initiatives, seven had a policy focus, and five had an organizing focus.
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Our research was conducted using a mixedmethod approach, collecting data from both a
literature review and semi-structured interviews.
(See Appendix.) To be included in the study, a
foundation had to have completed an exit or be in
the process of exiting from a particular initiative
or strategy in which it had been invested for at
least three to five years, as well as contribute to
the geographic-level diversity — national, statewide, and local — of the final mix of interviewed
funders. A research advisory group developed an
initial set of funders that met these criteria and
narrowed the list based on those available for
interviews during the project timeline.

expert researchers in comprehensive community
initiatives (CCIs). All the interviewees were nominated by The Endowment’s research advisory
group based upon their experience with placebased and organizing initiatives.
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A successful exit becomes more
likely when the exit is guided
by respect for the relationships
the foundation has forged
with grantee partners; a
clear intention to sustain
the change-making efforts
at the core of the initiative;
inclusive and evidence-based
decision-making; thoughtful
and advance consideration of
what comes next; and proactive
management of the internal
changes likely to accompany
transition to new efforts and
focuses.
proactive management of the internal changes
likely to accompany transition to new efforts and
focuses.

Wisdom on Successful Exit From Major
Place-Based Initiatives
The purpose of an exit strategy is not to hasten
the exit — exit is not valuable for its own sake —
but to improve the chance of sustainable outcomes
for the program.
–Gardner, Greenblott, and Joubert, 2005, p. 7

Although our research was intended to inform
The California Endowment about its future
exit from the BHC initiative, we recognized
that many of our findings could be relevant and
helpful to those in the larger philanthropic community who face the prospect of exiting from
similar initiatives. To communicate our findings
66 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

to this audience, we recast them in the form of
discrete recommendations that can be used by
diverse funders to craft their own unique exit
plans. Although many of these recommendations
may be familiar to some members of the philanthropic community as “best practices,” they
are often overlooked when the exigencies of the
exit process begin to exert their influence. By
collecting them together in a single article with a
carefully calibrated amount of supporting detail,
we hope to increase the likelihood that they will
be thoughtfully considered and actually implemented. Further, we believe that our expert
respondents have contributed some genuinely
new ideas to the field and broached some issues
in unforeseen ways.
These recommendations assume that planning
for exit begins well before the exit itself — ideally as part of the design of the initiative. The
research on effective exits emphasizes meticulous attention to planning. Developing and
implementing an exit and transition plan early in
an initiative will reduce many future operational
challenges, improve outcomes and sustainability,
build communities’ preparedness and ownership
of the transition process, and draw from communities’ own resiliency and assets (Gardner, et al.,
2005). Our interviews with foundation leaders
similarly underscored that a carefully considered exit and sustainability plan increases the
likelihood of a successful exit. Exit plans must
be thorough enough to offer firm structure, yet
flexible enough to allow foundations to adapt
to unanticipated changes. Exit plans must be
tailored to the demands and circumstances of
specific initiatives, but they can be constructed
from generalized best practices such as those
articulated here.

Managing Relationships With Grantees
and Other Partners
Effective philanthropy is based on strong
relationships with grantees and other community-based partners. Intentional planning around
how to manage these relationships prior to and
during an exit can mitigate some of the potential
challenges that funders often face further down
the line. Acknowledging that program staff

Exiting From Large-Scale Initiatives: Insights From a National Scan of Philanthropy

members are the “biggest advantage of a placebased strategy,” a Skillman Foundation leader
said that the quality of the foundation’s relationship with partners is, to a large degree, based on
program officers’ abilities to form trusting relationships with key community members.
Build Trust Through Transparency

The quality of a funder-grantee partner relationship can be measured by the extent to which
the grantee partner trusts that the foundation
will responsibly attend to the community’s survival and well-being. This trust is grounded
in transparency and respect, which requires
that communication between the foundation
and grantee partner be candid and recurring,
particularly when it addresses the foundation’s
commitment, its key objectives, and its expectations for the exit process.

Don’t Feed False Hopes

A few respondents in the research study spoke
about how difficult it can be for grantee partners
when the foundation talks about exit without being able to communicate clearly what
the foundation will be doing afterward. It can
be challenging to know how to communicate
openly with grantee partners when there are
many decisions that have yet to be made, but it is
important to be clear on where the foundation is
in the decision-making process.
To help articulate their messaging around
exit, Skillman staff members relied upon the
foundation’s values framework so that any
communication, however indecisive, would be
consistent with the beliefs of the foundation. A
Mott Foundation representative underscored
that it is the responsibility of the foundation to

say “yes,” “no,” or “we don’t know,” but never
to create the false hope of continued funding by
saying “maybe.” An Annie E. Casey Foundation
leader added this caution: During the final few
years of an initiative, a foundation often scales up
its efforts while simultaneously winding down its
involvement. The potentially misleading nature
of this opposition for grantee partners requires
that funders clearly explain the intent and endpoint of exit activities.
A Ford Foundation representative observed,
There is a price to transparency. It was really hard
in that middle period where we couldn’t tell groups
where we were landing but we could tell them that
we didn’t know if they were going to be funded
again. … If [the funder is] going to be transparent,
at least let the group feel like they had a line in and
it levels the playing field.

Underscore the Long-Term Commitment

In many cases, the foundation leaders interviewed had long-term relationships with grantee
partners that existed prior to and persisted
beyond a particular place-based initiative. Such
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“Talking about [exit] nonstop from the beginning,” said an Annie E. Casey Foundation
representative, “is difficult but necessary.” A
leader from the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
made the complementary point that the relationship between funder and grantee partner
during exit is “really more about communication and being clear” than it is “about new
strategic direction.”

The quality of a fundergrantee partner relationship
can be measured by the extent
to which the grantee partner
trusts that the foundation
will responsibly attend to
the community’s survival
and well-being. This trust is
grounded in transparency and
respect, which requires that
communication between the
foundation and grantee partner
be candid and recurring.
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In place-based initiatives
in particular, it is natural
for program officers to
assume indispensable roles
in the work of granteepartner organizations and
to become quite embedded in
communities. Removing them
suddenly would represent
an immense loss to grantee
partners, so it is important to
strategically prepare for this
eventuality well ahead of time.

important goals have not been accomplished.
Alternatively, a hands-off approach can help
build a sense of community ownership, which
in turn is a key factor in sustaining the efforts
at the core of the initiative. Regardless of the
degree of control exercised by the foundation,
however, exit represents a change in the locus
of decision-making, and this transition, respondents noted, is best managed by ensuring from
the outset that there is a common understanding
of desired outcomes. A MacArthur Foundation
representative advised,
Make sure that you are exactly on the same page:
What are the expectations for impact? What are
the shared expectations for the mode of achieving
that impact? What are the shared expectations
about what sustainability means? Then, when you
come closer to the [exit], you can always harken
back to that moment of … shared expectations for
going forward.

Ease Grantees Into a Changed Relationship

relationships are common among funders that
have a mission to serve particular cities or
regions. When these foundations exit an initiative and make a pivot in funding strategies,
their relationships with their grantee partners
undergo a change in status but they do not end.
Thus, one important message to relay to grantee
partners is that relationships do not end just
because the particular funding strategy ends —
and, indeed, the foundation can stay connected
to the grantee even if it is not through a funding
relationship.
Manage ‘Tension’ Between Community
Ownership, Foundation Decision-Making

While evaluation respondents varied widely
in what they believed was the ideal balance
between community ownership and foundation
direction, they agreed that managing this tension
is vital to the success of foundations’ community
change initiatives and plays an important role
in a successful exit. A “hands off” approach can
increase the chances, upon reaching the end of a
long-term initiative, of a foundation feeling that
68 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

In place-based initiatives in particular, it is
natural for program officers to assume indispensable roles in the work of grantee-partner
organizations and to become quite embedded in
communities. Removing them suddenly would
represent an immense loss to grantee partners,
so it is important to strategically prepare for this
eventuality well ahead of time.
Our interviewees described several instances in
which program officers who had been heavily
involved in local-area work shifted their roles so
that they were more “at arm’s length” toward
the end of an initiative. First 5 Los Angeles, for
example, worked to ease communities into developing their own leadership, decision-making,
and collaborative capabilities, rather than relying
on First 5 staff members. Program officers helped
grantees form partnerships with other organizations so that they could develop capacities and
skills together. Staff members then took on higher-level roles in which they transitioned from
being on the ground to focusing on policy advocacy. First 5 leaders saw this as a way to lessen
community partners’ dependence on First 5 in
advance of the exit.

Exiting From Large-Scale Initiatives: Insights From a National Scan of Philanthropy

Making Exit-Strategy Decisions
When planning to exit a major time-limited
initiative, it is important to develop a clear set
of criteria or a process that can be used to guide
decision-making throughout the exit period and
navigate the challenges that come with it.

• Establish a well-developed learning and
evaluation system to help create clarity
around capacity, traction, and impact.
Foundation leaders and the CCI experts
spoke about the necessity of having robust
data on community impact and grantee
partners’ capacity. Evaluation and assessment can inform a foundation’s decisions
about whether and how to exit, and can
help determine when it is appropriate to
proceed with the next phase of an initiative. Annie E. Casey Foundation leaders, for
example, focused on using data to inform
their approach at both foundation and site
levels, which allowed for a “continuous
learning process to track progress” and to
assess the ability of sites to thrive after exit.
In fact, as a national funder exiting multiple
geographic areas, Casey maintained working relationships with site partners through
continued learning and documentation
after its initiative ended. S. D. Bechtel, Jr.
Foundation leaders conducted retrospective

• Engage staff members in decision-making
to promote their investment in the exit
strategy. Ford Foundation leaders opted for
a very open process of dealing with specific
exit issues by having a broad conversation
among staff members about the change
in the foundation’s work. Northwest Area
Foundation representatives echoed that
value of staff involvement, and described a
collaborative exit-strategy design process
in which program staff, senior staff, and
board members participated. They said they
believe that including staff members in the
creation of the exit strategy was critical to
the success of the exit because it allowed
staff to deeply invest in the strategy.
• Take advantage of foundation staff members’ knowledge by involving them in exit
planning. A number of foundation leaders
chose to make the exit process largely staffdriven because they believe that program
officers have the deepest knowledge of the
strengths and weaknesses of specific initiatives and grantee partners’ fit with the
foundations’ values, mission, and mandate. Staff members not only understand
the foundation’s risk tolerance, collective
skill sets, and interests, but they are also
best positioned to draft exit or transition
“memos” on initiative accomplishments
and potential new directions that build
upon needs and opportunities. One representative of a major place-based funder
described using a team approach to exit in
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 69
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• Use the initiative’s theory of change
to inform decisions about exit and
sustainability. Foundation leaders emphasized their belief that the theory of change
underlying the work of an initiative is an
important resource for developing a strong,
results-oriented approach to exit. The
theory of change can be used to evaluate
indicators of initiative impact, and then
the results can determine what to sustain.
Hazen Foundation leaders, for example,
used an initiative’s theory of change as a
lens to select the community capacities that
needed to be sustained in order to keep their
grantee partners from reverting back to
how they were before the initiative began.
Whether or not an action or decision would
sustain each of these capacities then became
the criteria for exiting out of the initiative.

investigations into the organizational
capacity-building of grantees, which provided lessons that could be used to inform
its later exit as a spend-down foundation.
Several foundation leaders and field experts
suggested that it is important to keep in
mind that grantee partners and foundation
staff are likely to describe their site progress positively so as to ensure continued
foundation support. Therefore, formal and
independently gathered site-specific assessment and evaluation data may be needed to
complement the reports made by grantee
partners and program officers.
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When making decisions about
what aspects of an initiative to
sustain, it is helpful to solicit
input from outside observers.
It can be problematic to ask
only grantee partners and
foundation program staff to
identify what to leave behind
in communities because of their
personal connection to the
communities and their financial
reliance on the foundation’s
continued presence.
which foundation staff members collaborate
as cross-disciplinary teams; this individual described the approach as “very useful
because it brought different perspectives to
a topic.” In another example of this strategy,
Ford Foundation leaders engaged their communications department early in the exit
process to think through how to communicate difficult issues about the exit to their
grantee partners. In addition to ensuring
clear and honest communication, this effort
revealed aspects of the exit that foundation
leaders had not yet thought through.

Sustaining Initiative Accomplishments
Many foundation leaders said that when considering the exit from an initiative, they often
lacked clarity on which specific pieces of the
initiative were important to sustain and what the
role of the foundation was in supporting those
pieces. Respondents also emphasized that at the
tail end of an initiative there is a natural movement to “the next thing.” These factors point
to the importance of thinking about issues of
sustainability early in the exit process and keeping these issues in the forefront.
70 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Even when an initiative has a set time limit,
consider being flexible about the timing of exit
so as not to adversely affect the sustainability
of the initiative’s achievements. Setting a specific timeline may prove beneficial in that the
time limit can sharpen the foundation’s focus on
establishing sustainable systems; however, the
time limit may also impose artificial restraints
and restrict progress by promoting a false sense
of closure to the initiative.
A CCI researcher remarked that if sites are “hard
to leave because they’re doing exactly what needs
to be done and there’s momentum and leverage,”
then the foundation “should not be rigid in its
timeline.” In accordance with this view, foundation leaders recommend an open-ended approach
in which the funder chooses a time to investigate
what has been accomplished and what remains
unfinished relative to the original goals of the
initiative, and then makes decisions about the
timing of exit on that basis. “[What is,] really, the
calendar of social change?” a Hazen representative observed. “I don’t know. So my tendency
would be to be thinking about how far did we
get, what’s next, what can be closed out responsibly, what needs to be continued.”
When making decisions about what aspects
of an initiative to sustain, it is helpful to solicit
input from outside observers. It can be problematic to ask only grantee partners and foundation
program staff to identify what to leave behind
in communities because of their personal connection to the communities and their financial
reliance on the foundation’s continued presence.
A CCI researcher recommends that foundation
leaders conduct interviews with people who
have been in the target communities for some
time but whose salaries are independent of
foundation initiatives. These key onlookers will
be able to answer questions about the role the
initiative has played in the community and its
impacts, where the absence of the initiative will
be most felt, and what the future would look like
if the foundation was only able to continue with
select priority areas.
To sustain the efforts begun under their initiatives, several foundations deliberately took a
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[It is important to] have some kind of path for the
community to go from the foundation-directed
work to more community-driven work around
which they know they have local commitment.
They know they have local capacity, and they are
committing themselves to get support for it from
a variety of other sources; somehow that’s the exit
that has to happen.

Leverage the broader network of relationships
that exist outside of the one between funder
and grantee partner. Place-based funders have
a great opportunity to connect community
stakeholders to power brokers and to amplify
the voices of community residents. As funders
seek to exit, it is important to understand that
the exit influences a broader and often less visible set of partners and community members,
and that thoughtful engagement of these partners can play a role in supporting longer-term
sustainability. Furthermore, funders can forge
new relationships for grantee partners by connecting them to national networks to which they
would otherwise not have access.
Grantee partners should also have help building
capacity, so that they are in stronger positions
after the funding ends. Support for capacity

Place-based funders have a
great opportunity to connect
community stakeholders to
power brokers and to amplify
the voices of community
residents. As funders seek
to exit, it is important to
understand that the exit
influences a broader and often
less visible set of partners and
community members, and
that thoughtful engagement
of these partners can play a
role in supporting longer-term
sustainability.
building, leadership development, and connections to broader networks of support are critical
elements of sustainability, and they can be accomplished with nongrant funding. For example,
Skillman Foundation program staff created a
resource center for grantee partners that helped
them bolster their data-collection capacities and
internal monitoring systems, making them ultimately more attractive to other funders. In the
same vein, a CCI researcher recommended building the strategic, adaptive, and technical capacities
of grantee partners through training on strategic
decision-making, fundraising, and development.
Many of the funders we interviewed shifted their
working relationships with grantee partners as
they neared an initiative exit, placing more of
an emphasis on promoting leadership and organizational development. An Annie E. Casey
Foundation leader suggested that as a foundation
nears exit it should think of its role as a funder
differently than it did when it began the project;
specifically, the foundation should “move from
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step back in their leadership and management as
they neared exit, giving local stakeholders and
grantee partners the space to step forward and
choose their own governance groups and intermediaries — thus supporting a transition to local
governance and community ownership. Annie
E. Casey Foundation staff members created local
management entities led by community residents
that could oversee the sustainability of grantee
partners post-exit. Skillman Foundation staff
similarly facilitated the creation of governance
groups made up of local residents and grantee
partners. These groups have allowed for wider
ownership of the Skillman initiative and will
be responsible for its sustainability. In another
approach, Marguerite Casey Foundation staff
members asked local stakeholders to choose a
“network weaver” — a person or organization to
convene grantees and other partners in communities to work on cross-sector issues. As one CCI
researcher observed,

Cao Yu, Berman, and Jhawar

Sector

In addition to building the
capacity of grantee partners
to secure funding from other
sources on their own, it can
be important during exit for
foundations to forge or solidify
relationships with other
investors who share their goals
and values and who may be able
to support the grantee partners
in the future, and to work
together with those funders
to sustain what communities
believe will shift power and give
voice to residents.
being an initiative investor into being a strategic
and tactical investor in particular pieces of work.”
A Mott Foundation representative observed,
The key was making sure that funding didn’t
hollow out the organization or scoop up all the
talent in a community such that when the project
ends, the community has to go through a process
of rebuilding its leaders. It’s funding that’s really
directed at building local capacity and leadership
that is capable of addressing whatever the next
issue is that comes along.

Managing Changes in
Funding Practices
Although few of the funders had fully exited
from a long-term place-based initiative, they
were able to speak to how they would shift
funding practices to allow for flexibility and
leveraging of other resources.
They suggested engaging other funders on key
issues of concern through funder collaboratives,
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which are used to connect program officers with
other foundation leaders so that the program
officers can bring new funders to their sites.
Hazen Foundation staff members, for example,
use collaboratives to highlight their grantee partners and create a funding environment that will
be receptive to the work of their grantee partners
once they have exited. A representative from the
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation similarly believes
that capacity building needs to be about creating
a “resilient ecosystem of nonprofits” working
towards the same goals. Grantmakers engaged in
this way can play a role in linking grantee partners to future funders, convening funders to raise
awareness of urgent issues, and leveraging fieldlevel knowledge and research to support work on
the ground. As a foundation approaches an exit, it
may want to intensify this type of work to ensure
that key community capacities are sustained after
the sunset of the initiative. The ability of grantee
partners to “attract other resources into the
community” was of key importance, a Skillman
Foundation representative observed. “Part of
what we tried to do from the beginning was to be
really intentional about helping … communities
leverage funds and helping our grant partners, in
particular, understand the funding landscape and
how to maneuver through it.”
The exit period may consist of multiple phases
tailored to specific communities and designed
to capitalize on key points of strength. Leaders
from the Skillman and Annie E. Casey foundations, for instance, made hard decisions in the
second phases of their initiatives to cut some of
the original sites. This narrowing of focus ultimately helped them exit, as the leaders felt that
they could achieve more impact with fewer sites
and a more intense focus on specific issues. In
another example, MacArthur Foundation leaders selected half of their original communities
to continue working with beyond their original 10-year commitment. These were grantee
partners who had gained traction on key issues,
and the additional funding was designed to help
them make significant change.
In addition to building the capacity of grantee
partners to secure funding from other sources
on their own, it can be important during exit
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for foundations to forge or solidify relationships with other investors who share their goals
and values and who may be able to support
the grantee partners in the future, and to work
together with those funders to sustain what
communities believe will shift power and give
voice to residents. Few foundation representatives reported dedicating the necessary resources
and staff energy to engaging other funders from
the beginning.

Transitioning to New Areas of Work

An environmental landscape analysis can reveal
what has changed and where future needs and
opportunities lie. Site context changes frequently
and often unpredictably, making it crucial to
acknowledge these changes in the larger political
and social environment when planning for exit
and a transition to new work. Leaders from the
Skillman Foundation, for example, are attempting to understand the changing trajectory of the
city of Detroit, where their initiative is located.
They have opted to forgo a strategic-planning
process in order to use what they learn about
changes in Detroit as a platform for the future
and to allow their grantee partners to inform the
next iterations of the work based on the shifting
context of the city. A Hazen Foundation leader
further noted that it is important for a funder to
articulate how the world has changed since the
beginning of its initiative, how institutional goals
may have shifted, and how the foundation will
respond to those changes and move forward.
“There’s change and growth and development
over 10 years,” this leader said. “[It’s important]
that as you move forward, you’re not measuring
yourself by irrelevant and obsolete criteria.”

Several of the foundation leaders we interviewed
described an internal process of creating a values framework to guide prioritization of the
areas and goals on which to focus after an exit.
These frameworks are typically grounded in the
core principles and beliefs of the foundations.
Northwest Area Foundation leaders first created
a “very broad and aspirational strategic vision
document” that laid out an ideal account of the
exit and the foundation’s future plans. In order
to focus the values framework more sharply, the
foundation leaders translated it into a strategic
framework that had the specificity needed for
actual decision-making about exiting from their
initiative and pivoting to new lines of work.
In relation to making choices about where to
focus resources after an exit, one foundation
leader identified an underlying conflict of which
all funders should be conscious: Funders identify
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Making decisions about what new areas of
work to transition to is difficult but important.
Foundation leaders shared that they have made
weighty decisions about new directions based on
a combination of internal and external factors,
including the foundation’s mission and values,
the length of investment in initiatives, lessons
and successes from initiative implementation,
history and reputation in specific fields, and
strategic outlook based on analysis of funding
opportunities.

[O]ne foundation leader
identified an underlying
conflict of which all funders
should be conscious: Funders
identify themselves as
committed to equity for the
neediest communities, but at
the same time they are intently
focused on demonstrating
success. Unfortunately, the
communities and organizations
best able to successfully
implement foundation
initiatives are often the ones
that possess the most resources
and capacity.
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themselves as committed to equity for the neediest communities, but at the same time they
are intently focused on demonstrating success.
Unfortunately, the communities and organizations best able to successfully implement
foundation initiatives are often the ones that
possess the most resources and capacity. It can
be enticing for a funder to prioritize continued
support for these communities when it explores
its next steps, but doing so can undermine the
goal of helping higher-need communities. This
particular foundation leader recommended that
funders “stick with the places that have traction and are demonstrating what can be done,”
but also develop “a different strategy for the
really tough places.” A representative from The
California Endowment observed that “to get
some critical mass, you need to perhaps work
with folks who are a little more well off, even as
there are … communities that are desperately in
need. How do we reconcile those things with our
core values?”

Managing the Internal Process of Exit
Exits from large-scale, multiyear initiatives can
be particularly vulnerable times in foundations’
organizational life cycles. These periods are
characterized by heightened anxiety among
key stakeholders about programming and
operational procedures, as well as changes and
potential upheavals in leadership, staffing, and
funding structures.
Foundation leaders often devote too little time
to addressing their own team members’ anxieties around exit. In addition to its impact within
the foundation, this stress has negative effects
outside the foundation when it becomes a major
cause of partners’ anxieties. One place-based
foundation leader described this dynamic succinctly: “Your place-based strategy plays out the
same way that your internal strategy plays out.”
In other words, the foundation needs to establish
internal clarity or grantee partners and people
in the community will not have clarity either.
Invest in the internal process to make the external strategy more effective.
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As program staff members transition to reduced
roles in their communities, they are often the
ones who are most in touch with community
partners and hold the greatest trust. Therefore,
it is crucial to build the capacity of staff members
as key agents of the foundation and communication linkages to grantee partners, and to secure
staff buy-in on key decisions about the exit. As
one place-based funder observed,
The more you can equip [your staff], the more you
get them aligned, [and] the more comfort and clarity they have about where you’re going, the better
everybody else will be. ... They are the people who
help you execute, that hold the relationships that
do all that. I would spend some time really focusing on that talent, helping to transition that talent
wherever they may be. You need them to make big
pivots [and] create the capacity to help them do
that really well.

An outside change-management expert can
lend an objective perspective. One foundation
engaged a facilitator to ask the hard questions
that informed decision-making and moved the
foundation past the resistance and mourning
stages that came as a reaction to the decision to
exit. The process of moving to a “new beginning” required assessing which staff members
would be brought along into the new phase of
work. After a two-year exit process, another
funder acknowledged that the transition could
have happened more quickly and less painfully with the help of an expert who could
attend to different levels of staff readiness to
embrace change. “If I had it to do over again,”
this foundation leader said, “I would have had a
change-management expert by my side to help
me manage the internal dynamics.” Another
organizing funder observed that “an outside
facilitator” is necessary “to push and really ask
these questions,” since “there is absolutely no
way to authentically ask staff to disengage from
the work and the people that they have come to
admire and love.”
Staff departures become more likely as the
foundation engages in deep discussions about
potential new directions, and such turnover should be anticipated. One place-based
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foundation’s leaders, for example, found that as
the exit process began, staff members began to
assess their commitment to the foundation given
where the work was headed. Some staff members
who wanted to continue to support community
change found positions at other foundations and
organizations that were taking on place-based
work. Although every staff member was guaranteed a job if he or she wanted to stay at this
particular foundation, other foundations chose a
different approach. Those leaders advised having
a strong staff transition plan in place and being
decisive and clear about shifts in job descriptions
that reflect new strategic priorities.

Place-based funders often use an “embedded
funder” approach to build trust and strong
relationships with community partners. In the
course of playing this role, program staff members can become very closely and personally
aligned with their communities, and may have
great difficulty with the exit process. Foundation
leaders have addressed this dynamic during exit
periods by more clearly defining roles, rotating
positions, or assigning individuals to more than
one site. The tensions that can arise when program officers are deeply embedded in their sites
should be proactively addressd.

Conclusion
The planning and implementation of an exit
from a major investment is not an easy task. The
process can be arduous and represent a loss of
valuable resources and relationships for community partners, no matter what foundations
do to soften the blow. A graceful, responsible,
and ultimately successful exit can occur when
funders who are deeply committed to helping
the most vulnerable communities build on the
strength of relationships with grantee partners
and communicate with clarity, transparency, and
consistency. They celebrate hard-fought victories
and build awareness of accomplishments that
need to be sustained. They allow adequate time
for exit planning, maintain flexibility, and use
evaluation data to guide decision-making.
Our research revealed that communities and
partners will understand and support an exit plan
if a funder is able to convey that there is a natural
and logical progression from previous initiative goals and gains, and if it can express and
demonstrate a compelling vision for the future
consistent with its mission and values.
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As a consequence of staff departure and the
additional burdens of exit planning, those staff
members who remain are often spread too
thinly between their normal workloads and their
exit-planning responsibilities. At one foundation, the staff members found the extra work of
exit planning to be exhausting and challenging;
although this foundation did not shut down its
grantmaking operation completely during the
exit period, the program officers had to cut back
significantly on their field engagement due to
their heavy workloads. During and after an exit,
it is critical to provide extra support to staff.
“The exit took its toll,” a place-based funder said.
“Be respectful [to staff] in the same way that
we’re all very careful to be very respectful of
grantee partners. … Don’t forget that for staff at
all levels. A little extra care … goes a long way.”

Staff departures become
more likely as the foundation
engages in deep discussions
about potential new
directions, and such turnover
should be anticipated. One
place-based foundation’s
leaders, for example, found
that as the exit process began,
staff members began to assess
their commitment to the
foundation given where the
work was headed.
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APPENDIX
The questions used during the interviews were created in collaboration with executives from The
California Endowment based upon their primary areas of inquiry. The following topics were covered
in each interview; here, each topic includes one example of an associated interview question;
• Relationship management with partners. How did you think about maintaining relationships
with partners during the transition and post-transition?
• Sustaining partners’ capacity and infrastructures. How did the organization decide which
assets were a priority to sustain?
• Structural transition. How have you transitioned from foundation-created entities to ones
that are more widely owned?
• Funding practices. Are there particularly innovative funding practices used post-transition to
sustain previously funded work?
• Decision-making/prioritization. How did you make decisions about ending or transitioning
the initiative?

• Internal dynamics. What decision-making structure did the foundation use to support
transition?
• Managing multiple phases of transition. Were there staff members at the foundation who
managed the transition while other staff managed the next phase of the initiative?
The interviews were analyzed by first creating individual interview write-ups based on transcriptions
and interviewer notes. These write-ups were then uploaded into NVivo, a qualitative data-analysis
platform, and there they were coded for common themes. Based upon the themes — both expected
and emergent — that were highlighted in the coding analysis, the report authors were able to
synthesize and create recommendations for the endowment. Many of these were used in this article.
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• Communications. How did you manage communications with partners about transition?
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Introduction
What impact are we having? How should we
refine our approach? What are we learning that
could inform related efforts? These are among
the fundamental questions all foundation leaders
confront. But for a limited-life foundation, there
is another pressing and unavoidable question:
What will we leave behind?

Reflective Practice

Of course, every foundation hopes that its
legacy will be comprised of program outcomes achieved. But many of the problems
philanthropy seeks to address are complex, deepseated, and pervasive. Few, if any, can be solved
within a brief, defined time frame. Limited-life
foundations addressing these problems cannot
expect to declare victory when they sunset —
they can only strive to move the ball down the
field, and then enlist and prepare others to carry
the work forward. Given this reality, it would be
foolish — perhaps even irresponsible — for these
foundations to exit the game without making a
deliberate effort to share what they have learned
with the players who remain.
Purposeful, focused evaluation seems critical in
this context. As will become clear, the authors
believe that systematically capturing and sharing knowledge — about programs, as well as
social-change methods and grantmaking practices — can increase a foundation’s influence and
impact during its final years and beyond. This
article shares the emerging hypotheses of two
foundations, The Atlantic Philanthropies and
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, each four years
from sunset as of this writing, about the opportunities and challenges for evaluation in the
limited-life context. (See Figure 1.)
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Key Points
•• This article shares the emerging hypotheses
of two foundations, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
— each four years from sunset — about the
opportunities and challenges for evaluation
in the limited-life context.
•• Few, if any, of the problems philanthropy
seeks to address can be solved within
a brief, defined time frame. Limited-life
foundations can only strive to move the
ball down the field before they sunset,
and then enlist others to carry the work
forward. Given this reality, these foundations
are obligated to make a deliberate effort
to share what they have learned with the
players who remain.
•• The article argues that systematically
capturing and sharing knowledge — about
programs, as well as social-change
methods and grantmaking practices — can
increase a foundation’s influence and
impact during its final years and beyond.

Hypothesis 1: Urgency Is Evaluation’s
Best Friend and Worst Enemy
As the dark-witted Samuel Johnson once said,
“When a man knows he is to be hanged ... it
concentrates his mind wonderfully.” Indeed,
impending deadlines have a way of bringing
work into focus. As a limited-life foundation
approaches closure, with the sound of the countdown clock ever present, the sense of urgency
can be both exhilarating and overwhelming —
and it can advance or hinder evaluation.

End-Game Evaluation

FIGURE 1 The Atlantic Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation

About The Atlantic Philanthropies

About the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation

The Atlantic Philanthropies were founded by
entrepreneur Chuck Feeney, who decided in
1982 to devote his wealth to the service of
humanity. A champion of “giving while living,”
Feeney has long maintained that people
of wealth should use it to better the world
during their lifetimes. That belief led trustees
to decide in 2002 to limit Atlantic’s life to a
fixed term.

In 1957, Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr., former
chairman and CEO of the Bechtel Corp.,
created the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation as
a personal commitment to the prosperity he
envisioned and desired for California.

Chuck Feeney felt a connection to each of
the eight regions where Atlantic has made
major investments. With grantmaking and
partnerships in the United States, Republic
of Ireland, Northern Ireland, South Africa,
Vietnam, Australia, Bermuda, and Cuba,
Atlantic has sought to advance opportunity,
equity, and well-being. Culminating grants
aim to address 21st-century problems and
achieve significant, lasting results in the
following areas:
• Aging
• Children and Youth
• Reconciliation and Human Rights

The decision to sunset makes imminent the
question of what a foundation can and should
seek to learn — as well as the need to decide
how that information will be gathered, and with
whom and how it will be shared. At both Atlantic
and the S. D. Bechtel Foundation, Jr. Foundation,
this urgency has helped generate demand and
attention for evaluation, ensuring that it is adequately prioritized, resourced, and concentrated
in areas where the opportunities for learning and
influence are greatest.
But urgency creates challenges, too. We worry
that the drive to move quickly may cause

• The Education Program focuses on helping
young people develop the knowledge,
skills, and character they need to become
productive, engaged citizens. The
foundation supports STEM education and
character development, and encourages
effective education policy.
• The Environment Program concentrates
on the management, stewardship,
and conservation of the state’s natural
resources by supporting organizations
and partnerships that inform,
demonstrate, implement, and advocate
for improvements in water management
and land stewardship.
In 2009, the foundation decided to invest all
of its assets by 2020 in order to spur
significant progress in these areas sooner
rather than later.

mistakes that will cost time and resources
later. On the other hand, moving too slowly
may restrict what we can accomplish. After
all, the scope of evaluation efforts can only be
as expansive as time permits. Deadlines cannot be extended, meaning work that is delayed
may never be completed. And there will come
a point when it is simply too late to initiate anything new. Finally, enlisting the attention of
program staff is difficult; no matter how well
they understand and believe in the importance of
evaluation, the time-sensitive demands of their
grantmaking responsibilities can hamper their
ability to focus on it.
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• Health

The foundation’s vision is pursued through
two programs:
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In this context, we have found that a proactive
approach to evaluation planning and implementation is essential. Because time is short, it
is a consideration in every aspect of the planning process — from what to prioritize (see
Hypothesis 4), to which methods to use (see
Hypothesis 6), and even how to prepare for
contingencies, knowing that time will limit the
range of course corrections at our disposal. At
both foundations, we do our best to keep evaluations on track by anticipating and mitigating
potential obstacles, exercising disciplined project
management, and frequently recalibrating our
plans to reflect what is feasible within the time
remaining. These may be sound practices in any
setting, but in ours, they are absolute necessities.

Building the Right Team

Reflective Practice

A thoughtful organizational structure can
help keep evaluation top of mind. At the
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, most evaluation
activities are embedded in program work
and funded by program budgets. As a result,
program leadership must be truly committed
to evaluation in order for it to occur. However,
program staff are supported by a separate
organizational effectiveness team, including
an evaluation and learning officer who serves
as an advocate and internal consultant for
evaluation. While program staff are understandably focused on grantmaking, evaluation
staff can gently and continually raise questions
about what is being learned and how that
learning can be leveraged. This structure has
the additional benefit of enabling program staff
to seek “free” in-house evaluation expertise
whenever they need it. When time and money
are limited, the ability to walk down the hall for
advice is proving to be a real asset.

Hypothesis 2: Big Programmatic
Bets Create Big Opportunities for
Learning — and Accelerating Impact
By definition, when a foundation spends down
it liquidates and distributes all of its assets, and,
as a result, it typically operates with a far larger
grantmaking budget during its final years than
it would if it remained perpetual. With these
resources, a limited-life foundation may be able
to place “big bets” to advance solutions to societal problems within a defined time frame.1 Big
bets play a central role in Atlantic’s grantmaking;
a Bridgespan study found that Atlantic has
directed 50 percent more of these investments to
social-change causes than other U.S. philanthropies, on average (Powell, Huang, Foster, Boyd, &
Sakaue, 2016).2 Similarly, at the S. D. Bechtel, Jr.
Foundation, a small number of large, multiyear
initiatives constitute the majority of the foundation’s work in its final decade.
This increase in resources creates significant
programmatic opportunities. But if our foundations fail to document and share what is learned
through these investments, we will leave organizations and fields inadequately informed when
we go out of business. If, however, the big programmatic bets are accompanied by strategic
investments in evaluation, our foundations may
be able to propel grantees and fields forward by
accelerating their learning.
For example, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is
currently supporting two cohorts of California
school districts to implement new academic
standards in math and in science. The foundation’s decision to sunset created an opportunity
to invest significant resources in this work at a
critical time in education reform. On its own,
this investment would have paid dividends for
participating school districts. But in order to
spur broader impact, the foundation made a

1
Bridgespan defines “big bets” as investments of $10 million or more to an organization or defined initiative, and suggests
that investments of this nature have been instrumental to the success of some of the most effective nonprofits and social
movements in the U.S. (Foster, Perreault, Powell, & Addy, 2016).

Between 2000 and 2012, 20 percent of philanthropic big bets in the U.S., by dollar value, were allocated to “social-change
causes,” as defined by Bridgespan. (The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation was treated as an outlier and excluded from this
analysis.) Comparatively, a review of Atlantic’s 1989-2015 grantmaking found that 30 percent of its big bets were directed to
social-change causes.

2
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complementary and substantial investment in
evaluation — and in many ways, this evaluation
will be the true legacy of the work. WestEd —
a nonpartisan, nonprofit education research,
development, and service agency — is conducting formative and summative evaluation of the
foundation’s math and science initiatives. By
extracting lessons learned and actively disseminating this knowledge to education policymakers
and other school districts across the state and the
nation, the foundation seeks to support systemwide change.

Hypothesis 3: Going Out of Business
May Erode Some Traditional Barriers to
Learning in Philanthropy

For this reason, one of the most interesting
implications of going out of business is the way
in which it disrupts the usual incentives and
dynamics of the philanthropic environment,
potentially to the benefit of evaluation and
learning. As a grantmaker, would you be more
willing to own your mistakes if you knew your
job had a short shelf life? As a grantee, would you
feel more comfortable reflecting on what went
wrong with a funder if you knew your relationship with that funder was coming to an end?
We see evidence that, for our foundations, the
answer might be “yes.”
On an institutional level, our impending sunsets
have triggered some shifts in the way we think
about the purpose and audience for evaluation.
We are looking outward and forward, thinking
most about how we can generate useful knowledge for grantees, funders, policymakers, and

others who will carry on vital work after we
exit. We are investing in few, if any, evaluations
where our foundations are the only audience.
(See Hypothesis 4 for a full discussion of where
we do invest.)
And because our institutions are now arguably less concerned with brand building, we
are becoming more candid, particularly about
failure. Challenges and surprises — along with
what they mean and how they were addressed
— can, should, and will be celebrated. Early on,
Atlantic publicly committed to sharing a “top
10” list of lessons learned, including instructive examples of where and how it fell short.
Likewise, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, at
the encouragement of trusted colleagues and
partners, is making a deliberate effort to communicate more openly and more often about its
learning during its final years.
Although each of our foundations is at a somewhat different stage (as of this writing, Atlantic
has made its final grant commitments and the
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation still has several
years of intensive grantmaking ahead), we both
see shifts in staff behavior as well. As the sunset approaches and staff find that they are no
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 81
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A central barrier to learning in any institution is
our natural reluctance — as human beings and
as organizations — to admit failure. Employees
have an obvious incentive to appear successful in
order to advance their careers and, in the case of
foundation program staff, to protect their grantees. Cultivating an environment in which staff
feel safe enough to speak openly about mistakes
is hard. Building this kind of trust with the organizations we support — in spite of what often
feels like an inescapable power dynamic between
grantmaker and grantee — is even harder.

[O]ne of the most interesting
implications of going out
of business is the way in
which it disrupts the usual
incentives and dynamics of the
philanthropic environment,
potentially to the benefit of
evaluation and learning. As a
grantmaker, would you be more
willing to own your mistakes if
you knew your job had a short
shelf life?

Halverstadt and Kerman

[T]he limited-life context
seems to create an opportunity
to disentangle learning
from accountability — to
focus evaluation on building
knowledge that will advance
our fields of interest, and to
speak more honestly than ever
before about failure and lessons
learned from it.
longer competing for promotions or persuading the board to fund their work, some feel less
pressure to deliver glowing evaluation findings,
and more comfortable pointing to where things
went wrong. We hope that grantees will become
increasingly candid, too — in reflecting on their
own work and in providing feedback to us on our
performance — especially after their final grants
have been received.

Reflective Practice

In other words, the limited-life context seems to
create an opportunity to disentangle learning
from accountability — to focus evaluation on
building knowledge that will advance our fields
of interest, and to speak more honestly than ever
before about failure and lessons learned from it.

Hypothesis 4: Focus is Imperative,
But It Requires Difficult Choices and
Clear Criteria for Decision-Making
It’s axiomatic that translating insight into impact
requires focused learning at both the level of
the grantee and the foundation. But we have
found that setting priorities for evaluation —
not to mention setting priorities generally — is
a major challenge in a limited-life foundation.
Not everything can be evaluated; and the more a
foundation takes on, the greater its risk of being
spread too thin, spending time and money on
82 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

low-yield efforts at the expense of activities that
hold greater promise for learning.
At both Atlantic and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr.
Foundation, some form of reflection is required
of every grantee. At minimum, we require
grantees to clearly delineate their intended outcomes at the outset and then reflect on progress
against those outcomes in grant reports. In
some cases, a light-touch retrospective by staff
or an evaluation partner is also expected. At
Atlantic, retrospectives on concluding lines of
work focus not only on progress made but also
on challenges remaining; the aim is to advance
grantee sustainability by helping inform and
attract other funders (e.g., a synthesis of U.S.
comprehensive immigration reform highlighted
unfinished business for stakeholder groups; profiles of aging and economic-security advocacy
organizations were potential fundraising tools
for these entities).
At the other end of the spectrum, for some program areas or initiatives, evaluation is central
to the theory of change. For example, Atlantic’s
strategy for prevention and early intervention
services for children in the Republic of Ireland
and Northern Ireland hinges on rigorous evaluation. The primary goal of this work is to
identify successful, evidence-based practices
through evaluation, so that Atlantic’s government agency partners will be more informed and
disciplined about investing in effective services.
Thus, a significant commitment to evaluation is
nonnegotiable.
But what about the messy middle — all those
cases where there may be something to learn
through evaluation, but where evaluation is not
central to strategy? Making such choices is hard.
In our experience, it is important to establish
agreement internally about how these decisions
will be made, and by whom.
The criteria used by our foundations to determine where to invest in evaluation converge
around several dimensions. To maximize our
remaining years, we have both focused on areas
in which (a) there is an opportunity to be influential in service of foundation goals; (b) there is an
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FIGURE 2 Setting Priorities

FIGURE 2 Setting Priorities

GOALS

AUDIENCE

KNOWLEDGE

The greatest potential
for influence occurs here,
where the foundation’s
goals align with an
opportunity to generate
relevant knowledge and
deliver it to key audiences.

Understanding our goals and potential to advance them
GOALS

• Based on our mission and values, what influence do we hope to have
on the organizations, fields, or systems with which we are working?
• How do these “influence goals” manifest in this potential project?
• Will an investment in evaluation help us achieve these goals?

Identifying our target groups, and opportunity
AUDIENCE

• Is there currently an opportunity to influence our target audience?
• Are there partners that can help us influence this audience and ensure
the durability of the learning after we exit?

Assessing our ability to deliver meaningful learning
• Are there gaps in knowledge in the field that our work could help address?

KNOWLEDGE

• Is there something particularly valuable or interesting to be learned
from our experience?
• Will we be able to deliver knowledge products to our standards of
quality, given the time, resources, and staff remaining?

identifiable audience with corresponding dissemination opportunities; and (c) the foundation
has relevant, informative experience to bring to
bear on existing gaps in knowledge, as well as

the ability to generate knowledge products that
are appropriate to the audience and opportunity.3
(See Figure 2.)

3
In some circumstances, accountability emerges as a fourth consideration, as there may be unusually high-stakes
accountability concerns at play that require an investment in evaluation.
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• Who is our target audience—the foundation, the grantee(s), the field,
other funders—and how much does that audience care about this work?

Halverstadt and Kerman
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Regardless of the human
resources strategy employed,
a limited-life foundation’s
staff might well shrink
toward the end. As a result,
evaluation staff must
grapple with the reality that
institutional memory may be
slowly drained, since some
information is carried in the
minds of staff and not formally
documented. In a perpetual
organization, information can
be orally transmitted across
generations of staff. But in
a limited-life foundation,
information is at risk of
disappearing when staff do.
In both foundations, evaluation priorities are
established through a highly collaborative process that includes program, evaluation, and
communications staff, senior leadership, and, in
some cases, the board. Decisions about where to
invest are never made by evaluation staff alone.
As our foundations prepare to close, evaluation
of some grants, initiatives, or lines of work may
need to be set aside or scaled back in order to
devote adequate attention to the most pressing
priorities. These decisions come with some sense
of disappointment in lost opportunities for learning, but when time and other resources are finite,
it is important to look for the most significant
points of leverage — and if necessary, decline
opportunities that are less likely to bear fruit.
84 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Hypothesis 5: Staff Transitions
Complicate the Work, and Institutional
Memory Is No Longer a Given
Based on our experiences and those of other
limited-life foundations we have studied, it
seems that staffing levels may diminish as sunset
approaches, whether through design, attrition, or
some of each. Meanwhile, staff who remain will
likely see their roles evolve and often expand, in
ways that may or may not suit their interests and
abilities. These realities can make it difficult to
keep evaluation efforts adequately staffed, and
to extract the institutional memory needed for
meaningful learning.
Atlantic has implemented a human resources
strategy in which the foundation’s staff has
gradually but steadily decreased over a five-year
period. Although the foundation will not officially close its doors until 2020, grantmaking
drew to a close at the end of 2016. By then, most
program staff had moved on, while staff focused
on evaluation and communications modestly and
temporarily increased. As bandwidth constricted,
staff began to wear multiple hats, including an
increased emphasis on learning and dissemination — regardless of their interest or expertise
in such work. In some cases, this created a mismatch between the organization’s needs and
the staff’s capabilities, but it also created opportunities for individuals to grow. Some staff
— primarily impassioned by their grantmaking
responsibilities — self-selected out of the organization, while others embraced the new activities
to build and broaden their professional skill sets.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, on the other
hand, is not planning to reduce its workforce
prior to sunset. The foundation has ambitious
goals for its last few years and is hoping that
most of its roughly 35 staff will choose to stay
until the end, in order to shepherd final grants to
completion, prepare organizations and fields for
the foundation’s departure, and document and
disseminate learning. But even in the best-case
scenario, it is possible that some staff will decide
to move on before sunset. And since there will
likely come a time beyond which departing staff
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are no longer replaced, bandwidth may become a
challenge in the final years.
Regardless of the human resources strategy
employed, a limited-life foundation’s staff might
well shrink toward the end. As a result, evaluation staff must grapple with the reality that
institutional memory may be slowly drained,
since some information is carried in the minds
of staff and not formally documented. In a perpetual organization, information can be orally
transmitted across generations of staff. But in a
limited-life foundation, information is at risk of
disappearing when staff do. This makes it more
and more difficult to engage in reflective practice
as sunset approaches.

Hypothesis 6: A Limited Window
for Data Collection Presents
Technical Challenges
We are finding that the end-stage environment
also poses technical challenges for evaluation
design and implementation. Both Atlantic and
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation are investing in
complex program areas — human rights, education reform, sustainable water management,
and others — where change does not occur overnight. Perpetual foundations have the ability to

Foundations such as ours may be forced to
evaluate the impact of investments within a
much shorter time frame than might be ideal.
For example, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation’s
STEM-education work includes efforts to help
K-8 teachers shift their instructional practice to
align with new academic standards in math and
science. Enabling this kind of behavioral change
at scale will take many years, and it will take
even longer to see measureable improvements in
children’s academic performance resulting from
these shifts. In this case, the optimal window for
conducting summative evaluation will not open
until after the foundation’s doors have closed.
Since limited-life foundations may be out of
business before it is feasible to measure direct
indicators of impact, at times we instead must
use leading indicators — measureable factors that
are predictive of outcomes and likely to change
before outcome indicators change — to determine whether we are on the right path. Finding
valid, timely, and accessible measures can be
difficult. Many leading indicators are imperfect
proxies, but they may be the only option when
the window for data collection is closing.
For example, Atlantic’s board will make final
investment decisions for far-reaching funding
of its social-change fellowships5 based on early
assessment of organizational development,
initial implementation performance, and leading indicators for much longer-term systemic
impacts. Key-informant interviews may be held
with knowledgeable community leaders (e.g.,
advocates, public health leaders, policymakers,
and policy analysts) who are positioned to recognize early systemic changes, but it may take
many years for the fellows to facilitate broader
improvements in health and/or racial equity.
For this reason, one of the most anticipated

4

See, e.g., www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/subtheme/school-discipline-reform

5

See http://www.atlanticfellows.org
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At both foundations, we are working to mitigate
this problem through deliberate and proactive
efforts to capture staff knowledge. We have
established protocols, processes, and tools for
extracting important information from staff, as
well as systematic ways to store that data so it
can be easily retrieved when needed. Atlantic
developed a program review protocol that was
completed by current and former program staff,
in concert with evaluation and communications staff. After taking inventory of relevant
documentation for each program area, staff
developed a consensus summary of each program’s goals, salient strategies and investments,
impacts, and lessons learned.4 The S. D. Bechtel,
Jr. Foundation expects staff to complete a written
analysis of every grant at key inflection points.

track progress on issues like these longitudinally
if they choose, or to postpone evaluation until
the time is right. Limited-life foundations may
not have these options.

Halverstadt and Kerman

evaluation criteria concerns evidence of strong
grantee capacity, including a culture of learning
and adaptation, which is considered to be essential for long-term success.

Hypothesis 7: Influence May Wane
in the Final Years if It Is Not Actively
Cultivated
It is a well-known joke in philanthropy that when
you leave the field, you will suddenly discover
that you are not as good-looking, smart, or funny
as you used to be. There is an underlying truth in
this humor: When you have the power to affect
how philanthropic dollars are allocated, you have
influence; people pay attention to you and your
messages. If individuals lose influence when they
exit philanthropy, it seems likely that institutions
may as well. With four years until sunset and
grant commitments declining during this period,
each of our foundations is asking whether — in
terms of influence — we will be finished before
we are done.

Reflective Practice

This may be a hurdle for us and for other limited-life foundations that have ambitious goals for
their final years. Our influence may dwindle at
precisely the time that our opportunity to build
and disseminate knowledge may be peaking.
Mindful of this risk, we are experimenting with
several strategies designed to help us retain a
voice until the end.
Engaging End Users From Start to Finish

At both foundations, we strive to include important stakeholders in evaluation activities early on,
to ensure that research questions and methods
are relevant and responsive to stakeholder needs
and that stakeholders feel invested in the project
and its findings. We consider this to be sound
evaluation practice generally, but particularly
important in the limited-life context.
Atlantic sees its diverse experience with advocacy
grantmaking — spanning time, topics, strategies,
and geography — as one of its most valuable yet
underdeveloped learning assets. Approaching
sunset, the foundation sought to produce relevant syntheses of lessons learned from this work
that would complement the existing literature
86 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

on advocacy, in formats that would be useful to
the field. To pursue this goal, Atlantic partnered
with the Center for Evaluation Innovation on the
Atlas Project, building a learning agenda through
ongoing reconnaissance of other funders, advocates, and government representatives. Several
funders and advocates expressed hopes that
Atlantic would share successes, failures, and
lessons concerning collaborative financing
and strategic application of 501(c)(4) funding.
Throughout the process, on these topics and
many others, key internal and external stakeholders provided critical insight, institutional
memory, and assistance — from identifying
audiences and defining evaluation questions,
to developing data-collection approaches and
interpreting findings, to supporting targeted dissemination of actionable lessons.
Stakeholder engagement is proving critical for
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation as well. For
instance, a key stakeholder in the foundation’s
science education initiative is the California
State Board of Education. To ensure that the
external evaluation of the initiative is responsive
to the needs of this audience, the foundation
encouraged the evaluator to create a technical
working group to advise on the project, including prominent members of the board. Early on,
the technical working group’s input informed
the research questions and evaluation design.
Now midway through the initiative, the group
remains active, helping to interpret and prioritize
findings for publication. By engaging this audience in the work so directly, the foundation aims
to ensure that the evaluation findings are useful
to state policymakers.
Working With and/or Through Partners

Partnerships are an especially important asset
for limited-life foundations and serve multiple
purposes. During the final years, they may help
attract and retain the attention of target audiences; for example, if a foundation’s influence
begins to wane, it may be able to rely on the
influence of its partners. Following closure, partnerships may enable the ongoing application of
lessons learned by transferring leadership to the
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field and creating permanent “homes” for the
knowledge that was built.
But there is a dynamic tension in play with
respect to partnerships. We urgently need partners in order to ensure that our learning is
widely disseminated and productively used. And
yet, the reality is that we have very little time
or bandwidth with which to forge or sustain
partnerships. Given the many nonnegotiable
constraints of the limited-life context (e.g., time,
money, staffing), we cannot always accommodate other institutions’ timelines or needs in the
name of partnership building (and vice versa).
And we worry that potential partners may not
be willing to invest time and resources in collaborating with us, knowing that the relationship
will not endure. In other words, we are learning
that partnership building — for both programming and learning — can be at its most difficult
when it is most needed.

Atlantic is also cultivating leaders who are poised
to apply learning, and commissioning work
with long-term evaluation partners. A constellation of Atlantic Fellow program grants reflects
both strategies. Anchor institutions are funded
to pilot new leadership-development efforts for
emerging social-change leaders, incorporating
learning from Atlantic’s experience as well as
other sources. And, evaluators selected in concert
with corresponding program grantees support
a “learn while doing” approach that combines
developmental features to inform fellowship
program design, formative assessments to refine
program components and build quality improvement capacity, and summative evaluation to
inform the Atlantic board’s final 10- to 20-year
investment decisions.

The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is building
funder collaboratives to support several major
program and evaluation efforts. For instance, the
foundation is a founding member of the Water
Funder Initiative, a collaborative effort to identify
and activate promising water solutions through
strategic philanthropic investments. The foundation’s aim, with respect to evaluation, is for
participating funders to invest in learning as a
collective, ensuring that its reach extends well
beyond any individual funder’s scope of influence.
Convening

Approaching sunset, both of our foundations are
increasingly bringing grantees, funders, and others together to exchange knowledge and identify
opportunities to work together toward shared
goals. Particularly as our grantmaking tapers off,
we may be able to leverage our role as conveners
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 87
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Atlantic has pursued a number of partnership
approaches in order to ensure that learning is
applied during and after the foundation’s culmination. Scaling of several initiatives that embed
lessons learned has been achieved through
carefully cultivated partnerships with government; in Vietnam, for example, investments in
epidemiological data collection and professional
education led to a stronger, data-driven public
health system.

Partnerships are an especially
important asset for limited-life
foundations and serve multiple
purposes. During the final
years, they may help attract
and retain the attention of
target audiences; for example, if
a foundation’s influence begins
to wane, it may be able to rely
on the influence of its partners.
Following closure, partnerships
may enable the ongoing
application of lessons learned
by transferring leadership to the
field and creating permanent
“homes” for the knowledge that
was built.

Halverstadt and Kerman

An external communications
strategy seems essential at this
time if our foundations hope to
remain influential and helpful
to the organizations and fields
we support. This means that for
each of our major evaluations
– especially those associated
with our big bets – we are
developing a corresponding
communications plan.
to retain the attention of key stakeholders,
while simultaneously creating opportunities for
those stakeholders to digest evaluation findings
together and forge relationships that may live on
after we exit.
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In some cases, we have taken advantage of
existing convenings to disseminate knowledge.
For example, lessons learned from a jointly
conducted evaluation of our capital grants
have been shared at national philanthropy conferences hosted by Grantmakers for Effective
Organizations and the Center for Effective
Philanthropy. Atlantic has also made use of
standalone funder meetings in the United States,
Ireland, Belgium, and Australia to share findings.
In other instances, our foundations have
hosted convenings to bring target audiences
together. Atlantic and the Center for Evaluation
Innovation hosted a meeting in 2015 to examine
cutting-edge advocacy evaluation methods, as
well as an international conference in September
2016 on public interest law and strategic litigation. Meanwhile, in July 2016, the S. D. Bechtel,
Jr. Foundation brought its National Character
Initiative grantees together for a two-day workshop on youth character-development research.
The workshop, led by the National Research
88 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Council, was immediately followed by a oneday convening of the grantees to reflect on
the research and identify opportunities for
collaboration.
Developing a Strategic Approach to
Communications

An external communications strategy seems
essential at this time if our foundations hope to
remain influential and helpful to the organizations and fields we support. This means that for
each of our major evaluations — especially those
associated with our big bets — we are developing
a corresponding communications plan.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is currently
working through this process for several of its
education initiatives. In close collaboration with
communications consultant Williams Group,
the foundation is bringing stakeholders together
to clarify learning and influence goals, identify
target audiences, and specify — for each audience — the information that audience needs,
the product or format it will find most useful,
the message and messenger it is most likely to
respond to, and the channels through which it
can best be reached. In many cases, the most
suitable format in which to convey evaluation
findings will not be a tome-like report, but
rather a policy brief, handbook, presentation,
webinar, or any number of other knowledge
products. And the best messenger and dissemination channel may not involve the foundation
at all, but will instead leverage the voice of a key
partner in the field.
At the same time, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr.
Foundation has been working to strengthen its
own communications capacity, so that tools,
resources, and lessons learned — for which the
foundation is the appropriate messenger — can
be widely shared in real time. In 2016, the foundation launched a new section of its website
to house knowledge products, and began to
actively disseminate information and resources
to external audiences via email campaigns. For
many of the foundation’s initiatives, summative evaluation findings will not be available
until the last year or two of the foundation’s
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life or even post sunset, but by sharing interim
learning along the way, the foundation seeks to
engage the field now and build anticipation for
future publications.

Hypothesis 8: Post-Hoc Evaluation
Is Challenging, But of Tremendous
Benefit to the Field
A key question for limited-life foundations is
whether, when, and how they should assess the
ultimate impact of their work. At Atlantic and
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, we are placing
big bets during our final years of grantmaking.
What will become of these investments? What
will become of our grantees and the gains they
have made? Will these organizations and their
progress endure? The potential for meaningful and beneficial learning does not end when a
foundation’s lights go out. Yet there is very little
existing research on the impact of exiting, and
we believe there is a need for more limited-life
foundations to commission post-hoc evaluation.

Atlantic has been working into its sunset with
collaborators like the Center for Evaluation
Innovation to look at advocacy lessons over time,
and Bridgespan to look at lessons about big-bet
grantmaking. Other external partners are positioned to gauge and share the results of final
efforts as they become available. Each of these
partners has a vested interest in the knowledge
being built. At the same time, Atlantic chose to
articulate its most “personal” institutional learning on its own, finding the process of reflecting
with past leaders and staff helpful and satisfying
as a way to mark the impending transition.

For grantmaking initiatives that require coordinated evaluation and dissemination post sunset,
Atlantic has identified like-minded partners to
oversee the work. For instance, Atlantic has
asked the James Irvine Foundation to assume
management of Atlantic’s investments in Linked
Learning, a career pathways-based education
model. Irvine is well suited for this role because
the foundation actually initiated and supported
the development of the Linked Learning model.
In general, such relationships seem to work best
when the partner has similar values and goals
related to its own mission, a deep knowledge of
the grantmaking approach and context, and a
commitment and capacity to help grantees adapt
to changing conditions.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is still wrestling with the question of whether and how to
assess final impact. Because organization and
field building is central to its work, the foundation may conduct a longitudinal study of the
capacity and resiliency of a sample of grantees.
Such an effort might involve one or two interim
reports during the foundation’s lifetime, followed by publication of a final report a few years
after sunset (e.g., 2023). The goal of such a study
would be to assess the impact of the foundation’s
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 89
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The question we face is: Who will do it? Since the
foundations will be closed and our entire staffs
will have moved on to other endeavors, a third
party must lead the work. But who should be
entrusted with this responsibility? How do you
vet an organization for this unusual role? Who
will manage the contract, holding the evaluator
accountable to the intended level of rigor and quality, course correcting when things get off track,
and helping to interpret the findings? How will
the findings be disseminated and applied? When is
the right time to conduct this type of evaluation?

A key question for limited-life
foundations is whether, when,
and how they should assess
the ultimate impact of their
work. At Atlantic and the
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation,
we are placing big bets during
our final years of grantmaking.
What will become of these
investments? What will become
of our grantees and the gains
they have made?

Halverstadt and Kerman

Every institution amasses a
huge amount of documentation
that may help to tell a story.
But what do you do with it all
when you close? When does
it make sense to establish an
archive?

for different audiences, and actively promoted in
order to get uptake.

capacity-building investments, as well as the
impact of its exit, on the strength of grantees.

However, it simply is not possible to fully anticipate the future interests and needs of every
potential audience. Atlantic’s leadership team is
thinking hard about how to make the archive as
flexible and responsive as possible. For example,
by including raw data (not just final research
products) and by making the archive easily
searchable, Atlantic hopes to accommodate the
uncertain and potentially wide-ranging research
needs of coming decades.

In addition, the foundation may consider commissioning an impact evaluation to assess the
attainment and/or durability of program outcomes for select lines of work. As of this writing,
further exploration is needed to determine who
would be entrusted with this work and how it
would be managed.
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Hypothesis 9: Knowledge Needs
a Home and a Caretaker in Order
to Be Made Useful
When all is said and done, limited-life foundations like ours face the question of what to do
with the knowledge we have built. This pertains
not only to the direct products of evaluation and
learning efforts, but in an even broader way to
the entire “paper trail” of the foundation.
Every institution amasses a huge amount of
documentation that may help to tell a story. But
what do you do with it all when you close? When
does it make sense to establish an archive? It
may not be necessary in every case, especially if
strong partners are poised to become stewards of
the foundation’s knowledge. If you do establish
an archive, how do you ensure that it is not just a
storage facility, but rather that the information is
accessible and productively used to inform decisions, drive continuous improvement, or catalyze
shifts in policy or practice? Our assumption
is that making information available is rarely
enough; it will need to be curated, repackaged
90 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Atlantic has elected to create an archive at
Cornell University, which will encompass the
organization’s paper and digital records. The
foundation has done its best to try to understand
and predict the priorities of potential audiences
for this archive. Program, evaluation, and communications staff have tapped grantees and other
funders to help determine who might be interested in the archive, how they would learn about
it, and what they would do with it.

In addition, the contents of Atlantic’s archive
will be actively curated and disseminated. The
website will be regularly updated for 10 years
following the end of grantmaking in 2016, and
outreach efforts will help make other materials available to philanthropic, nonprofit, and
academic communities with interests in topics including “giving while living,” limited
life, big bets for social change, and leadership.
Modest grants to infrastructure organizations
like the Center for Effective Philanthropy, the
Foundation Center, and Rockefeller Philanthropy
Advisors will support new data collection and
syntheses, resulting in tailored materials that
address emergent information needs and highlight opportunities to use the archives.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, aware that
establishing an archive of this scope and nature
requires years of careful planning is, as of this
writing, considering a wide range of approaches
to synthesizing and sharing insights, including
but not limited to preserving foundation documents in a formal archive.
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Conclusion
In the experience of our two foundations, the
decision to sunset has advanced evaluation in
many ways. The focus and urgency it brings is
refreshing and energizing. There are opportunities to “go big” on evaluation during the final
years and to leverage learning for grantees, peer
funders, and field leaders. And the ability to shift
from “evaluation for accountability” to “evaluation for learning and influence” has helped break
down many of the barriers that typically stand in
the way of meaningful reflective practice.
But there are challenges, too, and unique considerations. We face difficult choices about what
to evaluate. Staff capacity and attention are
strained. Institutional memory may be gradually drained unless efforts are made to preserve
it. Time constraints introduce methodological
limitations. Our influence may diminish with
our grantmaking budgets, even as our abilities
to build and disseminate knowledge are peaking.
Partnerships are essential but more difficult to
forge than ever. Decisions must be made about
whether to commission post-hoc evaluation as
well as whether and how to archive all or parts of
a mountain of information.

Our advice?

• Commission a post-hoc evaluation of your
work. There is a dearth of research on what
happens to program outcomes, grantee
organizations, and fields following the
departure of a major funder.
• Commit to publishing findings — good,
bad, and ugly. Long after your grant dollars stop flowing, the lessons learned from
your experience — what you tried, and
how others can build on your work or avoid
repeating missteps — will continue to have
impact. In a way, the knowledge you generate through evaluation will be your final,
parting gift to the field.
Our foundations are eager to continue documenting and disseminating learning — leading
up to but also following our sunsets. Over time,
we hope others will join us in this journey.
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• Put an evaluation and learning plan in place
early, including a strategy for capturing
institutional knowledge.
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• Resist the temptation to evaluate everything. Don’t invest unless your research
questions have relevance and value to external stakeholders.
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There is no guidebook to help limited-life foundations navigate these challenges. As S. D.
Bechtel, Jr. Foundation President Laurie Dachs is
fond of saying, “We’re building the plane as we’re
flying it — and soon we’ll have to start disassembling it.” But in the spirit of interim learning, the
combined reflections of our foundations have
been offered here in hopes of encouraging other
limited-life foundations — or those considering a
sunset — to make the most of evaluation.

• Make sure you have partners in the field at
every stage — from scoping and designing
evaluations to curating and diffusing knowledge — so that everything you do will have
its own legs after you exit.
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Changing in Place:
The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the
Good Neighborhoods Initiative
How did a hometown grantmaker conduct
and conclude its largest-ever initiative?

At work where Detroit’s kids live. In 2006, the Skillman
Foundation committed $100 million to a decade-long investment
in six neighborhoods. (See Figure 1, page 83.) Through this Good
Neighborhoods Initiative, the foundation directed a majority of its
grantmaking toward an intensive focus on changing the conditions
where, at the time, one-third of Detroit’s children lived. The goal
was to ensure that children in those places were safe, healthy, welleducated, and prepared for adulthood.
Reflective Practice

The initiative concluded in 2016, ultimately spanning 11 years and
involving $122 million in grants, which represented 67 percent of the
Foundation’s total grant spending in this time frame. Along the way,
the foundation reset its strategy and sharpened its goal — in response
to seismic shifts in the local context and informed by indicators of
progress.
To capture information on the unique challenges facing an embedded
funder as it changes program direction, Bob Tobin, senior consultant
at Williams Group, interviewed Marie Colombo, Skillman Foundation
director of strategic evaluation and learning. The
interview took place on
Dec. 8, 2016.
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interview
Bob Tobin (BT): When launching the Good
Neighborhoods Initiative, the Skillman
Foundation defined this as a 10-year
effort. Why that particular horizon?
Maria Columbo (MC): We had a good sense of
what it would take to do serious place-based work
— we knew we needed to allow time to actually
build capacity and see evidence of change. Tonya
Allen, now our president and CEO, was a principal architect of the approach; her team drew
from many knowledge sources, including literature and the experience of others — such as the
Annie E. Casey and W.K. Kellogg Foundations’
work in communities on behalf of children.

In 2011, we moved into the implementation
phase. At this time, we were dealing with severe
change in the Detroit economic, social, and political context. We entered into an extensive review
and evaluation of the initiative in this light,
revisiting and reshaping our approach in the first
years of implementation. This very large body
of work then continued to completion in 2016. In
total, we ended up with an 11-year initiative.
BT: How would you characterize the
Skillman Foundation’s approach to this
work in community?

Throughout the initiative, the Skillman
Foundation had a hands-on role that drew on the
foundation’s deep knowledge about Detroit and
on our relationships with a wide range of stakeholders. Program officers worked with residents
and local organizations, while contracting with
intermediaries to help with community outreach
and engagement, capacity building, and technical expertise.
As part of this approach, each neighborhood
established four to six action-planning teams
that received technical assistance to develop
more specific short- and longer-term goals, along
with strategies and action steps for achieving
these goals. To further involve residents, give
them a say in what happened locally, and build
their capacity, we set up a small-grants program.
Initially, we used small grants to provide modest funding for research and learning activities
to help residents plan; later these small grants
supported youth-focused grassroots projects.
The program was administered by a group of
residents from across the six neighborhoods, and
they made grants of $500 to $5,000. Over the
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 93
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The wisdom of the time suggested a commitment
of 10 or more years, with three distinct phases.
We followed this thinking, and announced a
decade-long scope for the work. It started with a
planning phase that covered the first two years,
2006 and 2007. That was a time for us to listen,
learn, and build respectful relationships. Then,
from 2008 to 2010, we were in a readiness phase,
which focused on engaging residents and growing
the capacity of neighborhood leaders, including
initiating new forms of local decision-making.

MC: For our team, it was all about authentic
engagement with residents in the six neighborhoods where we wanted to have impact. It
was a multistep, multifaceted process. In each
neighborhood, the planning phase began with
resident-engagement meetings where we shared
our interest and aims for the initiative and
gained initial reactions and questions. We held
similar sessions with other stakeholders, including local nonprofits and faith-based institutions.
As the work progressed, we held focus groups
to more specifically vet our planned approaches.
Then, with large groups of residents and leaders of community organizations, we ran a series
of six well-structured planning sessions in each
neighborhood. These sessions were about the
community setting overarching goals for that
particular neighborhood. We took these sessions
very seriously — with agendas, translators, voting equipment, and other supports.

Interview: Tobin and Colombo

initiative, the Skillman Foundation invested $2.8
million through this small-grants program.
BT: Can you say more about local
leadership and “new forms of local
decision-making”?
MC: From the start, the Skillman Foundation
created and funded full-time community liaisons — typically, people in the neighborhood
who had some organizing experience — to be
the on-the-ground lead, helping engage residents
and providing a point of contact for all the work.
I should note that the nature of these positions
has morphed and elevated in responsibilities
over time — and that three of the six people
originally in these positions are still in place
after 10 years.

Reflective Practice

Beyond these liaison positions, we provided technical assistance to identify, nurture, and develop
leaders among residents and others involved with
local nonprofits and faith-based groups. This was
another substantive set of supports — including
a leadership academy that took place over eight
weekends, a Community Builders Leadership
Institute that offered ongoing supports across
the initiative’s first two phases, plus individual
coaching and customized training.
This approach to local leadership development
in turn led to the creation of formal community “governance” groups. During the readiness
phase in 2010, six community-led planning and
advocacy bodies were established — one in each
neighborhood. Today, these bodies continue to
be active in five of the six neighborhoods. Board
members are elected annually, committee structures have been established, bylaws have been
developed, and an agenda for improving neighborhood conditions and outcomes for children is
in place. These governance groups each provide
a forum for planning within their neighborhood,
a hub for advocacy activities, and a legitimate
local group that can be a point of contact for
those outside the neighborhood — essentially
acting as neighborhood intermediaries.
94 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

BT: At a program level, what were the key
elements of the initiative?
MC: We invested in four strategy areas. We
worked from a detailed theory of change,
with multiple program strands within each
strategy area, and I will just illustrate a few
program components here. We’ve already
talked about the first strategy area, which was
community leadership — creating a pipeline
for resident leaders, including support for local
decision-making structures, with these efforts
supplemented by a robust small-grants program
directed by a resident panel.
Another strategy was about education, which
is a long-standing priority of the foundation.
This involved a complex set of programs. We
focused on both citywide system reform and on
building-level improvement approaches. Those
school-focused efforts featured involvement of
parents, youth, and other community members.
There was a youth-development strategy to
increase the scale and quality of local youth
programming as well as employment opportunities. The Foundation provided funding
for direct service programs, summer youth
employment, and technical assistance supporting quality improvement for program providers,
plus creation of a network among these local
youth program providers.
Fourth, we had a strategy for improving safety,
particularly around schools and youth-development program hubs. This involved support for
block clubs, community-embedded policing,
restorative practices, and anti-gang activities.
BT: After a planning phase followed by a
readiness phase, the foundation began
implementation in 2011. By 2013, the
initiative approach had shifted. Why?
MC: The local context for our work had changed
dramatically. When we began the initiative in
2006, nobody could have anticipated what would
take place in Detroit soon after.

Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the Good Neighborhoods Initiative

In 2008, the national economy went into deep
recession, which led to the collapse of the automotive industry. We saw two of the Big Three
automobile manufacturers declare bankruptcy
in 2009.
High unemployment contributed to the housing
foreclosure crisis, which was arguably felt worse
here than anywhere in the country. For example,
there were more than 70,000 foreclosures in the
Detroit metropolitan area in 2009 alone.
We were also in a period of political dysfunction,
with three mayors in three years after Mayor
Kilpatrick pled guilty to felony crimes and then
resigned in 2008. The city itself was on the path
to insolvency; Detroit filed for bankruptcy in
2013. The schools were in a similar plight, as
Detroit Public Schools came under emergency
management, accompanied by the unfettered
expansion of charter schools.
BT: What went into the decision to reset
strategy for the initiative?

We also identified capacities that were being
developed in the neighborhoods, including
neighborhood governance groups, youth-development programs, and a connected system
of providers, as well as school improvement
efforts. We thought about what it would take
to continue to build as well as protect these

BT: What were the specifics of this
midcourse change?
MC: After talking with grant partners and residents, we made the decision to go to a tiered
strategy in the six neighborhoods where we
were working. Three neighborhoods would
continue with full implementation and support
for all strategies. One would continue implementation of all strategies but in more of an
intermediate mode, meaning relatively less
investment from the Foundation. In two of
the neighborhoods where governance groups
were not able to coalesce, we discontinued our
support for formal community leadership but
continued to fund youth development, education, and safety. In these ways, the foundation
reallocated resources at a time of tremendous
difficulty in Detroit, with a deeper commitment
to the neighborhoods where we were seeing the
greatest potential for impact.
By continuing funding for youth-specific programming in all neighborhoods, we buttressed
the progress that was being made in improving
high school graduation rates. Related, we sharpened our overall intent for the initiative in an
important way at this midpoint, adopting a much
more specific focus on high school graduation
rates for young people in the six target neighborhoods. A 90 percent high school graduation rate
became our overarching goal.
We worked through and implemented these
changes in 2012 and 2013.
I should also say that in one of the two
neighborhoods where we withdrew community-leadership support, there was a response to
this decision. Neighborhood members created a
functioning governance group that we re-funded
in the latter years of the initiative.
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Reflective Practice

MC: With our evaluators, in 2011 we began
assessing what we had learned in the first two
phases of the work. This included looking at data
we collected to track progress toward a set of
2016 goals in each of our four strategy areas. For
the community-leadership strategy, our goals
had to do with the number of residents engaging
in the initiative, the number of leaders emerging in neighborhoods, and the effectiveness of
leadership groups in the neighborhoods. Our
assessment, based on the data and on our own
observations as our program team worked in
the neighborhoods, told us that we were making
more progress toward our goals in some neighborhoods than in others.

capacities moving forward. All this led us to
realize we needed to reset, to do what we
labeled a “strategic refresh.”

Interview: Tobin and Colombo
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Reflective Practice

BT: Evaluation played a role in the reset
and throughout the initiative. What were
the contours of the evaluation effort?
MC: Funding for data and evaluation activities
was $500,000 to $900,000 annually over the life of
the initiative. The scope, approach, and evaluation partners varied with each stage of the work.
In the upfront planning phase, our focus was
on developing the strategic monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework for this ambitious
change initiative — as well as building the internal and external data capacity it required. The
next phase was about readiness, and the evaluation work included refining 2016 goals and
developing a data dashboard, while continuing
96 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org
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to conduct process and outcome evaluations. The
implementation phase included developmental
evaluation of the revised strategies, final data
collection against the 2016 goals, and an intensive, comprehensive analytic review of the Good
Neighborhoods Initiative.
BT: How difficult was it to change several
years before the initiative was scheduled
to conclude?
MC: It was challenging, because it meant that we
had to alter some relationships with grant partners’ organizations and residents. Since we are
part of the community where we invest, these
relationships are often very personal for staff.

Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the Good Neighborhoods Initiative

But we needed to be resolute in doing what we
thought was best for Detroit kids. That’s always
been our north star. In the 2012-to-2013 strategic
refresh we were motivated to do our best to lay
the groundwork to achieve sustainable impact for
children, schools, and neighborhoods. We intensified our efforts to make progress by 2016 and to,
in effect, build a platform for the next generation
of the Foundation’s work beyond 2016.
BT: So your midcourse strategic refresh
included planning for the end of the
initiative in 2016?
MC: Yes. We wanted to be intentional in thinking about the remaining four years of Good
Neighborhoods and to get ready to transition
from the initiative in the most powerful way.
BT: How did you communicate and
implement the strategic reset in 2012 and
2013?

Our program officers also met one-on-one with
individual grant partners. This was especially
important in cases where our relationship with a
partner was changing.
BT: You reference relationships in several
of your responses. Why this emphasis?
MC: As an embedded funder striving for change
in our community, we don’t think of relationships as an incidental or secondary aspect of our
work. For us, in many ways relationships are
the work, in so much as they are the method for
most of what we do. We think of relationships as
an enduring resource that can be valuable to the
community and the Foundation beyond any individual grant or initiative.

MC: When we did the strategic refresh in 2013,
we concluded some grantee relationships with
tie-off grants. Each of these grants included
specific program goals that supported our overall initiative strategies. Some of these grants
included flexible dollars that the organization
could use for sustainability planning.
Similarly, tie-off grants were used in recent years
with the majority of grantees as we began to
ramp down the initiative.
With a group of grantees highly connected to
our program approaches, in 2016 we issued
transition grants that extend through 2018, providing funds for continued work on initiative
strategies while allowing for their planning
beyond the initiative.
We looked at our entire group of grant partners
and tried to be very clear in our verbiage with
each to make sure they knew if we were making
a concluding grant, or going through a stepdown funding process over multiple years.
We also wanted to make it clear that a foundation decision to not make a further grant under
the Good Neighborhoods Initiative does not preclude an organization from applying for funds in
a future initiative.
BT: How would you describe your
management of the initiative’s conclusion
with grantees as you approached 2016?
MC: Responsibility for the transition rested
with the foundation’s chief of staff and the vice
president for program and strategy. Staff from
our evaluation and communications groups supported these internal leaders and all program
staff throughout the process.
We knew a one-size-fits-all approach would not
work. With our close-in grant partners, there
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:1 97
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MC: We included core grant partners in the
refresh. They participated in planning meetings
with us. Once the plan was completed, we held a
series of large-group information meetings with
all grant partners and neighborhood leaders.

BT: How did your grantmaking align with
the changes you made in the initiative,
including its endpoint?

Interview: Tobin and Colombo

were a series of meetings — typically one per
month over 18 months, each a few hours in duration and involving program and evaluation staff.
These meetings had multiple aims. We wanted
to ensure that these partners were clear on what
was ending, while also asking them to help us
shape what the transition would look like and to
think with us about what would come next.
For other organizations, the message about
transition was communicated in the individual
meetings that took place once or twice a year
between each program officer and grant partner.
Particularly important in the transition phase
was the presence and voice of the few remaining foundation staff who were involved in
the initiative since its beginnings. They could
ground newer foundation staff in the history
and evolution of the work and relationships;
this helped support these newer staff in having
informed interactions with grant partners and
community members.
BT: How effective was your approach?

Reflective Practice

MC: While we communicated well with the
core group of grant partners, with our broader
set of grant partners we learned we were not
doing as well as we thought. In 2015, we got the
results of a Center for Effective Philanthropy
grantee perceptions survey. Grant partners said
loud and clear that, while we were respectful
of them and our goals were clear, the quality
of our relationships had diminished in recent
years. Some of this response was driven by our
actions, some was probably caused by anxiety
related to the Good Neighborhoods Initiative
ending, and some may have come from our
grants partners’ having grown to hold us to
high expectations through experiencing our
deep work with them.
Regardless of the causes, that input was a real
wake-up call. Since then we have been much
more intentional in communicating. We held
three large-group convenings in 2016 — sharing
information, gathering insightful input, and nourishing relationships. We now publish monthly
98 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

blog posts from our president, Tonya Allen. We
also set up an account where anyone can email
Tonya directly with questions or comments.
BT: What really stands out for you as
lessons for communicating with grantees?
MC: It’s important to be in contact, even when
we can’t be as clear as we would like about our
direction and message. We have been going
through a lot of analysis and planning for the
past 18 months to figure out where the foundation is headed beyond the Good Neighborhoods
Initiative. In this time, we have not been able
to be totally clear with external stakeholders
regarding where we are going. Still, we realize it is important to communicate what we do
know, to talk about what we are doing, and to
be transparent.
Two-way communication really matters.
It’s critical to solicit ideas and feedback from
grant partners. Through listening sessions, we
have gained a variety of perspectives on how
to most effectively transition from the Good
Neighborhoods Initiative and capitalize upon the
progress and assets built through this work.
I would also say that all of this — all aspects of
communication, especially during a transition,
especially as we seek inputs to inform next steps
— takes a lot of effort. Funders should not underestimate this point.
BT: Were your evaluators involved with the
community as the initiative concluded?
MC: Evaluators conducted individual as well as
focus group interviews with community members. They were part of several listening sessions
with community leaders that were led by foundation staff. Evaluators also sat in on sessions the
foundation held with community leaders that
focused on planning for beyond the initiative’s
conclusion in 2016.

Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the Good Neighborhoods Initiative

BT: Did you rely on any outside sources
to help you think about handling this
transition?
MC: We have connected with some other foundations to learn about their experiences. We
were interested in how they engaged with grant
partners and other partners in their own processes, and with whom they communicated. For
example, a Skillman Foundation team met with
colleagues from the MacArthur Foundation. In
addition to learning about some useful communication tools, one important takeaway from
a very thought-provoking day was that it’s OK
to not have everything figured out before you
begin to communicate with grant partners
and stakeholders. Being direct is what matters,
which is something our team knew already —
but having senior leaders from one of the world’s
most significant foundations validate that practice gave us an emotional boost and confidence
to charge ahead.

MC: Correct. We do not think about this as exiting in the sense of leaving everything behind.
It is not a full stop in the way that others may
view an exit. As an embedded funder, we are
not leaving town or ending relationships. We
are changing course, and right now we are in an
active period of transition that involves redefining many existing relationships in anticipation
of new work that advances our focus on kids
in Detroit. Our goal continues to be helping
these young people get ready for college, career,
and life. Our means to this end are shifting
— and much of the investment we have made
in building the capacity of local leaders and
organizations, and in the relationships we have
developed, remains very relevant to our goal.
So for us it is important to state that we are not
leaving the work in a way that may be implied

BT: Before we hear more about where the
foundation is going next, let’s do a little
retrospective. The Good Neighborhoods
Initiative was a huge investment for the
Skillman Foundation. Did it produce the
results you expected?
MC: We feel good about many aspects of the
progress made in this initiative, especially given
the dramatic changes and intense new challenges
for Detroit in the years following launch in 2006.
This new context affected the foundation’s ability
to achieve all that we originally hoped for; still,
we saw meaningful improvements.
Graduation rates in the high schools serving our
six neighborhoods went from 65 percent in 2008
to 82 percent in 2015. These schools once trailed
but now outpace Detroit schools at large.
Neighborhood identities and capacities are
stronger than 10 years ago. New awareness
and understanding of the six neighborhoods
came about because of this initiative. Skillman
Foundation grantmaking totaled $122 million,
and we can point to $1.2 billion in additional
investments — this is the amount committed by
others to support improvement in the neighborhoods where we were working. That is a 10-to-1
leverage factor.
There are more specific, on-the-ground indicators of improvement. Today, there are many
functioning resident-leadership groups in the
neighborhoods. More residents from these neighborhoods are running for or being elected to
public office, and getting involved with citywide
boards. There were three times more jobs for
young people in Detroit last summer compared
to the summer of 2008.
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BT: Even though the initiative is
concluding, it seems that the Skillman
Foundation doesn’t really refer to this as
an exit.

through the term “exit.” Rather, we view this
transition as an opportunity to engage with
grant partners and an array of other stakeholders to ensure that their capacities get used in
new ways.

Interview: Tobin and Colombo

In these and many other ways we can see a difference from the initiative. Notwithstanding these
successes, there were also disappointments. For
example, if we were to do it again, we’d likely
select smaller neighborhoods and be more intentional about connecting our four strategies more
effectively within the foundation as well as in
neighborhoods. As one illustration of this point,
we learned that when the safety, community
leadership, and education strategies intersected,
there was a greater decrease in crime in target
areas around schools and youth-development
centers compared to crime levels citywide.
BT: Did the foundation change through this
initiative?
MC: Internally, our board and staff feel we
have become more savvy and effective in our
change-making work because of the Good
Neighborhoods experience. For example, we
are better at attracting and tracking leveraged corporate investments, and at employing
social-innovation financial tools such as program-related investments, loan guarantees, and
equity investments.

Reflective Practice

We have also seen an unanticipated rise in our
own leadership role. One of our evaluators
writes about the growth in social capital that has
accrued to the Skillman Foundation through this
initiative. Our reputation has grown through our
work in neighborhoods. This has opened doors
to new forms of collaboration with the mayor’s
office, with the governor’s staff, and with other
funders investing in Detroit. For example, we
helped with a new cross-sector education coalition that has already generated several policy and
system changes along with an infusion of $666
million — which is a much-needed new investment in Detroit Public Schools.
There are other tangible ways we are seeing the foundation’s enhanced stature make a
difference. Our early commitment and programming for boys of color led to local and national
partnerships under the My Brother’s Keeper
initiative. Our decade-long work in youth
employment has been embraced by the current
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mayor, with our initial impact of 300 jobs now
growing to 8,200 jobs.
BT: What was more difficult than you
personally anticipated in the transition
process?
MC: For me, and I think most foundation staff, it
was the very personal challenge of transitioning
long-term relationships. We were working in
relationships where the foundation was very
hands on. We wanted to transition to relationships that would still be strong, but that would
be different — with much less direct foundation
involvement.
We worked closely with residents and grant
partners for a decade, and we were saying goodbye to a phase of the work where there was a
deep human investment. For foundation staff,
there is a personal adaptive challenge in that,
and it is hard.
BT: Is the Foundation evaluating the
transition?
MC: In the narrow sense, no, since we are not
conducting a discrete evaluation of the initiative
conclusion.
In a broader sense, yes, as we are committed to
continuous evaluation and learning in all our
work. We are currently wrapping up an extensive, 18-month analytic review of the Good
Neighborhoods Initiative. We are concurrently
planning for the next iteration of the foundation’s
monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework.
We will also do another Center for Effective
Philanthropy grant partner perceptions survey in
2017, and it will include initiative participants.
BT: What’s in the analytic review of the
Good Neighborhoods Initiative?
MC: This has been a deep process, involving
hundreds of people over the last year and a half.

Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the Good Neighborhoods Initiative

We engaged evaluators who looked at each strategy in the initiative. We then took initial reports
to our key implementation partners, who helped
vet and enrich the findings.
Next, we did community data walks with a
broader group of grant partners as well as community residents, including youth groups. The
data walks focused on progress toward our 2016
initiative goals — we asked people to reflect on
what they noticed in the data, tell us where they
saw traction, and describe their biggest concerns.
Additionally, we did education-focused data
walks with partners working in the neighborhoods to get their interpretation of the data. We
have also been engaged in listening and learning
sessions with a variety of individuals and community groups.
This series of interactions and iterations is
informing the next phase of community investment at the foundation. This process is very alive
and it is continually bringing new clarity to our
next stage. We expect that the strategic reset will
be completed by the end of the year.

MC: What we do know right now is that we
will continue to strengthen our ability to
support civic leadership. Through the Good
Neighborhoods Initiative, we learned how to
hear and champion diverse voices. We lifted
up leaders of our communities so that their
knowledge and perspective were included in conversations at the city, state, and national levels.
And we worked to prepare our youth for civic
leadership as well, so that they could contribute
to Detroit’s comeback. Supporting civic leadership will be central to the foundation moving
forward, as we work to ensure our city’s recovery is equitable — that children are prepared for
and connected to economic opportunities, and
are capable of contributing to the positive change
they want for their community.

BT: Based on the foundation’s experience
changing in place — both during the
initiative and at its conclusion — what
advice would you offer others?
MC: Be respectful, transparent, and as clear as
possible in working with all grant partners and
other stakeholders.
Related, know that you can’t present clarity
externally when you don’t yet have it internally.
In our strategic refresh in 2012 and 2013, and in
our final approach to the transition in 2016, it has
taken time to get clarity and alignment inside
the foundation regarding our direction. In those
periods, it is still important to be transparent
with people outside the organization — letting
them know where we are at and how we are
thinking about the next phase.
BT: Is there a headline for the Skillman
Foundation as you reflect on this
experience as an embedded funder?
MC: We worked hard to keep our sights on the
mission and our boots on the ground.
We gained credibility as a civic leader, and in
communities, by always making sure our mission and goals around children were front and
center. And through the way we conducted the
work and engaged people in neighborhoods, we
accrued trust. Credibility and trust are assets we
can steward and carry forward.
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BT: What’s likely to be part of the Skillman
Foundation’s next stage?

We also expect that our emphasis will no longer
be isolated to six neighborhoods; we are thinking
about the systems that impact youth and families
in Detroit and the neighborhoods in which they
live. Detroit kids remain our focus, but the local
context is now very different than in 2006 when
the initiative began, and very different than
in 2011 when the city was under such extreme
stress. This is a time of continued need as well as
revitalization in Detroit. We want to ensure that
youth are benefiting from, as well as leading and
contributing to, the reshaping of the city.

Interview: Tobin and Colombo

But building these assets meant being in place.
As the Good Neighborhoods Initiative got
started, foundation staff spent a lot of time in
the neighborhoods — listening, learning, and
demonstrating that we wanted to hear from
residents directly, not have their voices filtered
through neighborhood nonprofits or other stakeholders. Staff grew to understand — in a way
that we couldn’t have if program people stayed
in their offices — the challenges facing residents,
and the ways in which the six neighborhoods
were working and not working.
This led to an authentic sense of knowing and
being known, which contributed over time to
the foundation’s reputation as an organization
that can “stand with the community.” It is this
accrual of trust and respect, built over time,
that we believe helps position the foundation to
evolve in its work on behalf of children.
BT: How are you and your colleagues
feeling as you continue the transition from
the Good Neighborhoods Initiative?
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MC: We see the potential for a powerful evolution of what has been built in six neighborhoods
in light of many positive things now happening
in the city of Detroit — where there are upticks
in employment, commercial investment, public
safety, and other indicators of community vitality.
We see the opportunity for young people to have
a greater voice and stake in the rebirth of the
city. We see the opportunity for grant partners
and other stakeholders to apply capacities they
now have in new ways. We see the opportunity
for funders to share information and collaborate
toward mutual goals.
We do not take lightly the challenges that still
face young people in this community, and we
are mindful of the fragility of institutions serving them. True revitalization for the city of
Detroit will be measured by whether children
do better and are connected to its recovery. We
are thinking about these things as we shape the
foundation’s strategic direction. We have reason
to be optimistic about the future.
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BT: How can readers learn more?
MC: Lots of information from our analytic
review will be released throughout 2017. This has
really been a massive effort, and we are publishing analyses as well as dialogue with evaluators,
residents, grant partners, and community allies.
We invite everyone to visit www.skillman.org/
GNI.

Marie Colombo, (M.A.), is director of evaluation and
learning at the Skillman Foundation. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marie Colombo,
Skillman Foundation, 100 Talon Centre Dr., Suite 100,
Detroit, MI 48207 (email: mcolombo@skillman.org).
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Exiting is a Natural Part of Philanthropy —
Learning From it? Not so Much.
By Debra Joy Perez, Ph.D.

The purpose of this commentary is to share
my personal reflections on what makes exiting
from long-term philanthropic investments so
challenging.1
As a funder, I took part in the design, implementation and evaluation of dozens of major initiatives
and programs. I also called grantees and key partners to deliver the news of an exit. These were
never easy conversations, but with each one, I
learned so much about the exit process.
There are many reasons for exiting; among
them are changes in leadership, strategy,
resources, program staff expertise and/or performance. Success and achieving the intended
impact could also be a reason to exit. Regardless
of the “why” and the “how” of exiting, philosophies or approaches are rarely shared among
funders and thus are poorly understood. This
special issue details a number of case studies
about exits including a review of multiple foundation strategy and initiative case studies. Each
case describes different explanations for exiting and tactical approaches used to effectively
implement the exit.

philosophy for your own foundation. There is
no “one size fits all” approach. As I reviewed
the articles in this special issue, I was struck by
the variations in lessons. However, each case
unequivocally elevates one common theme —
the importance of communicating the rationale
and approach for exiting to grantees, staff, and
key stakeholders. Specifically, when it comes
to exiting, funders must communicate consistently, constantly, and collaboratively. This is
not an uncommon finding from prior studies
(Petrovich, 2013).
In 2009, I engaged a consultant (Janice Petrovich)
to conduct a review of how well the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation had implemented
an unplanned reduction in payout. The reduction was not a planned exit. It was a necessary
reduction in payout due to a huge loss in our
endowment resulting from a worldwide economic crisis. In just over a year, the foundation’s
endowment fell from $10 billion to $7.7 billion.
Needless to say, those were very trying times
for many foundations and its grantees. Some

Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is currently conducting an internal review of programmatic exits. The study is still
underway so rather than provide any premature assessment of the findings, I will focus on my experience as a foundation
senior program officer, researcher, and evaluator for the past 20 years.

1
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Filling a critical field knowledge gap, this monograph provides significant lessons from such
varied experiences leading to the same outcome
— the decision to end/exit a programmatic
investment area. In reviewing the articles, there
is great value in determining what resonates
and fits with your foundation’s approach and

Debra Joy Pérez, Ph.D., is the
chief measurement, evaluation,
and learning officer at the
Gordon and Betty Moore
Foundation in Palo Alto, California.
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foundations and community based organizations
were even forced to close their doors.
While maintaining prior commitments, the
foundation was forced to make substantial cuts
or reductions in its future grant making. Many of
our grantees and partners understood and even
empathized with the economic situation leading
to the reductions. In fact, many were most appreciative of the direct and frank communication
provided by the foundation and its president.
While we were going through the reduction, we
also wanted to learn as much as we could during
the process. In fact, while appreciating that the
crisis of 2008 may not repeat itself to the same
magnitude, we thought we could apply lessons
from the downturn to explore how we could
be more intentional and explicit about future
programmatic transitions. Thus, building on lessons from the 2009 Budget Reduction Study, the
foundation commissioned a study on responsible
exiting. The 2010 study, also by Janice Petrovich,
Exiting Responsibly: Best Donor Practices in Ending
Field Support (Exit Study) included interviews
with foundation grantees and staff as well as
senior leaders from 30 foundations and grantee
organizations. While the Budget Reduction
Study was retrospective, the purpose of the Exit
Study was prospective and intended to result in
lessons about effective donor practices that could
be translated into guiding principles for exiting.
Those effective practices are:
• Use various forms of communications to
inform field actors clearly, early and often.
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• Involve the foundation’s chief executive in
the communications with the field.
• Ensure that all foundation staff is informed
of the field exit and able to respond effectively to questions from grantees and their
field.
• Invite questions from field actors regarding
the exit, and involve them in assessing their
impact on the transitioning field.
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• Publicize the successes, needs and opportunities of the field and its grantees,
stakeholders and partners.
• Involve field advocates in determining their
capacity-building needs going forward and
provide support for these opportunities.
• Attract other donors into the field by signaling continued interest through matching
and tie-off grants.
Variations on any one of these tactical practices
are included among the seven articles in this
special issue. Yet, the decision to stay or go has
as many emotional implications as it has tactical implications for funders, grantees, and key
partners. For those of us who have made the
shift from responsive grant maker to strategic
philanthropy, frank and authentic conversations
about when we leave a body of work are complex. In strategic philanthropy, we see ourselves
as thought partners and build relationships of
trust and make long-term commitments. So,
when a decision is made to leave, we may experience every gamut of emotion common in any
break up — betrayal, abandonment, and the grief
of losing a long-time friend and/or family member. Indeed, to some degree, exiting can result
in stages of grief and loss — denial and isolation,
anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.

Denial and Isolation
There is enormous privilege and power in
philanthropy. Twenty years ago, my first boss in
philanthropy warned me of the false sense of confidence and wisdom that befalls new entrants into
the world of philanthropy. Let’s face it, as soon
as you become a foundation staffer you become
more attractive, funnier and often deferred to as
if you were the smartest person in the room (in
case you are wondering, you are not).
So when we exit (i.e., de-fund) a program, it not
only feels like a loss, it is a blow to our confidence and our ego. When our programs end,
it is as if part of our identity is gone. We deny,
deny, deny, “This can’t be happening.” We hide
from the facts and try to make up for what
might be perceived as a programmatic failure.

Exiting is a Natural Part of Philanthropy

One form of denial is conjuring up a way to
“spin” the narrative about why we are exiting. It
might also result in trying to reinvent the exiting
program into a new idea or position it as if it has
a new purpose and relevance for the new strategy. This means using the same grantee to do
new work even at the cost of mission drift for the
grantee. Grantees and the non-profit leaders that
support them are also in mourning and feel and
enormous sense of loss and abandonment.

Anger
Grantees are rarely the chief engineers of programmatic exits. Usually, they fall victim to
changes in foundation leadership, strategy, policy environment or economic situation. And
no organization wants to lose a good funding
partner. When a closely foundation-identified
program is slated for exit, we become protective of our grantees and the fields in which they
work. We begin to exhibit a hyper-sensitivity
to any criticism of our grantee efforts. We are
more empathetic to the errors and challenges of
our beloved ending programs. We ask, “who is
to blame?” and rationalize our anger by comparing our program to others that are not exiting.
Why me?

Bargaining

easily known as Debra as I was known as the
program officer of New Connections, or Finding
Answers, or Expanding the Bench Initiative.
When an exit is imminent, we mourn the loss
of friends (family) and affiliations, and lose our
internal and external influence. We even lose
a bit of our own identities. We realize that we
are not the smartest people in the room and are
losing power.

Acceptance
Only at the point of exit certainty, can we implement best donor practices. We can honor the
work, celebrate our grantees and partners, begin
to codify the lessons, and plan for a healthy
exit. We may need to spend more time with our
grantees and the field to provide support and
strategize on messaging, make introductions to
other prospective funders, or just sit in silence
and comfort each other. Whatever the motivation, at this stage authentic conversations about
sustainability and legacy begin to take shape.

Depression

Conclusion

Too often, our identities as program funders are
tied to our program grantees and their success.
Our internal and external identities are synonymous with our created program. We become
known for our program affiliation. I was just as

In my experience, too often funders and grantees fail to acknowledge that exiting is a part
of the investment life cycle. As a result, they
also fail to discuss the realities of it and the
importance and value of exiting. As in any
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The incentives in any foundation program are
to keep investing and growing the program.
There is often little incentive to reduce program investments unless otherwise dictated by
the senior leadership or board. Any reduction
to the budget is perceived as a cut; any cut perceived as a failure or at minimum, depreciation
in value. So, we try to explain to ourselves and
others just why ending a program is a bad idea.
Perhaps we blame ourselves or someone else,
but we mostly try to bargain as much as we can
and rethink the exit or make the transition as
painless as possible.

[T]oo often funders and
grantees fail to acknowledge
that exiting is a part of the
investment life cycle. As
a result, they also fail to
discuss the realities of it and
the importance and value of
exiting. As in any relationship,
these pain points are key to our
growth and learning.
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relationship, these pain points are key to our
growth and learning.
Foundations prize relationships with close-in
partners, but they should not get twisted about
why they funded the grantee in the first place.
Grantees are leaders and are not blind to the
difficult choices and tradeoffs made by funders.
We should respect them enough to speak the
truth and acknowledge the natural exit process.
Grantees have their own sense of privilege and
power from being selected by philanthropy.
I know this sounds odd but I would like to propose, at the risk of offending, that exiting is
healthy and a necessary evil for strategic philanthropy. Why? We learn (or could learn) so much
about our investment, a grantee, and a field
when they are undergoing a strategic exit. Exits
are a good opportunity to document progress,
how the grantee and/or partners contributed to
the field, their innovation, how they improved
over time, and any lasting impact. By being frank
about the intention to exit and by providing a
timeline, we help level the playing field for grantees. They can be more proactive in their own
planning and approach to sustainability.
Breaking up is hard, but leaving one relationship
makes room for new opportunities. We could
learn more as philanthropists if we embraced
foundation exits as a healthy part of an initiative life cycle. As stewards of private resources,
we have a responsibility to ask ourselves what
else can we do to reach our goal. Did we do all
we could? Is our impact significant enough? Is it
time to look elsewhere to see where impact can
be greater?
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I once heard a mindfulness podcast describing
loss as an opportunity for new growth. What
if we allowed ourselves to see how responsible
exits lead to new beginnings and an opportunity
for growth and innovation — not only for the
funder but also for the grantee?
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Although time-bound philanthropic initiatives are a well-established practice, there is still
much to learn about effective ways to implement, evaluate, and wind down these types of
investments. This article describes the NSI evaluation, how the findings informed Hewlett’s
philanthropic approach, and provides a case example of a philanthropic-initiative exit. Key
considerations for monitoring and evaluation practices particular to the context of a planned
exit are discussed.
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Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in Northern Ireland supported three thematic intervention
areas: aging; children and young people; and reconciliation and human rights. Its exit strategy
has involved a formal partnership arrangement with the Northern Ireland Assembly to take
external interventions to scale and mainstream services previously funded through NGOs.
This article draws on qualitative data gathered through interviews with key stakeholders
— the funder, government officials, and NGOs — and considers the consequences of this
approach. It also offers specific and general lessons on partnering with government as an
exit strategy.

Tools
40

Evaluation at Sunset: Considerations When Evaluating a Program as
It Concludes
Blair Beadnell, Ph.D., Holly Carmichael Djang, M.A., Jan Vanslyke, Ph.D., and Tatiana Masters, Ph.D.,
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While the benefits of beginning evaluation efforts at a program’s inception are well known,
for a variety of reasons many organizations are unable to do so and instead begin these efforts
closer to a program’s conclusion. A sunset evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s School
Food Initiative showed positive outcomes and provided recommendations for organizations
interested in similar efforts. Because the evaluation was begun as the foundation was
spending down, it required creative design approaches. This article uses the evaluation
as a case example of a rigorous and useful sunset evaluation, and discusses other possible
extensions of these methods.
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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
Barbara Kibbe, J.D., S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation

Funding relationships begin, and they end. Yet little is known about the effects of foundation
exits on the work, the grantees, and the related fields. This article draws on interviews with
funders and grantees involved in more than a dozen exits to fill the gaps in what is known
about how to exit well. The article discusses four areas where foundation exits present
particular challenges and where there are significant opportunities to improve practice —
deciding on and planning to exit, funder leadership, clear communication, and final grants —
and includes summaries of advice from funder and grantee perspectives.
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Hanh Cao Yu, Ph.D., and Moninder-Mona K. Jhawar, M.P.H., The California Endowment, and
Daniela Berman, M.P.P., Social Policy Research Associates

This article shares insights and lessons from a research project commissioned by The
California Endowment in early 2016 to inform the planning for its transition out of Building
Healthy Communities. A guiding framework for exit and sustainability planning is presented
as a set of recommendations that relate to issues such as managing relationships between
funder and grantee partners during the exit, using the initiative’s theory of change as a
tool for decision-making, finding a balance between demonstrable success and equity, and
managing the internal processes of the funding organization.
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Few, if any, of the problems philanthropy seeks to address can be solved within a brief,
defined time frame. Limited-life foundations can only strive to move the ball down the field
before they sunset, and then enlist others to carry the work forward. This article shares the
emerging hypotheses of two foundations, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel,
Jr. Foundation — each four years from sunset — about the opportunities and challenges for
evaluation in the limited-life context. The article argues that systematically capturing and
sharing knowledge — about programs, as well as social-change methods and grantmaking
practices — can increase a foundation’s influence and impact during its final years and beyond.
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Good Neighborhoods Initiative
How did a hometown grantmaker conduct and conclude its largest-ever initiative?

In 2006, the Skillman Foundation committed $100 million to a decade-long investment in
six neighborhoods. Along the way, the foundation reset its strategy and sharpened its goal
— in response to seismic shifts in the local context and informed by indicators of progress.
To capture information on the unique challenges facing an embedded funder as it changes
program direction, Bob Tobin, senior consultant at Williams Group, interviewed Marie
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The author shares personal reflections on what makes exiting from long-term philanthropic
investments so challenging.
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Abstracts of up to 250 words are being solicited for Volume 10, Issue 1 of
The Foundation Review. This issue will be an open (unthemed) issue. Papers on
any topic relevant to organized philanthropy are invited.
Submit abstracts to submissions@foundationreview.org by May 30, 2017. If a full
paper is invited, it will be due September 15, 2017 for consideration for publication
in March 2018.
Abstracts are solicited in four categories:
• Results. Papers in this category generally report on findings from evaluations of foundation-funded work. Papers should include a description of
the theory of change (logic model, program theory), a description of the
grant-making strategy, the evaluation methodology, the results, and discussion. The discussion should focus on what has been learned both about
the programmatic content and about grantmaking and other foundation
roles (convening, etc.).
• Tools. Papers in this category should describe tools useful for foundation staff or boards. By “tool” we mean a systematic, replicable method
intended for a specific purpose. For example, a protocol to assess community readiness for a giving circle would be considered a tool. The actual
tool should be included in the article where practical. The paper should
describe the rationale for the tool, how it was developed, and available
evidence of its usefulness.
• Sector. Papers in this category address issues that confront the philanthropic sector as whole, such as diversity, accountability, etc. These are
typically empirically based; literature reviews are also considered.
• Reflective Practice. The reflective practice articles rely on the knowledge and experience of the authors, rather than on formal evaluation
methods or designs. In these cases, it is because of their perspective about
broader issues, rather than specific initiatives, that the article is valuable.
Book Reviews: The Foundation Review publishes reviews of relevant books.
Please contact the editor to discuss submitting a review. Reviewers must be free of
conflicts of interest.
Questions? Contact Teri Behrens, editor of The Foundation Review, at
behrenst@foundationreview.org or call 734-646-2874.
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